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TARGETING IN OUTER SPACE:
AN EXPLORATION OF REGIME INTERACTIONS IN
THE FINAL FRONTIER
CAITLYN GEORGESON*
MATTHEW STUBBS**

ABSTRACT
Space infrastructure is now integral to both civilian life and
warfare. Belligerents may find great military advantage in destroying a satellite in orbit, but this could have grave consequences for civilians on earth and create long-lasting space
debris. This Article identifies the applicable law by harmonizing
international humanitarian law, human rights law, and international space law. The Authors conclude that targeting a satellite
in armed conflict will be permissible only as a measure of last
resort, not of first response.
I. INTRODUCTION
SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE HAS shaped the modern world,
becoming increasingly integrated into many facets of both
civilian life and modern warfare.1 Civilians rely on satellites for
everyday activities including communication (whether for voice,
data, television, or radio); navigation (from mobile telephones
to aircraft and ships); and financial systems (which are dependent on timing provided by satellite position, navigation, and
timing systems, such as Global Positioning System (GPS)).2 Mili-
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1 See Sarah M. Mountin, The Legality and Implications of International Interference
with Commercial Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 101, 109–14
(2014).
2 See Dale Stephens & Cassandra Steer, Conflicts in Space: International Humanitarian Law and Its Application to Space Warfare, 40 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 71, 90–91
(2015); What is Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT)?, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP.
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taries are also dependent on satellites for communication, navigation, situational awareness, and munitions guidance.3
Yet, increased reliance on space systems also increases vulnerability. During wartime, belligerents are likely to attempt to deny
an adversary’s connection to space—particularly if their reliance
on space assets is high.4 Further, space assets such as satellites
are “soft” targets due to their relative vulnerability: satellites (1)
are generally unshielded; (2) often have predictable, traceable
orbits; (3) have limited ability to maneuver to avoid attack; (4)
are few enough in number that their destruction could have significant impacts; and (5) are not easily replaceable due to the
expense and time involved.5 Moreover, many satellites of military value are likely to be dual-use, also providing a range of
services to civilians.6
As an example, it is entirely possible that one satellite in low
Earth orbit (LEO) might provide critical positioning information to a State’s armed forces but also be used to coordinate
civilian disaster relief activities. In any consideration of targeting
the satellite, the impacts on civilians will have to be taken into
account (in this example, potential civilian deaths due to the
disruption of disaster relief activities).7 Further, should the satellite be attacked by an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT), it will also be
important to consider that debris created by the interception
could remain in orbit for up to a century, making orbits that
intersect with the debris field dangerous to use.8
The increasing militarization of outer space has prompted significant academic discussion on the legal regulation of military
space activities.9 It also coincides with contentious proposals led
(June 13, 2017), https://www.transportation.gov/pnt/what-positioning-navigation-and-timing-pnt [perma.cc/NJQ6-9PLH].
3 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 75.
4 Matteo Frigoli, Wild Military Operations in Outer Space: A Sword of Damocles
Hanging over the Future of Space Environment and Space Activities, in A FRESH VIEW ON
THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 49, 53 (Annette Froehlich ed., 2018).
5 Id. at 53–54; Kimberly Brinson, How Satellites Avoid Attacks and Space Junk
While Circling the Earth, FORBES (July 2, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2018/07/02/how-satellites-avoid-attacks-and-space-junk-while-circling-theearth/?sh=72c989b1596a [perma.cc/ACJ9-2WNE].
6 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 89–90.
7 Id. at 91.
8 Id. at 76.
9 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space,
10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 89 (2006); Dale Stephens, The International Legal
Implications of Military Space Operations: Examining the Interplay between International
Humanitarian Law and the Outer Space Legal Regime, 94 INT’L L. STUD. 75 (2018);
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by Russia and China for a new treaty addressing the placement
of weapons in outer space,10 as well as multiple proposals for a
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.11 Of course, outer
space is not a legal vacuum—there is a body of international
space law (ISL) which applies, in addition to other legal regimes.12 Of particular importance for understanding the legal
regulation of military activities in outer space are three overlapping regimes: ISL, international humanitarian law (IHL), and
international human rights law (IHRL). There are important
questions yet to be fully explored regarding how these legal regimes will interact in the context of targeting satellites in an international armed conflict.

Kubo Mac̆ák, Silent War: Applicability of the Jus in Bello to Military Space Operations,
94 INT’L L. STUD. 1 (2018); Stephens & Steer, supra note 2; Steven Freeland, The
Laws of War in Outer Space, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE SECURITY 81 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl,
Peter L. Hays, Jana Robinson, Denis Moura & Christina Giannopapa eds., 2015);
Frans von der Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 29
(Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
10 Draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space
and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects,” in letter dated
Feb. 12, 2008, from the Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Rep. of China Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on
Disarmament, U.N. Doc. CD/1839 (Feb. 29, 2008); Updated Draft “Treaty on the
Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or
Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects,” in letter dated June 10, 2014, from
the Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Rep. of China
Addressed to the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament,
U.N. Doc. CD/1985 (June 12, 2014); see also Analysis of a Draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, or the Threat or Use of
Force Against Outer Space Objects,” in letter dated Aug. 19, 2008 from the Permanent Rep. of the U.S. Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament, U.N. Doc. CD/1847 (Aug. 26, 2008); Fabio Tronchetti & Liu
Hao, The 2014 Updated Draft PPWT: Hitting the Spot or Missing the Mark?, 33 SPACE
POL’Y 38 (2015).
11 E.g., Council of the European Union, International Code of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities, Draft, Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/
archives/docs/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_
draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf [perma.cc/5JVQ-3T3U]; see also generally Jack
M. Beard, Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 335 (2017).
12 “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance
with international law. . . .” Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. III, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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In existing scholarship in this area, the interface between IHL
and ISL has been the primary focus.13 Comparatively, the relationship between IHRL and ISL has been considered to a lesser
extent,14 and the triangular relationship between ISL, IHL, and
IHRL has not been examined by any previous study.
Historically, IHL and IHRL were viewed as divergent bodies
of law, applying in wartime and peacetime respectively.15 The
convergence of IHL and IHRL is now commonly recognized by
international bodies and legal scholars, and IHRL is regarded as
applying both in peacetime and in situations of armed conflict.16 Both regimes protect the fundamental principle of humanity and both contain provisions governing the use of force
against persons and objects.17 When the use of force has a connection to outer space, the provisions of ISL will also apply.18
See sources cited supra note 9.
See, e.g., Steven Freeland & Ram S. Jakhu, The Intersection between Space Law
and International Human Rights Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 225
(Ram S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2017) [hereinafter Freeland &
Jakhu, The Intersection between Space Law and International Human Rights Law];
Steven Freeland & Ram Jakhu, What’s Human Rights Got to Do with Outer Space?
Everything!, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 365
(Rafael Moro-Aguilar, P.J. Blount & Tanja Masson-Zwaan eds., 2015); Irmgard
Marboe, Human Rights Consideration for Space Activities, in IN HEAVEN AS ON EARTH?
THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE REGULATION OF OUTER
SPACE 135 (Stephan Hobe & Steven Freeland eds., 2013).
15 See, e.g., Noëlle Quénivet, Introduction: The History of the Relationship Between
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 6–7 (Roberta Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008) (quoting G.I.A.D.
Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 1979 ACTA JURIDICA 193, 205
(1979)).
16 See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106
(July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 216–17 (Dec. 19); Hum. Rts. Comm.,
General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13 (May 26, 2004); THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
12 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
17 See infra Parts II–III.
18 IHL “applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the
past, those of the present and those of the future.” Legality of Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 86. The International Committee of the Red Cross
has explicitly stated that “any hostile use of outer space in armed conflict . . .
must comply with IHL, in particular its rules of distinction, proportionality and
precautions in attack.” Weapons: ICRC Statement to the United Nations, 2015, INT’L
13
14
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This Article examines the laws applicable to the targeting of a
satellite, including the relevant provisions of ISL, the IHL rules
applicable in an international armed conflict, and the IHRL
right to life.19 Relevant provisions of IHL, IHRL, and ISL will be
examined in Parts II, III, and IV respectively. Part V will outline
interpretative approaches to reconciling these provisions. Part
VI will present a proposal for the reconciliation of IHRL and
ISL norms with the IHL that primarily governs situations of
armed conflict in outer space using the interpretive tools of lex
specialis and harmonization.
II.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Two fundamental principles—military necessity and humanity—form the foundation of IHL.20 These principles are set out,
both explicitly and implicitly, in the 1907 Hague Regulations,21
the 1949 Geneva Conventions,22 and their Additional Protocol I
(API).23 Military necessity, at its most rudimentary level, is the
principle that allows belligerent parties lawfully to kill and injure
persons, and to damage and destroy property.24 The principle
requires any action undertaken during an international armed
conflict (IAC) to be justified as necessary to achieve a discerniCOMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/
weapons-icrc-statement-united-nations-2015 [perma.cc/3Y9U-GV75].
19 Other IHRL rules might also be relevant in particular circumstances, but the
right to life is examined here as it is likely to be the most important in the context of targeting a satellite.
20 See sources cited infra notes 21–23.
21 See, e.g., Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
opened for signature Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
22 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field arts. 10, 12, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
23 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
pmbl., arts. 1–2, opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
API].
24 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 84.
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ble military advantage.25 On the other hand, the principle of
humanity seeks to mitigate the effects of war on civilians and
combatants.26 The principle dictates that unnecessary measures
of military violence are forbidden.27 The tension between military necessity and humanity plays out in the further guiding
principles of IHL—namely, distinction, proportionality, precaution, and constant care.28 IHL also contains rules aimed at protecting the environment in armed conflicts.29 Each of these
principles is discussed below, as is their application in the space
environment.
A.

DISTINCTION

The principle of distinction is set out in Article 48 of API,
which requires parties to an IAC to “at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives,” and to “direct their
operations only against military objectives.”30 Characterization
of an object as a “military objective” is therefore critical to the
legitimacy of targeting.
A test for determining whether something is a military objective is provided in Article 52(2) of API.
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.31
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNAARMED CONFLICT 103 (3d ed. 2016).
26 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, supra note 22.
27 Waldemar A. Solf, Article 35, in NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 192, 195 (1982).
28 See infra Sections II.A–D.
29 See infra Section II.E
30 API, supra note 23, art. 48. This requirement, otherwise known as the “basic
rule,” has been recognized as an expression of customary international law. See
Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
¶ 79 (July 8); Partial Award Regarding Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and
Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26 (Eri. v. Eth.), PCA
Case Repository No. 2001-02 (2006); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 11 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
31 API, supra note 23, art. 52(2).
25

TIONAL

2020]

TARGETING IN OUTER SPACE

615

This definition is widely accepted as an expression of customary
international law,32 though its abstract, nonprescriptive nature
has led to considerable debate regarding the scope of its
application.33
In essence, Article 52(2) creates a two-part test, namely, that
an object must: (1) make an effective contribution to military
action due to its nature, location, purpose, or use; and (2) offer
a definite military advantage through its total or partial
destruction.34
1.

“Nature, Location, Purpose or Use”

The “nature” of an object means it must be directly used by
armed forces.35 Scholars suggest that, in the space environment,
this definition includes any satellite used by military forces,
whether for a military purpose or otherwise.36
“Location” means that objects, by mere virtue of their location, can be deemed to make an effective contribution to military action.37 In traditional forms of warfare, such an object
could be an important mountain pass, trail, or bridge.38 In the
space environment, Schmitt notes that “[p]erhaps the singlemost distinguishing characteristic of space is its location.”39 Indeed, by virtue of location, space “constitutes a lucrative military
objective.”40 Accordingly, a civilian satellite in close proximity to
a military satellite may be a legitimate target if an attack against
the satellite would affect a military need, or if a belligerent
could place space debris into a particular orbit to deprive the
enemy of the use of that orbit at a particular moment.41
“Purpose” refers to the intended future use of an object, while
“use” refers to its present function.42 While the present use of a
32 Partial Award Regarding Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims,
Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, PCA Case Repository No. 2001-02,
¶¶ 112–13; see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 30, at 29.
33 See DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 103.
34 API, supra note 23, art. 52(2).
35 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 2020
(Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
36 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 88–89; Schmitt, supra note 9, at 116.
37 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 35, ¶ 2021.
38 See DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 115–16.
39 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 117.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 89; Schmitt, supra note 9, at 117.
42 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 35, ¶ 2022.
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satellite may be relatively easy to determine, the future intended
use of a space object is particularly difficult to establish.43 In the
space domain, it is often difficult to amass sufficient intelligence
to establish intent because intended uses of objects are often
communicated deceptively, if communicated at all.44 Further,
space systems may be immediately converted to military use by
little more than the programming of a satellite to handle military data.45 The combination of these factors creates a highly
uncertain environment in which to ascertain the purpose of a
space object. In fact, the intended use of a space object may not
become clear until the object is actually in use. Importantly, in
this context, where there is doubt about intended use, an object
must be presumed to have a civilian purpose.46
2.

“Definite Military Advantage”

Once an object is shown to make an effective contribution to
military action, the second step of the cumulative test is to determine whether its destruction would offer a “definite military advantage.”47 Scholars suggest that a definite military advantage
must be a “concrete and perceptible military advantage,”48
based on sufficient information,49 and directly or indirectly logically related to a weakening of enemy forces.50 However, the
shifting nature of armed conflicts means that objects that offer a
definite military advantage at one moment may cease to do so
shortly thereafter, making it “[im]possible to have a class of target.”51 For example, in the space environment, the location of a
space object may shift, the use or ownership of a satellite may
change or be transferred, or circumstances could change such
that the destruction of an object no longer offers a definite military advantage.52 Accordingly, Dinstein suggests that an apStephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 89.
Id.
45 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 117.
46 API, supra note 23, art. 52(3); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 35,
¶ 2022.
47 API, supra note 23, art. 52(2).
48 Waldermar A. Solf, Article 52, in NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, supra note 27, at 318, 326.
49 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 35, ¶ 2024.
50 IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 61 (2009).
51 Id. at 48 (quoting Françoise J. Hampson, Proportionality and Necessity in the
Gulf Conflict, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 45, 49 (1992)).
52 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 89.
43
44
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praisal of military advantage must necessarily consider the
background of the circumstances prevailing at the time; the definition of targetable military objects is therefore “relativized.”53
3.

Dual-Use Targets

Dual-use objects are objects that serve both military and civilian purposes.54 Such objects further complicate the concept of a
“military objective.” For the purpose of distinction, all dual-use
objects are classified as military objectives, irrespective of any
use for civilian purposes.55 However, simply because a dual-use
object is a military objective does not mean it is targetable56—
the civilian component of a dual-use object must be taken into
consideration before an attack is carried out against it, using the
requirements of proportionality, precautions, and constant care,
which are discussed below.57
A significant number of space objects are dual-use.58 Some
have gone so far as to say that “[a]ll space technologies are inherently dual-use.”59 For example, dual-use satellites might carry
transponders capable of handling the needs of military and civilian users simultaneously or interchangeably; alternatively, a
dual-use satellite might host separate military and civilian payloads.60 Perhaps most famously, the primary Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS), GPS, is used for both military and civilian applications.61 Thus, the satellites that guide military aircraft
will often be the same ones that guide a civilian’s car.62
4.

Summary—Distinction

In sum, IHL’s principle of distinction requires that parties to
an IAC distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants,
53 DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 107 (quoting GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE
1945, at 272 (1994)).
54 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 116.
55 MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (2014). For a discussion on the principle of distinction in relation to dual-use space objects see Schmitt, supra note 9, at 116.
56 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 116.
57 See Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 87–91; infra Sections II.B–D.
58 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 118 (“Many space systems are used for both civilian
and military purposes.”).
59 G. Ryan Faith, The Future of Space: Trouble on the Final Frontier, 175 WORLD
AFFS., Sept. / Oct. 2012, at 82, 84.
60 See Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 90–91.
61 Id. at 95.
62 Faith, supra note 59, at 84.
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and between “civilian objects and military objectives.”63 Military
objectives are those that: (1) through their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action;
and (2) offer a definite military advantage through their destruction.64 For the purpose of distinction, all dual-use objects
are classified as military objectives, irrespective of any use for
civilian purposes.65
A satellite that is used by a State’s military forces for positioning information, for example, could be regarded as making an
effective contribution to military action either through its military “nature” or, more likely, through its current “use.”66 Further, the destruction of such a satellite would offer a definite
military advantage by temporarily disrupting the provision of
critical positioning information to that State’s armed forces.67
The fact that a satellite is used for both military and civilian purposes does not prevent it from being classified as a military objective for the purposes of IHL.68
B.

PROPORTIONALITY

The identification of a military objective does not mean that
an attack against it will be lawful; rather, for an attack to be lawful it must also comply with other rules of IHL and the principle
of proportionality in particular.69 This principle, recognized as
customary in nature,70 is considered to be the “central pillar of
robust civilian protection” from military attacks during wartime.71 For an attack to be proportionate, Article 51(5) of API
states that it must not cause excessive incidental damage to civilians or civilian objects, as measured against the anticipated concrete and direct overall military advantage.72 It is commonly
accepted that “military advantage” refers to the advantage anticipated from an attack considered as a whole, and not only in
respect of isolated parts of the attack.73
API, supra note 23, art. 48.
Id. art. 52(2).
65 ROSCINI, supra note 55, at 185.
66 See supra Section II.A.3.
67 See supra Section II.A.2.
68 ROSCINI, supra note 55, at 185.
69 See Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 84, 88, 90; Schmitt, supra note 9, at 84,
88, 90.
70 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 30, at 46.
71 DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 153.
72 API, supra note 23, art. 51(5); see also id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii), (2)(b).
73 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 30, at 49–50.
63
64
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An attacker must therefore identify foreseeable collateral
damage,74 and then evaluate such damage against the military
advantage anticipated as a result of the attack. The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has described this
standard as follows: “In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably wellinformed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator,
making reasonable use of the information available to him or
her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result
from the attack.”75 Therefore, any determination of lawfulness is
necessarily a balancing exercise, though the process of balancing the “dissimilar considerations”76 of anticipated military advantage and incidental civilian losses is “so complicated, needs
to take into account such a huge amount of data and so many
factors, that any attempt to design a formula which is both comprehensive and precise would be ridiculous.”77
Notably, civilian damage that is “extensive” may not be “excessive” under Article 51(5)(b) when compared to the anticipated
concrete and direct military advantage.78 As noted above, no
formula for “excessiveness” can be applied to determine proportionality; each determination must take into account the facts of
that specific situation.
74 The notion of “foreseeability” is present in a number of State military manuals. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 261–62, 366 (2016); 1
GOV’T OF SPAIN, ORIANTACIONES: EL DERECHO DE LOS CONFLICTOS ARMADOS [ORIENTATIONS: THE RIGHT OF ARMED CONFLICTS] ¶¶ 2.5.a, 4.3 (1996); PRESIDENTE DE
LA REPUBLICA [PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERU], REGLAMENTO DEL DECRETO
LEGISLATIVO NO. 1095 [REGULATION OF LEGISLATIVE DECREE NO. 1095] art. 7(5)
(2010); DANISH MINISTRY OF DEF., MILITARY MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW RELEVANT TO DANISH ARMED FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 308, 311–12
(2016); U.K., THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶
5.33.4 (2004); NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF DEF., MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 1.27, 2.34 (2013).
75 Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 58 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
76 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 94 (citing DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 158).
77 Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 16, at 198. Notably, there is a strand of
scholarship that considers the two sides of the proportionality balance to be incommensurable. See, e.g., Janina Dill, Oxford University, Panel Discussion: Interpretative Complexity and the International Humanitarian Law Principle of
Proportionality, in 108 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 81, 83 (2017). Dill commented
on the principle of proportionality. Id. In addition to Dill, the panel comprised
Daniel Cahen, International Committee of the Red Cross; Yoram Dinstein, Tel
Aviv University; Sandesh Sivakumaran, University of Nottingham. Id.
78 DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 156.
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Proportionality in the Outer Space Environment

The prevalence of dual-use space objects, as discussed above,
means that an attack against a space object will likely result in
indirect effects on aspects of the object used for civilian purposes.79 For example, an attack against a dual-use satellite could
disrupt GNSS signals used for civilian aviation, financial transactions, telecommunications, or dams.80 As noted by Schmitt,
“[t]here is absolutely no doubt that loss of the GPS signal would
place civilian lives and property at great risk.”81 Thus, although a
space object’s dual-use nature means it is a military objective, it
may also mean that incidental civilian loss is much more likely to
occur as a result of an attack against it.82 Therefore, proportionality is likely to be a major consideration in all cases.
2.

Summary—Proportionality

In sum, for an attack to be proportionate it must not cause
excessive incidental damage to civilians or civilian objects, as
measured against the anticipated concrete and direct overall
military advantage.83 Consequently, an attacker must identify
foreseeable collateral damage and evaluate such damage against
the military advantage anticipated as a result of the attack.84 Proportionality is likely to be a major consideration in attacks
against dual-use satellites due to the high likelihood of significant incidental civilian loss.85
C.

PRECAUTIONS

A further requirement under IHL is that belligerents shall
take precautions to spare civilians and civilian objects during the
conduct of military operations.86 This principle is reflected in
customary international law.87
Schmitt, supra note 9, at 118.
Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 91.
81 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 120.
82 Jack Beard, The Principle of Proportionality in an Era of High Technology, in 1
COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF
MODERN WARFARE 261, 284 (Christopher M. Ford & Winston S. Williams eds.,
2019).
83 API, supra note 23, art. 51(5).
84 See sources cited supra note 74.
85 See supra Section II.B.
86 API, supra note 23, art. 57(1).
87 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 35, ¶ 2191; INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, supra note 30, at 51; Partial Award Regarding Western Front, Aerial
Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26
79
80
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Choice of Means and Methods

In line with this principle, Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of API states
that belligerents who plan an attack must: “Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a
view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”88 Belligerents are therefore required to consider carefully
the precision and range of weapons and munitions, in order to
minimize civilian losses.89
2.

Precautions in the Outer Space Environment

The requirement to take precautions has “particular
resonance within the space domain” due to its unique characteristics as compared to terrestrial domains.90 Of primary concern
is the creation of considerable debris fields upon the destruction of a space object.91 The orbital lifetime of a space object,
such as debris, “depends on how strongly it is affected by atmospheric drag.”92 Physicist David Wright notes that debris could
have a lifetime of weeks orbiting at 300 kilometers (km), a year
at 500 km, and several decades at 700 km; specifically, “[i]f a
satellite destroyed by an ASAT weapon were orbiting at an altitude above about 800 km, then a large fraction of the debris
particles created in the collision would remain in orbit for decades or longer.”93 The adverse effects of this scenario are suitably demonstrated by the infamous destruction of a weather
satellite by China in 2007.94 China used an ASAT to destroy an
aging weather satellite known as Fengyun-1C (FY-1C) at an altitude of 863 km,95 within the range of orbital altitude known as
LEO.96 The destruction of FY-1C created more than 3,000 pieces
of space debris, accounting for almost half of all known and
(Eri. v. Eth.), PCA Case Repository No. 2001-02, ¶ 142 (2006) (recognizing the
principle in § IX(B)(2)).
88 API, supra note 23, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
89 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 35, ¶ 2200.
90 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 99.
91 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 120.
92 David Wright, Space Debris, 60 PHYSICS TODAY 35, 39 (2007).
93 Id.
94 Brian Weeden, 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet, SECURE WORLD
FOUND. (Nov. 23, 2010), https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_
sheet_updated_2012.pdf [perma.cc/7LL5-C43F].
95 Id.
96 Types of Orbits, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.esa.int/
Our_Activities/Space_Transportation/Types_of_orbits [perma.cc/5FGB-R4SV].
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tracked satellite debris currently in LEO—79% of which will remain in orbit until approximately 2108.97
Thus, due to the certainty that debris fields will be created by
kinetic space attacks, the principle of precautions may require
belligerents to avoid such attacks by first using other non-space
attacks, such as a terrestrial kinetic attack on command and control facilities. As Schmitt noted, “if a satellite can be reliably neutralized through a strike on a ground-based control node in a
remote area, it would not be permissible to attack the satellite
kinetically and thereby create dangerous space debris.”98
If non-space attacks will not result in a comparable military
advantage, incremental approaches to space attacks would be required. For example, where “soft kill”99 means of satellite attack
(such as a cyberattack against a computer network) are feasible,
it is likely that there is a legal obligation to use soft kill means,
rather than kinetic means of attack to minimize incidental damage.100 Both the United States and the United Kingdom (UK)
generally employ incremental approaches to military space operations: deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and then
destruction.101
3.

Summary—Precautions

The precautions principle requires that belligerents take all
feasible precautions in choosing means and methods of attack
with a view to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental
damage to civilians or civilian objects in the conduct of military
operations.102 Due to the certainty that debris fields will be created by kinetic space attacks, the principle of precautions may
require belligerents to avoid such attacks by first using other
non-space attacks, such as a terrestrial kinetic attack on command and control facilities, where such attack is a feasible alterWeeden, supra note 94.
Schmitt, supra note 9, at 121. Of course, attacks on ground stations may have
civilian consequences, and may be seen as a more direct affront to territorial
sovereignty, and these are matters regulated by international law—but they are
not the focus of this Article.
99 For descriptions of “soft kill” technologies, see Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 27 (2000);
Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 78–79.
100 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 120–21; Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 101.
101 See Schmitt, supra note 9, at 119; WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, CONFLICT LAW: THE
INFLUENCE OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMERGING ACTORS
125 n.130 (2014).
102 API, supra note 23, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
97
98
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native.103 If non-space attacks will not result in a comparable
military advantage, incremental approaches to space attacks
through escalating means such as deception, disruption, denial,
degradation and, finally, destruction, may be used.104
D.

CONSTANT CARE

A further requirement of IHL is constant care. Article 57(1)
of API requires that “[i]n the conduct of military operations,
constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”105 A similar obligation exists at customary international law.106 This obligation requires that
impacts on the civilian population be considered and minimized (as much as possible) at all stages of the planning and
execution of military operations so that there are no unnecessary negative consequences for the civilian population.107
This obligation supplements the requirements of distinction,
proportionality, and precautions,108 imposing a duty of taking
constant care to spare the civilian population even in the conduct of attacks which meet those three sets of requirements.109
In the outer space context, one important consequence of the
rule of constant care is that adverse impacts on civilians will have
to be considered even if they might not have sufficient proximity to be taken into account in the proportionality analysis.
In any attack on a satellite, the rule of constant care would
require that, at all stages of the planning and execution of the
attack, (1) the impact on the civilian population (even those effects that may not be required as part of the formal proportionality analysis) be expressly considered; and (2) care be taken to
spare the civilian population any deprivations that are unnecessary to the achievement of legitimate military objectives.
E.

ENVIRONMENT

In addition to the principal IHL rules on targeting addressed
above, considerations of the space environment are also relevant. Environmental considerations are, in fact, directly relevant
See supra Section II.C.2.
Id.
105 API, supra note 23, art. 57(1).
106 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 30, at 51.
107 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE
ERATIONS 476–77 (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017).
108 See supra Sections II.A–C.
109 API, supra note 23, art. 57.
103
104

TO

CYBER OP-
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to targeting. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held,
“[r]espect for the environment is one of the elements that go to
assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles
of necessity and proportionality.”110 However, IHL also contains
freestanding environmental obligations on belligerents to protect the natural environment during armed conflict.111 Article
35(3) of API provides that “[i]t is prohibited to employ methods
or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment,”112 and Article 55(1) requires that:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the
health or survival of the population.113

Scholars note that the “conjunctive nature” (widespread, longterm, and severe) of these obligations establishes a high threshold for breach, requiring environmental damage to be “exceptionally serious.”114 While API Articles 35(3) and 55(1) do not
expressly apply to outer space, their application to the space environment “would be a logical deductive conclusion.”115 Indeed,
the group of experts who authored the recent Oslo Manual on
Select Topics of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oslo Manual)
agreed that “in the conduct of Outer Space operations [Article
35(3)] should be applied by analogy.”116 Moreover, the United
Nations (UN) Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
110 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 30 (July 8); see also Michel Bourbonnière, Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or Ius in Bello Satellitis, 9 J. CONFLICT &
SEC. L. 43, 63 (2004).
111 See API, supra note 23, arts. 35(3), 55(1).
112 Id. arts. 35(3), 55(1).
113 Id. art. 55(1). The International Committee of the Red Cross takes the view
that these rules have, since the time of their adoption, come to represent customary international law (except with respect to certain persistent objectors). INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 30, at 151–54; see also G.A. Res. 47/37,
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict (Feb. 9, 1993); Johan
D. van der Vyver, The Environment: State Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Armed Conflict, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 85, 98–103 (2009).
114 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, supra note 107, at 539.
115 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 80.
116 YORAM DINSTEIN & ARNE WILLY DAHL, OSLO MANUAL ON SELECT TOPICS OF
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 13 (2020).
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Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
(ENMOD)117 prohibits military use of hostile environmental
modification techniques that cause “widespread, long-lasting or
severe effects.”118 “Environmental modification techniques” include “any technique for changing . . . the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere,
hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.”119
Although limited relevant State practice120 indicates that kinetic destruction of satellites (in non-armed conflict situations)
has not yet been considered through the lens of either Articles
35(3) or 55(1) of API, or under ENMOD,121 the widespread,
long-lasting, and severe effects of space debris are evident,122
and States should consider these effects when planning kinetic
attacks against space objects.
F.

SUMMARY: IHL REQUIREMENTS

FOR

TARGETING

A

SATELLITE

This Part has outlined the principal IHL rules relevant to attacks on satellites: (1) distinction; (2) proportionality; (3) precautions; (4) constant care; and (5) protection of the
environment.123
The IHL principle of distinction mandates that attacks may
only be conducted against military objectives124—objects that,
through “their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action.”125 As has been shown, military objectives in the space environment include any satellite
used by military forces,126 including all dual-use objects.127 Furthermore, destruction of an object must offer a definite military
advantage128—a concrete and perceptible advantage based on
117 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1976, 31
U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 17119.
118 Id. art. 1(1).
119 Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
120 See supra Section II.C.2 (destruction of satellite FY-1C); supra Section V.A
(destruction of satellites USA-193 and Microsat-R).
121 Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 9, at 331, 344–45.
122 See Wright, supra note 92, at 39.
123 See supra Part II.
124 API, supra note 23, art. 48.
125 Id. art. 52(2).
126 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 88–89; Schmitt, supra note 9, at 116.
127 ROSCINI, supra note 55, at 185; DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 120.
128 API, supra note 23, art. 52(2).
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sufficient information under the circumstances prevailing at the
time.129
To be lawful under IHL, attacks against military objectives
must comply with the principles of proportionality, precautions,
and constant care.130 The principle of proportionality mandates
that States must assess the potential impacts on the civilian population as a result of the destruction of a military objective.131 As
has been established, the kinetic destruction of a space object
will often result in the creation of a considerable debris field.132
Furthermore, attacks against dual-use space objects will likely result in indirect negative effects on civilians on Earth.133 Thus,
proportionality is likely to be a major consideration in all attacks
against space objects.
Further, this Part has established that States must take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
to avoid incidental harm to civilians.134 This requirement is significant within the space environment due to the certainty that
space debris will be created upon the kinetic destruction of a
space object.135 Thus, if terrestrial attacks are feasible and will
result in a comparable military advantage, they should be used.
If not, incremental approaches to space attacks should be used.
Similar considerations arise from the requirement that constant
care be taken to spare the civilian population, which requires
ongoing action to avoid unnecessary harm to civilians arising
from the pursuit of military objectives.136
Additionally, it has been shown that IHL separately obligates
States to protect the outer space environment during armed
conflict.137 This protection includes a prohibition against methods or means of warfare that may be expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural
environment and therefore negatively affect the civilian
population.138
129 Solf, supra note 48, at 326; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 35, ¶
2024; DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 107.
130 See supra Sections II.B–D.
131 API, supra note 23, arts. 51(5), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).
132 Wright, supra note 92, at 36; see supra Section II.B.
133 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 118; see supra Section II.B.
134 API, supra note 23, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
135 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 120; see supra Section II.C.
136 See supra Section II.D.
137 See API, supra note 23, art. 35(3); see also supra Section II.E.
138 API, supra note 23, art. 35(3).
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To return to the example of a dual-use satellite noted above,
the satellite will likely be found to make an effective contribution to military action due to its use, making it a “military objective.”139 The dual-use nature of the satellite does not preclude its
classification as a military objective.140 However, the civilian
component of the satellite must be taken into consideration—
using the proportionality, precautions, and constant care principles—before an attack is carried out against it.141 With regard to
proportionality, the likelihood of civilian losses must be weighed
against the anticipated military advantage.142 Further, the precautions principle requires consideration of the inherent civilian consequences of destroying the satellite.143 Due to the
certainty that debris fields will be created by successful kinetic
space attacks, a State would be required first to consider other
non-space attacks, such as a terrestrial kinetic attack on command and control facilities.144 If non-space attacks will not result
in a comparable military advantage, a State would be required to
consider a soft-kill attack, or, if this option is not feasible, incremental approaches to space attacks of deception, disruption, denial, and degradation before, finally, destruction may be
considered.145
Finally, a State is required to take care to protect the outer
space environment against widespread, long-term, and severe
damage.146 There is, as yet, no State practice to further illuminate how the kinetic destruction of a satellite in an IAC would
measure up against this requirement under IHL.147 However, it
is clear that attacks at the most serious end of the spectrum
could well raise environmental issues under IHL.148
In sum, IHL does not prohibit attacks against satellites if they
qualify as military objectives. But the principles of proportionality, precautions, and constant care—and the prohibition of causing widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the outer
space environment—are likely to (1) reduce significantly the
circumstances in which a kinetic attack on a satellite will be law139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

See supra Section II.A.3.
ROSCINI, supra note 55, at 185.
See supra Sections II.A–D.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
Id.
Id.
API, supra note 23, arts. 35(3), 55(1).
See supra Section II.E.
Id.
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ful; and (2) require the consideration and employment of alternative means and methods, and alternative targets, in many
instances. While IHL itself therefore does not prohibit kinetic
attacks on satellites where military necessity may demand them,
applying IHL’s rules that are protective of humanity will, in
practice, significantly constrain the ability of States to lawfully
target satellites if—as is highly likely in most instances—there
will be significant civilian consequences of such an attack.
III.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The previous Part investigated the IHL approach to uses of
force. This Part examines relevant IHRL. It should be noted that
while IHL inherently covers death as well as injury and damage,149 IHRL deals with these consequences separately. For the
purpose of this Article, only the IHRL right to life will be examined, as loss of life is the most serious consequence that may
result from an attack on a satellite.
A.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

IHRL instruments apply only to those within the “jurisdiction”
of the acting State.150 However, jurisdiction is broader than the
literal concept of the national territorial boundaries of a
State.151 The extraterritorial application of IHRL has been accepted by the ICJ,152 the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR),153 and the Human Rights Committee (HRC),154 alSee supra Part II.
See sources cited infra notes 152–154. However, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights appears to establish a limitless obligation on contracting States to recognize and give effect to the human rights set out in therein.
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 1, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
58.
151 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 152-54.
152 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 111 (July 9) (providing
that “[i]n conclusion, the Court considers that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the
exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.”).
153 See, e.g., Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶¶ 137–38.
The ECtHR held that
[i]t is clear that, whenever the State, through its agents, exercises
control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the
State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention
[for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms]
149
150
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though the scope of its application remains subject to debate. In
particular, IHRL obligations will extend beyond a State’s territory in situations where that State exercises “power or effective
control”155 over territory or individuals. For example, a State
may be in effective control of a foreign territory if its armed
forces exercise effective control over the territory.156 Regarding
personal jurisdiction, a State may be in effective control over an
individual if that individual is physically in the power of the
State, such as individuals who are detained by the State.157
Accordingly, a preliminary question regarding the applicability of IHRL obligations to the targeting of a satellite is whether
the affected individuals are within the jurisdiction of the attacking State. As the ECtHR recognized in Drozd and Janousek v.
Spain and France,158 a State’s “responsibility can be involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their
own territory.”159 Of course, the ECtHR’s controversial decision
in Bankovic v. Belgium excluded extraterritorial jurisdiction over
an air strike.160 However, in many subsequent instances, the

Id.
154

Id.

that are relevant to the situation of that individual. . . . Another
exception to the principle that jurisdiction under Article 1 is limited to a State’s own territory occurs when, as a consequence of
lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State exercises effective control of an area outside that national territory.
See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 16, ¶ 10.
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and
to ensure the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant)] rights to all persons who may be within their
territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means
that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of
that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
Party. . . . This principle also applies to those within the power or
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national
contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.

155 Id. For consideration of this concept under the ECHR, see Al-Skeini, 2011-IV
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 130–40.
156 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 112.
157 See, e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep.
482, 517 (1976); Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 ¶ 91.
158 Drozd v. Spain, 240 Eur Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
159 Id. ¶ 91.
160 Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 ¶¶ 74–76.
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ECHR has been held to apply extraterritorially where military
forces are in effective control of territory or persons.161
In addition to the range of cases in recent years dealing with
effective control over persons, two recent pronouncements have
heralded an expanded application of States’ human rights obligations. In 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued its Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human
Rights, holding that individuals outside the territory of a State
would nonetheless be within the jurisdiction of that State if they
were harmed by activities carried on within the State if the State
“exercises effective control over the activities that caused the
damage and the consequent human rights violation.”162 In 2018,
the HRC issued its General Comment 36; in addressing the
question of the extraterritorial application of the right to life in
Article 6 of the ICCPR, the HRC concluded:
[A] State party has an obligation to respect and to ensure the
rights under article 6 of all persons who are within its territory
and all persons subject to its jurisdiction, that is, all persons over
whose enjoyment of the right to life it exercises power or effective control. This includes persons located outside any territory
effectively controlled by the State, whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in a direct and
reasonably foreseeable manner.163
161 See, e.g., Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305 ¶ 86; AlSkeini v United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99 ¶ 149; Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶ 76. Earlier cases reached the same result. See, e.g.,
Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 64
(1995); Cyprus, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 517.
162 Environment and Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, ¶ 104 (Nov. 15, 2017). Similarly, the Advisory Opinion
states that “persons whose rights have been violated are under the jurisdiction of
the State of origin, if there is a causal link between the act that originated in its
territory and the infringement of the human rights of persons outside its territory.” Id. ¶ 101. See also Christopher Campbell-Duruflé & Sumudu Anopama
Atapattu, The Inter-American Court’s Environment and Human Rights Advisory
Opinion: Implications for International Climate Law, 8 CLIMATE L. 321, 333–34
(2018); Angeliki Papantoniou, Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human
Rights, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 460, 461–62 (2018); Antal Berkes, A New Extraterritorial
Jurisdictional Link Recognised by the IACtHR, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 28, 2018), https://
www.ejiltalk.org/a-new-extraterritorial-jurisdictional-link-recognised-by-theiacthr/ [perma.cc/E2CW-KFRV]; Giovanny Vega-Barbosa & Lorraine Aboagye,
Human Rights and The Protection of the Environment: The Advisory Opinion of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.ejil
talk.org/human-rights-and-the-protection-of-the-environment-the-advisory-opinion-of-the-inter-american-court-of-human-rights/ [perma.cc/F56P-GG3B].
163 Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
GC/36, (Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No.
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According to this approach, human rights obligations exist with
respect to persons over whose life a State “exercises power,” including those “impacted by its military or other activities in a
direct and reasonably foreseeable manner.”164 The application
of these tests to the targeting of a satellite confirms that affected
individuals might come within the jurisdiction of a State attacking a satellite and thus attract the protection of IHRL. Accordingly, the discussion turns to address the content of the right to
life that these affected persons would enjoy.
B.

ELEMENTS

OF THE

RIGHT

TO

LIFE

The right to life is commonly regarded as one of the most
fundamental human rights.165 It is customary in nature,166 and
all international human rights treaties recognize the right to
life, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)167 and the European Convention on Human
36] (references omitted). See also Daniel Møgster, Towards Universality: Activities
Impacting the Enjoyment of the Right to Life and the Extraterritorial Application of the
ICCPR, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/towards-universality-activities-impacting-the-enjoyment-of-the-right-to-life-and-the-extraterritorialapplication-of-the-iccpr/ [perma.cc/SQ7L-JFXL]; Shaheed Fatima, Targeted Killing and the Right to Life: A Structural Framework, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/62485/targeted-killing-life-structural-framework/
[perma.cc/62A8-JFXP]; Ryan Goodman, Christof Heyns & Yuval Shany, Human
Rights, Deprivation of Life and National Security: Q&A with Christof Heyns and Yuval
Shany on General Comment 36, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/62467/human-life-national-security-qa-christof-heyns-yuval-shany-generalcomment-36/ [perma.cc/7HCU-PJ37]. This builds on the HRC’s 1981 holding
that a State’s human rights obligations can extend to acts “which its agents commit upon the territory of another State.” Hum. Rts. Comm., Lilian Celiberti de
Casariego v. Uru., Commc’n No. 56/1979, ¶ 10.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/
1979 (July 29, 1981).
164 Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36, supra note 163, ¶ 63.
165 It should be noted that, although it is commonly understood that some
human rights may be derogated from during times of public emergency, this is
not applicable to the IHRL prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life, which is
non-derogable. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 4, 6,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, T.I.A.S. No. 92-908, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 15, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
ECHR]. ECHR Article 15(2) states that the right to life is non-derogable except in
relation to deaths resulting from lawful act of war. Id. art. 15(2). At present, this
exception has not been relied upon by European States.
166 See, e.g., Quénivet, supra note 15, at 331; ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO
LIFE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 91 (2010); Jessica Lynn Corsi, Drone Deaths Violate Human Rights: The Applicability of the ICCPR to Civilian Deaths Caused by Drones,
6 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 205, 210 (2017).
167 ICCPR, supra note 165, art. 6.
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Rights (ECHR).168 The HRC, the body that monitors implementation of the ICCPR, considers the right to life to be “the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted.”169
Article 6 of the ICCPR provides that “[e]very human being
has the inherent right to life. . . . No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of [their] life.”170 Similarly, Article 2 of the ECHR
states that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law.
No one shall be deprived of [their] life intentionally save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following [their] conviction
of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”171 Unlike
the ICCPR, the ECHR also sets out the following permitted exceptions to the right to life:
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is
no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape
of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot
or insurrection.172

An extensive body of jurisprudence and soft law has developed
the scope of the right to life in IHRL. Four key principles have
been established: (1) necessity; (2) proportionality; (3) a precautionary procedural element; and (4) the requirement to
hold an ex post facto investigation. Each of these principles is
discussed in turn by reference to relevant jurisprudence.
1.

Necessity

Deprivation of life will be arbitrary when the force used exceeds that which is absolutely necessary for the achievement of a
legitimate aim.173 As such, Article 2(2) of the ECHR permits the
deprivation of life if it “results from the use of force which is no
more than absolutely necessary” for the achievement of one or
ECHR, supra note 165, art. 2(1).
Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Sept. 3, 2019).
170 ICCPR, supra note 165, art. 6(1).
171 ECHR, supra note 165, art. 2(1).
172 Id. art. 2(2).
173 NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (Vaughan
Lowe ed., 2008). The ECtHR has equated the term “absolutely necessary” with
“indispensable.” See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 48
(1976).
168
169
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more of the permitted aims set out in Article 2(2) Sections
(a)–(c): (1) defense from unlawful violence; (2) to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
or (3) in action lawfully taken to quell a riot or insurrection.174
In McCann v. United Kingdom,175 the ECtHR found that the
principle of necessity in the context of the right to life under
IHRL “must be strictly construed.”176 The court found that the
test of “absolute necessity,” which applies to the right to life, is
“stricter and more compelling” than the test of “necessary in a
democratic society,” which applies to the protection of other
human rights in Articles 8–11 of the ECHR.177
An assessment of the absolute necessity required to justify lethal force under IHRL comprises two sub-questions: (1)
“[C]ould other measures be employed to reach one of the aims”
pursued? And (2) “if no other measures are available, is it absolutely necessary to use lethal force, or could some lesser degree
of force be employed?”178
In sum, the principle of necessity under IHRL dictates that
lethal force may only be used in circumstances of strict or “absolute necessity” as a last resort, in order to pursue a legitimate
aim.
2.

Proportionality

The IHRL principles of proportionality and necessity are
strongly related. As stated by the ECtHR in Güleç v. Turkey,179 “a
balance must be struck between the aim pursued and the means
employed to achieve it.”180 Hence, the amount of force used by
a State must be “strictly proportionate” to the achievement of
the legitimate aim pursued.181 In Stewart v United Kingdom,182 the
European Commission on Human Rights set out the following
considerations for determining whether a use of force is strictly
proportionate:
ECHR, supra note 165, art. 2(2)(a)–(c).
McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
176 Id. ¶ 147.
177 Id. ¶ 149.
178 ROLAND OTTO, TARGETED KILLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH SPECIAL
REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (2012).
179 Güleç v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1698.
180 Id. ¶ 71.
181 McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 149, aff’d, Tanli v. Turkey, 2001-III
Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, ¶ 140.
182 Stewart v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10044/82, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 453
(1985).
174
175

634

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

In assessing whether the use of force is strictly proportionate, regard must be had to the nature of the aim pursued, the dangers to life
and limb inherent in the situation and the degree of the risk that the force
employed might result in loss of life. The Commission’s examination
must have due regard to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the deprivation of life.183

3.

Precautions

Although the requirement to take precautions when contemplating the use of lethal force is not explicitly referred to in
IHRL treaties, it has been implied in IHRL jurisprudence. The
ECtHR in McCann identified the requirement of precaution
when it found that assessments of Article 2 violations must take
into consideration not only the actions of those who administer
force but also “all the surrounding circumstances including such
matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination.”184 In particular, the ECtHR found that operations must
be “planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimize,
to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force.”185 The
ECtHR affirmed this approach in Andronicou v. Cyprus,186 adding
that actors must take precautions that are “reasonable in the circumstances”187 to ensure they are not negligent in their choice
of action. Additionally, in Isayeva and Others v. Russia,188 the
ECtHR specified information that would assist the court in determining whether an operation has been sufficiently planned
and executed: (1) a plan of the operation; (2) information as to
how the operation had been planned; (3) assessments of perceived threats and constraints; (4) what other weapons or tactics
had been at the State’s disposal; and (5) assessments and prevention of possible harm to civilians who might have been in the
vicinity of the legitimate target(s).189 The requirement to take
precautions cannot impose an unrealistic or impossible burden
on authorities;190 however, authorities are expected to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that intelligence assess183 Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis added), aff’d, Wolfgram v. Federal Republic of Germany,
App. No. 11257/84, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548, 549 (1986).
184 McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). ¶ 150.
185 Id. ¶ 194.
186 Andronicou v. Cyprus, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 491 (1997).
187 Id. ¶ 183.
188 Isayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00, ¶ 175 (Feb. 24,
2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68379 [perma.cc/H86H-L4A4].
189 Id. ¶ 175.
190 McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 200.
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ments of the relevant situation may be wholly or partially
incorrect.191
4.

Effective Investigation

In the event that a life is lost, there is a positive obligation on
States to undertake an effective and independent investigation.192 As stated by the ECtHR in McCann v. United Kingdom, “a
general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the
State would be ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by
State authorities.”193 This requirement has been confirmed in a
number of HRC decisions;194 moreover, investigations must be
adequate in the circumstances.195 The requirements for an effective investigation set out in ECHR jurisprudence are:
(1) Authorities must act sua sponte—it cannot be left to the
next of kin to take responsibility for the conduct of any
investigative procedures.196
(2) Persons responsible for carrying out the investigation
must be “independent from those implicated in the
events.”197
(3) The investigation must be effective—that is, it must be
“capable of leading to a determination.”198 This does not
obligate investigating authorities to reach a result.199
Rather, they must have taken “reasonable steps available
to them” to secure relevant evidence, including eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and—where appropriate—an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate
record of injury and an objective finding of cause of
death.200
Id. ¶¶ 213–14.
Kelly v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30054/96, ¶¶ 94–98 (May 4, 2001),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59453 [perma.cc/A6JQ-XBPY].
193 McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 161.
194 See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Baboeram v. Suriname, Commc’n No. 146/
1983, ¶ 14.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/24/D/146/1983 (Apr. 4, 1985).
195 Hum. Rts. Comm., Rubio v. Colom., Commc’n No. 161/1983, ¶ 10.3, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/31/D/161/1983 (Nov. 2, 1987).
196 Kelly, App. No. 30054/96, ¶ 94.
197 Id. ¶ 95.
198 Id. ¶ 96.
199 Id.
200 Id.
191
192
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(4) The inquiry must be prompt and reasonably
expeditious.201
(5) There must be a “sufficient element of public scrutiny” of
the investigation and its results.202
(6) The victim’s next of kin must be involved “to the extent
necessary to safeguard [their] legitimate interests.”203
With respect to cases of armed conflict, the court in Kaya v. Turkey found that the prevalence of armed conflict or a high incidence of fatalities does not displace the obligation to ensure
effective, independent investigations into killings.204 In fact, the
requirement is arguably heightened in instances where the circumstances of a death are unclear.205 Similarly, the Al-Skeini case
concerned exclusively the question of the application of the effective investigation requirement in an international armed
conflict.206
Hence, in instances where individuals are deprived of life,
States are obligated to undertake effective ex post facto investigations. To be effective, investigations must be thorough,
prompt, and impartial. Additionally, authorities must act sua
sponte, and the family of the deceased must be involved in the
investigative process. Relevantly, the existence of an armed conflict does not displace these obligations.
C.

IHRL SUMMARY

This Part outlined the IHRL principles relevant to the targeting of a satellite: necessity, proportionality, precautions, and investigation. As has been established, a use of force that results in
deprivation of life will be permitted under IHRL if it complies
with the aforementioned principles.
Under IHRL, lethal force must be “absolutely necessary” to
maintain, restore, or impose law and order in the circumstances207—a stricter standard than force necessary to achieve
legitimate aims such as national security, territorial integrity,
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

101.

Id. ¶ 97.
Id. ¶ 98.
Id.
Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, ¶¶ 91, 108–09.
See id. ¶ 104.
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶ 168–77.
ECHR, supra note 165, art. 2(2)(a)–(c); see also MELZER, supra note 173, at

2020]

TARGETING IN OUTER SPACE

637

and public safety.208 Further, the amount of force used must be
“strictly proportionate” to the achievement of the aim pursued209 and have regard for the nature of the legitimate aim, the
dangers to life inherent in the situation, and the risk that the
use of force might result in loss of life.210 The precautions principle requires States to plan and control operations so as to minimize recourse to lethal force,211 including undertaking
sufficient planning in advance of an attack to demonstrate that
risks to civilians have been identified and minimized.212 Finally,
in instances where individuals are deprived of life, States are obligated to undertake effective ex post facto investigations.213
The purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that the IHRL
standards and tests can or should be applied in full to a loss of
life in an armed conflict scenario. Parts V and VI of this Article
will examine the extent to which these principles of IHRL are
capable of being applied in an IAC. For now, the point is to
demonstrate how IHRL would approach the question of
whether the right to life was violated if individuals were killed as
a result of targeting a satellite.
In order to be lawful under IHRL, the destruction of a satellite must be absolutely necessary to achieve one of the aims set
out in ECHR Article 2(2).214 Two potential issues arise: (1)
whether this strict standard of necessity is met; and (2) whether
the aim of disabling a portion of an adversary State’s military
positioning systems is sufficiently connected to an acceptable
justification such as defense against unlawful violence.215 Moreover, interruption of the positioning system must be strictly proportional to the likelihood of civilian deaths.216 The principle of
proportionality under IHRL sets a high threshold, fundamentally seeking to avoid loss of civilian life.217 These requirements
See McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 149 (1995).
Id., aff’d, Tanli v. Turkey, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, ¶ 140.
210 Stewart v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10044/82, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 453 ¶ 19
(1985).
211 McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 194.
212 Isayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00, ¶ 175 (Feb. 24,
2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68379 [perma.cc/H86H-L4A4].
213 See McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 161; Hum. Rts. Comm., Baboeram
v. Suriname, Commc’n No. 161/1983, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/31/D/161/1983
(Apr. 4, 1985).
214 See ECHR, supra note 165, art. 2(2); supra Sections III.A–B.1.
215 See supra Section III.B.1.
216 See supra Section III.B.2.
217 Id.
208
209
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are supplemented by the precautions principle, which requires a
State to plan and control the operation in a way that will minimize recourse to lethal force.218 Although there are similarities
with the IHL tests, which will be further examined in Parts V
and VI of this Article, it is obvious that IHRL imposes a very high
standard to justify any civilian deaths that might result from the
targeting of a satellite.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW

Having considered relevant IHL and IHRL rules, this Part will
now outline the ISL rules applicable to the targeting of a satellite—specifically, ISL rules relevant to the creation of space debris. A kinetic attack against a satellite will undoubtedly cause an
environmental threat in outer space, creating a sizeable and hazardous field of debris.219 Mountin describes the effects of a kinetic attack against a satellite as follows:
A single collision can be catastrophic. Such an event, involving
sufficiently large objects and satellites, can produce hundreds of
thousands of fragments, which, depending on the orbit, can trigger other collisions, thereby causing a cascade of subsequent collisions. Put another way, not only is there a prompt and pervasive
debris environment, but also additional collisions with that debris imperil space objects and make orbits completely unusable,
especially if debris continues to collect indefinitely.220

As established in Part II, IHL will take this into account through
its principles of proportionality, precautions in attack, and constant care.221 IHRL will also take debris into account under proportionality and precautions principles.222 However, for a more
complete understanding of the legal considerations that relate
to the creation of space debris, ISL must be considered.
ISL is regulated by five multilateral treaties.223 Of these treaties, the Outer Space Treaty forms the basic legal framework of
See supra Section III.B.3.
See Wright, supra note 92, at 37; Space Debris from Anti-Satellite Weapons,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Apr. 2008), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/debris-in-brief-factsheet.pdf [perma.cc/NNE2-G8N4].
220 Mountin, supra note 1, at 116.
221 See supra Sections II.B–D.
222 See supra Sections II.B.2–3.
223 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; Convention on Registration
218
219
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ISL and provides the most relevant regulatory regime for military activities in outer space.224 As such, Outer Space Treaty provisions relevant to debris creation will now be examined.
A.

OUTER SPACE TREATY

All military space activities carried out by State parties to the
Outer Space Treaty must be guided by the principle of non-contamination—specifically, Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty
mandates that States must “pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful
contamination.”225
The Outer Space Treaty does not define “harmful contamination”—or the related concept of “harmful interference.”226
However, having assessed Article 9 using treaty interpretation
consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,227 Mineiro posits “that harmful contamination of outer
space is the introduction of elements that make outer space unfit for use or are likely to be injurious to users of outer space.”228
The Cologne Commentary on Space Law explicitly states that
“space debris are a form of harmful contamination.”229 However, States are not prohibited from harmfully contaminating
outer space; they are merely obligated to avoid harmful contamination.230 It is particularly difficult to determine satisfactory
avoidance of harmful contamination because the Outer Space
Treaty, while requiring “appropriate international consultations” in the case of apprehended “harmful interference,” is silent in regard to the situations and manner in which such
consultations are to occur, and there is no body that could proof Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363
U.N.T.S. 3.
224 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12.
225 Id. art. 9.
226 See generally id.
227 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
228 Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal Obligations Under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321, 339
(2008).
229 Sergio Marchisio, Article IX, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 169,
177 (Stephen Hobe, Berhard Schmidt-Tedd, Kai-Uwe Schrogl & Gerardine
Meishan Goh eds., 2009).
230 Mineiro, supra note 228, at 340.
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vide an authoritative evaluation.231 Thus, the threshold for an
avoidable degree of “harmful contamination” is likely to be established primarily by future State practice.232
Nevertheless, it is clear that a major source of contamination
of the outer space environment is space debris.233 Space debris
is defined by the European Space Agency (ESA) as “all nonfunctional, human-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering into Earth’s atmosphere.”234 As of February 2020, there were approximately 34,000
debris objects larger than 10 centimeters (cm), 900,000 thousand debris objects from 1 cm–10 cm, and 128 million debris
objects from .1 cm–1 cm orbiting the Earth.235 As highlighted in
Part II, debris caused by the kinetic destruction of a space object
could remain in orbit for decades or even centuries.236
Three relevant instances of State practice should be considered here: the 2007 destruction of satellite FY-1C by China,237
the 2008 destruction of satellite USA-193 by the United States,238
and the 2019 destruction of satellite Microsat-R by India.239
These actions are the foremost examples of State practice in relation to Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty and are relevant to
considerations of harmful contamination.
As discussed in Part II, the Chinese destruction of FY-1C introduced more than 3,000 pieces of satellite debris into LEO—almost half of all traceable debris currently in LEO—most of
which will remain in the outer space environment for up to a
century.240 This debris has significantly modified the LEO and
Id. at 348, 351.
Id. at 352.
233 See Space Debris by the Numbers, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Feb. 2020), https://
www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers
[perma.cc/AT8B-C7DN].
234 Space Debris: Frequently Asked Questions, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, https://
www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/FAQ_Frequently_
asked_questions [perma.cc/5EDP-FSF5].
235 Space Debris by the Numbers, supra note 233.
236 See supra Part II.
237 Id.
238 U.S. Missile Hits ‘Toxic Satellite’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2008), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7254540.stm [perma.cc/PC9F-Q9KQ].
239 Vasudevan Mukunth, Mission Shakti: India Likely Destroyed Microsat R Satellite
in First ASAT Test, WIRE (Mar. 27, 2019), https://science.thewire.in/space/mission-shakti-india-likely-destroyed-microsat-r-satellite-in-first-asat-test/ [perma.cc/
Q99A-DLBN].
240 Weeden, supra note 94, at 2–3.
231
232
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polar orbit241 environments, making orbits that intersect with
the debris field dangerous to use.242 Given the significant
amount of debris created, Mineiro considers the destruction of
FY-1C to satisfy the test of harmful contamination.243 Relevantly,
the destruction of space objects can be conducted at altitudes
and with positional inclinations that can minimize harmful contamination.244 In the case of FY-1C, it does not appear that there
was any attempt to minimize harmful contamination by modifying the satellite’s orbit so it was outside of the congested LEO.245
Hence, there may be an argument that the Chinese violated the
harmful contamination provision of Article 9.246
In a similar example of State practice, the United States used
an ASAT to destroy an out-of-control satellite, USA-193, in “Operation Burnt Frost.”247 In contrast to the Chinese destruction of
FY-1C, the United States publicly acknowledged that the destruction of the satellite would create harmful contamination in the
form of space debris248 and consequently took measures to destroy the satellite at a low orbit of just below an altitude of 250
km,249 with impact reportedly on a downward angle,250 so as to
minimize the creation and persistence of space debris.251 This is
in line with the general principle that the further into space an
object, including debris, is located, “the longer it will take to
241 Types of Orbits, supra note 96 (“Satellites in polar orbits usually travel past
Earth from north to south rather than from west to east, passing roughly over
Earth’s poles. . . . Polar orbits are a type of low Earth orbit, as they are at low
altitudes between 200 to 1000 km.”).
242 Mineiro, supra note 228, at 347.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 348.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 U.S., USSR Pioneers of Anti-Satellite Weapons Technology, FIN. EXPRESS (Mar 28,
2019), https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/us-ussr-pioneers-of-anti-satellite-weapons-technology/1529826/ [perma.cc/EJ5E-NJQF].
248 U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD News Briefing with Deputy National Security Advisor
Jeffery, Gen. Cartwright and NASA Administrator Griffin (Feb. 14, 2008), in USA-193:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 51, 55 (P.J. Blount & Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz eds.,
2009), http://airandspacelaw.olemiss.edu/pdfs/usa193-selected-documents.pdf
[perma.cc/DU23-3PQU].
249 See NASA Orbital Debris Program Off., Satellite Breakups During First Quarter
of 2008, in USA-193: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 248, at 151, 152.
250 Marco Langbroek, Why India’s ASAT Test Was Reckless, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 30,
2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/why-indias-asat-test-was-reckless/
[perma.cc/34P5-38XD].
251 See U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 248, at 51–53.
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reenter Earth’s atmosphere.”252 In the case of USA-193, the majority of debris re-entered Earth’s atmosphere within an hour of
interception, and the remaining debris was said to be in “shortlived” orbits, re-entering within a matter of months.253 Unlike
Chinese conduct in relation to the destruction of FY-1C, these
actions are considered by Mineiro to be in accordance with the
Article 9 obligation to avoid harmful contamination.254
In a recent example of State practice, in March 2019, India
used an ASAT to destroy a satellite, Microsat-R, in a weapons test
code-named “Mission Shakti.”255 Microsat-R was intercepted at a
low orbit of approximately an altitude of 270 km, similar to the
altitude of USA-193 at destruction.256 In an official statement
post-impact, India stated, “[t]he test was done in the lower atmosphere to ensure that there is no space debris. Whatever debris that is generated will decay and fall back onto the earth
within weeks.”257 Further, an Indian official claimed that the
ASAT hit Microsat-R “head-on . . . to ensure debris would not be
a concern.”258 However, contrary to official statements, scientists
consider that about 50% of tracked debris remained in orbit for
forty-five weeks, and some debris will linger for almost two
years.259 Furthermore, scientists concluded that the ASAT hit
Microsat-R on a “clear upwards angle,” rather than head-on,
which caused debris to travel into a range of higher orbital altitudes of 400 to 2200 km, placing debris into orbital altitudes
more typical for satellites, and above the orbital altitude of the
International Space Station (ISS).260 NASA Administrator Jim
Mountin, supra note 1, at 115.
See NASA Orbital Debris Program Off., supra note 249, at 151–52.
254 See Mineiro, supra note 228, at 354.
255 Mukunth, supra note 239.
256 Vladimir Akhmetov, Vadym Savanevych & Evgen Dikov, Analysis of the Indian ASAT Test on 27 March 2019 (May 22, 2019) (manuscript), https://
arxiv.org/pdf/1905.09659.pdf [perma.cc/MAF6-WPXJ].
257 Frequently Asked Questions on Mission Shakti, India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test
Conducted on 27 March, 2019, GOV’T OF INDIA MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFS. (Mar.
27, 2019), https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31179/Frequently_
Asked_Questions_on_Mission_Shakti_Indias_AntiSatellite_Missile_test_conducted_on_27_March_2019 [perma.cc/N6J6-TTTZ].
258 DRDO Defends ‘Shakti’ Test as Experts Say Indian ASAT Debris ‘Threatens All LEO
Sats’, WIRE (Apr. 6, 2019), https://science.thewire.in/space/drdo-defends-shaktitest-as-experts-say-indian-asat-debris-threatens-all-leo-sats/ [perma.cc/6PH3EWG8].
259 See Langbroek, supra note 250.
260 Id.; Akhmetov et al., supra note 256.
252
253
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Bridenstine said the ASAT test increased the risk of small debris
hitting the ISS by 44%.261
Therefore, debris created by the destruction of Microsat-R is
significantly less, both in quantity and longevity, than debris created by the destruction of FY-1C. Nevertheless, the Indian ASAT
test underscores the complexity associated with minimizing
space debris upon kinetic destruction of a satellite. Although
Microsat-R was destroyed at a low orbit, debris was still ejected
into higher, congested orbits and could remain there for up to
two years.262 Moreover, the spread of the debris was worsened by
the ASAT hitting Microsat-R at an upwards angle, rather than
head-on or on a downward angle.263 Nevertheless, the Indian
ASAT test is almost certainly in accordance with the Article 9
obligation to avoid harmful contamination, given the high
threshold for breach.
In sum, the Outer Space Treaty provides that States must pursue space activities so as to avoid harmful contamination of
outer space, including through the creation of space debris.
State practice indicates States must minimize harmful contamination when planning to kinetically destroy a satellite by intercepting a satellite while in its lowest possible orbit, head-on or at
a downward angle.
B.

DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES

In addition to relevant provisions of the Outer Space Treaty,
space debris mitigation guidelines have been adopted by the UN
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)264
and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC).265 Although these guidelines are not themselves legally
binding, they may well acquire the status of customary international law if sufficient State practice and opinio juris crystallizes
around them.266 The UN General Assembly has endorsed the
261 Helen Regan, India Anti-Satellite Missile Test a ‘Terrible Thing,’ NASA Chief
Says, CNN (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/02/india/nasa-indiaanti-missile-test-intl/index.html [perma.cc/XNT9-6NDM].
262 Akhmetov et al., supra note 256; Langbroek, supra note 250.
263 Akhmetov et al., supra note 256; Langbroek, supra note 250.
264 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Sci. and Tech.
Subcomm. on Its Forty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC/105/890, annex IV
(2007).
265 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm. [IADC], Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01 (Sept. 2007).
266 North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. Ger./Den.; Fed. Rep. Ger./Neth.),
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 4 (Feb. 20).
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COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.267 The intentional destruction of space objects is addressed by UN COPUOS
Guideline 4 as follows:
Recognizing that an increased risk of collision could pose a
threat to space operations, the intentional destruction of any onorbit spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages or other harmful activities that generate long-lived debris should be avoided.
When intentional break-ups are necessary, they should be conducted at sufficiently low altitudes to limit the orbital lifetime of
resulting fragments.268

Similarly, paragraph 5.2.3 of the IADC guidelines states: “Intentional destruction of a spacecraft or orbital stage (self-destruction, intentional collision, etc.), and other harmful activities that
may significantly increase collision risks to other spacecraft and
orbital stages should be avoided. For instance, intentional breakups should be conducted at sufficiently low altitudes so that orbital fragments are short lived.”269
The standard of care that these guidelines set out is demonstrated by the destruction of USA-193. Prior to the engagement
of USA-193, NASA’s then-chief scientist for orbital debris,
Nicholas Johnson, made a presentation on behalf of the United
States to the UN COPUOS to describe the anticipated results of
the engagement.270 The presentation was used to emphasize the
United States’ commitment to the debris mitigation guidelines
and to note that the engagement would take place at a very low
altitude, with more than 99% of debris predicted to re-enter
Earth’s atmosphere within seven days so the operation would be
“fully compliant” with UN COPUOS Guideline 4.271 Further, the
United States stated that the engagement would not significantly
increase collision risks to other spacecraft and orbital stages,
thus also making the engagement “fully compliant” with paragraph 5.2.3 of the IADC guidelines.272
Therefore, the non-binding UN COPUOS debris mitigation
guidelines explicitly state what may be inferred from Article 9 of
267 G.A. Res. 62/217, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, ¶ 26 (Feb. 1, 2008).
268 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 264, annex IV,
guideline 4.
269 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., supra note 265, ¶ 5.2.3.
270 Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Space Debris Assessment for USA-193, in
USA-193: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 248, at 65.
271 Id. at 67–68.
272 Id. at 69.
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the Outer Space Treaty: intentional destruction of space objects
must be avoided wherever possible, and if unavoidable, must be
carried out (where feasible) at a sufficiently low altitude to mitigate debris creation and the harmful contamination of outer
space.
In sum, ISL mandates that all military space activities must be
guided by the principle of non-contamination. Specifically,
States must conduct space activities in a manner so as to avoid
the harmful contamination of outer space,273 including through
the creation of space debris.274 The UN COPUOS and IADC
debris mitigation guidelines explicitly state that the intentional
destruction of a space object that would create long-lived debris
should be avoided.275 However, where destruction is necessary, it
should be conducted at a sufficiently low altitude to limit the
orbital lifetime of space debris.276 State practice has yet to clearly
define the boundaries of a State’s obligations regarding the
avoidance of harmful contamination.277 Where there has been
no attempt to minimize debris creation when destroying a satellite, it is likely that the harmful contamination provision will be
violated.278 In contrast, where measures have been taken to minimize the creation of debris, such as intercepting a satellite
head-on or on a downward angle at a low orbit, a violation is less
likely to be established.279
With regard to the targeting of a satellite in an IAC, ISL requires that a State conduct its operation so as to avoid harmful
contamination of the outer space environment.280 The baseline
response to this principle would be outright avoiding kinetic destruction of the satellite, due to the consequent harmful contamination of the outer space environment. In the alternative, if
the destruction of the satellite is essential, the State should take
all available measures to minimize the creation of space debris.281 In particular, this would include destroying the satellite in
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, art. 9.
Marchisio, supra note 229, at 177.
275 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 264, annex IV,
guideline 4; Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., supra note 265, ¶
5.2.3.
276 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., supra note 265, ¶ 5.2.3.
277 See Mineiro, supra note 228, at 354.
278 Id. at 348.
279 Id. at 354.
280 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, art. 9.
281 The potential relevance of international environmental law is outside the
scope of this Article. However, this conclusion can be supported as an application
273
274
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such a manner as to mitigate the creation of persistent space
debris. However, State practice has yet to clarify whether the soft
law instruments that contain this requirement go so far as to
require a State to abstain from an attack that can only be carried
out at a higher altitude.
V.

RECONCILIATION OF REGIMES

Having identified IHL, IHRL and ISL norms that are relevant
to the targeting of a satellite in an IAC—the law of targeting, the
right to life, and the harmful contamination of outer space—
this Article will now discuss how these norms may be reconciled.
This Part will first outline the law enforcement and conduct of
hostilities paradigms and will compare how relevant principles
are treated under each. Next, the co-application of IHRL and
ISL alongside IHL in times of armed conflict will be established.
The resolution of normative conflict using the lex specialis
maxim and the interpretive process of harmonization will then
be explored.
A.

LAW ENFORCEMENT PARADIGM VS. CONDUCT
PARADIGM

OF

HOSTILITIES

Relevant to this discussion is the tension between two legal
paradigms: (1) the law enforcement paradigm, reflecting IHRL,
and (2) the conduct of hostilities paradigm, reflecting IHL.282
of the precautionary principle, which requires States to seek to avoid environmental degradation—the classic statement of the principle is found in the 1992
Rio de Janeiro Declaration:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, principle 15, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. 1), annex I
(Aug. 12, 1992). This principle has been regarded as representing customary international law. See ARIE TROUWBORST, PRECAUTIONARY RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF
STATES 7 (2006). For examination of the precautionary principle in the context
of international space law, see Paul B. Larsen, Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 295, 297–306 (2006); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL
B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 174, 233, 249, 255 (2d ed. 2018).
282 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE USE OF FORCE IN ARMED CONFLICTS:
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PARADIGMS 1 (Gloria Gaggioli ed., 2013); see also ERIC HENDRIK POUW, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF
COUNTERINSURGENCY: WITH A PARTICULAR FOCUS ON TARGETING AND OPERATIONAL
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Traditionally, the use of force in armed conflict has been regarded as governed by the conduct of hostilities paradigm
where, as detailed in Part II, individuals may be lawfully killed in
pursuit of a military objective—so long as the principles of distinction, proportionality, precautions, and constant care are
complied with.283 Meanwhile, under the law enforcement paradigm, lethal force may be used only in limited circumstances
such as to maintain or restore public security, law, and order—
and only if the principles of necessity, proportionality, and precautions are complied with and an effective ex post facto investigation is carried out.284 Importantly, under the law enforcement
paradigm, lethal force may only be used as a measure of last
resort if lesser forms of force would be insufficient; in the armed
conflict paradigm, combatants may be subject to lethal force in
the first instance, although civilians enjoy protection up to the
point that they may suffer in the proportionate pursuit of lawful
military objectives.285 Evidently, the conduct of hostilities paradigm contemplates the killing of combatants and incidental loss
of civilian lives in circumstances that the law enforcement paradigm does not. The principles demonstrated above—proportionality, necessity, and precautions—are common to both legal
regimes but operate in different ways and have different meanings in each of the two paradigms. Under international law,
there has been considerable debate as to which paradigm
should be applied, even in armed conflict situations.286

DETENTION 333 (2013), https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=1bd1879d-696c4eeb-975e-eefa9c76ea18 [perma.cc/PG7F-WVTK].
283 See supra Part II.
284 See supra Section III.B.
285 See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of
Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL
STUD. 52, 74–84 (2010); Marco Sassòli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 599, 605–16 (2008); Kenneth Watkin, Maintaining Law and Order During
Occupation: Breaking the Normative Chains, 41 ISR. L. REV. 175, 188–92 (2008).
286 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 282, at 4–12; Gloria Gaggioli,
The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Conduct of Hostilities, Law Enforcement, and SelfDefense, in COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE, supra note 82, at 61.
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REGIMES

Co-Application of IHRL and IHL

A growing body of international law confirms that IHRL can
continue to apply during situations of armed conflict, alongside
the provisions of IHL. In 1996, in its advisory opinion, Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,287 the ICJ rejected the submission that the ICCPR applies only during peacetime and that
deprivation of life in armed conflict is solely governed by IHL:
[T]he protection of the [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war,
except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s
life also applies in hostilities.288

This conclusion was affirmed in 2004 in Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,289 where
the ICJ confirmed that “the protection offered by human rights
conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict,”290 and
was further upheld in 2005 in Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo.291 Thus, the ICJ has confirmed the application of IHRL
in situations of armed conflict.
The more difficult question, which is the subject of extended
analysis below, is how the application of IHRL in armed conflict
situations is to work in practice. The 2011 decision of the
ECtHR in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom292 raised this issue starkly
by applying the requirements of IHRL without any consideration of their interaction with IHL rules also applicable to the
situation.293 For many observers, this case represented a water287 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
288 Id. ¶ 25.
289 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
290 Id. ¶ 106.
291 Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 216–217 (Dec. 19).
292 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99.
293 Id. ¶ 163. In a manner almost dismissive of the reality of the armed conflict
situation that prevailed, the ECtHR stated:
While remaining fully aware of this context, the [ECtHR]’s approach must be guided by the knowledge that the object and purpose of the [ECHR] as an instrument for the protection of
individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted
and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.

2020]

TARGETING IN OUTER SPACE

649

shed moment because it threatened that IHL principles might
be displaced by those of IHRL, even in an armed conflict situation. The question of how the two regimes can be applied together, in a manner sensitive to both, will be addressed below.
2.

Co-Application of ISL and IHL

The application of ISL during armed conflict has been considered to a much lesser degree than IHL. Broadly, the ICJ has
stated that IHL “applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds
of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of
the future,”294 which supports the application of IHL to armed
conflict in outer space. More specifically, the International Committee of the Red Cross has stated that “any hostile use of outer
space in armed conflict . . . must comply with IHL, in particular
its rules of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack.”295 Moreover, numerous scholars acknowledge that ISL
continues to operate during times of armed conflict.296 As recently argued by Stephens and Steer, “it would seem certain that
in a time of armed conflict, the [Outer Space Treaty] would
continue to apply.”297
Hence, the applicability of IHRL and ISL to situations of
armed conflict in outer space regulated by IHL has been confirmed. What must consequently be considered is how the coapplication of IHL, IHRL, and ISL provisions can be made to
work in practice. The next Sections first consider the interpretive techniques that may be used to achieve co-application of the
three regimes, before applying these techniques of interpretation to the targeting of a satellite in an international armed
conflict.
3.

Lex Specialis

The maxim lex specialis is a widely accepted technique used to
resolve normative conflicts in international law.298 In essence,
Id. ¶ 162.
294 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 86 (July 8).
295 Weapons: ICRC Statement to the United Nations, 2015, supra note 18.
296 See, e.g., Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 77; see generally Schmitt, supra
note 9; Mac̆ák, supra note 9.
297 Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 83.
298 Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc A/
CN.4/L.682 34 (Apr. 13, 2006).
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the maxim provides that if a matter is regulated by both a general norm and a specific rule, the specific should prevail over
the general.299 Notably, characterization of a treaty as lex specialis
does not require a conflicting treaty to be set aside.300 Rather,
the other instrument “remains ‘in the background,’ controlling
the way the later and more specific rules are being interpreted
and applied.”301 While the lex specialis maxim ostensibly provides
a neat resolution to normative conflict, it is appropriately criticized for being “too absolute.”302 The maxim has been described
as unable “to achieve a full understanding of the applicable legal standards and the nature of the relationship between special
rules.”303 Moreover, a majority of commentators agree that the
principle of lex specialis cannot determine that an entire body of
law can be characterized as being more specific than another
area of law.304 Thus, rather than viewing an entire legal regime
as lex specialis to the entirety of another legal regime, it is more
appropriate to address the relationship between relevant norms
on a case-by-case basis.305 In any event, a norm that is identified
as more general will nevertheless remain relevant to the interpretation of the specific norm, and thus be “allowed to influence ‘from the background’ the interpretation and application
of the prioritized law.”306 The lex specialis maxim may, therefore,
be a useful interpretive technique, but its proper application will
be a complex matter of determining the potential scope for regime interaction in any given situation, not a simple matter of
applying the principles of one regime to the exclusion of others.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31.
301 Id.
302 Id. ¶ 62.
303 Conor McCarthy, Legal Conclusion or Interpretive Process? Lex Specialis and the
Applicability of International Human Rights Standards, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 15, at 101, 103.
304 See, e.g., Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System:
The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 27, 44 (2005); Noam Lubell,
Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
737, 751–53 (2005); Martti Koskenniemi, Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶ 111–12, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L/682 (Apr. 13, 2006); PANOS
MERKOURIS, ARTICLE 31(3)(C) VCLT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION: NORMATIVE SHADOWS IN PLATO’S CAVE 214–17 (2015).
305 See MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES 234 (2011).
306 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 298, ¶ 19.
299
300
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Harmonization

The individual legal regimes of IHL, IHRL, and ISL may be
reconciled through application of the conceptual approach of
harmonization, or systemic integration.307 Harmonization was
examined by the International Law Commission (ILC) in its
study, Fragmentation of International Law,308 and is implicitly recognized in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which provides the following rule of treaty interpretation: “There shall be taken into account, together with
the context . . . [a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”309 This approach is reflected in the Oil Platforms judgment, where the ICJ held that
“[t]he application of [other] relevant rules of international law
. . . forms an integral part of the task of interpretation.”310 This
principle also found expression in Hassan v. United Kingdom,311
where the ECtHR rejected the UK’s argument that, as lex
specialis, IHL barred jurisdiction under the ECHR.312 Instead,
the court held that “in situations of international armed conflict, the safeguards under [IHRL] continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the background of the provisions of
international humanitarian law.”313 Moreover, the court interpreted an ECHR provision in light of a comparable IHL provision,314 implicitly characterizing the relationship between the
307 E.g., Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 279, 280, 286 (2005);
Matthew Stubbs, Human Rights Obligations as a Collateral Limit on the Powers of the
Security Council, in IMAGINING LAW: ESSAYS IN CONVERSATION WITH JUDITH GARDAM
61, 67–68 (Dale Stephens & Paul Babie eds., 2016); Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, The Use
of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology?, 31
MICH. J. INT’L L. 621, 624 (2010).
308 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 298, ¶¶ 37–43.
309 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 227, art. 31(3)(c); see
also McLachlan, supra note 307, at 280; MERKOURIS, supra note 304, at 214.
310 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161 ¶ 41 (Nov. 6).
311 Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
312 Id. ¶¶ 76–77.
313 Id. ¶ 104.
314 Id. ¶ 106.
As regards procedural safeguards, the [ECtHR] considers that, in
relation to detention taking place during an international armed
conflict, Article 5 §§ 2 and 4 must also be interpreted in a manner
which takes into account the context and the applicable rules of
international humanitarian law. Articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention provide that internment “shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body.”
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two regimes as symbiotic where similar provisions exist—demonstrating a possibility for IHL and IHRL to apply in a harmonized
way, where their requirements can be reconciled.
In Fragmentation of International Law, the ILC observed that
norms which appear to “point in diverging directions” may be
“adjust[ed]” and subsequently applied in such a way that any
overlap or conflict between the norms will cease.315 To adjust
conflicting norms, the ILC noted that they should be read from
the perspective of their contribution to some generally shared
“systemic”316 or “coherent objective,”317 which consequently enables the interpreter to prioritize a particular goal.318 This is the
“accommodation” of competing values that Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal advocated in the Arrest Warrant
case, instead of “the triumph of one norm over the other.”319
Whilst it might not be practicable, in the course of an international
armed conflict, for the legality of detention to be determined by an
independent “court” in the sense generally required by Article 5
§ 4 . . . nonetheless, if the Contracting State is to comply with its
obligations under Article 5 § 4 in this context, the “competent
body” should provide sufficient guarantees of impartiality and fair
procedure to protect against arbitrariness.
Id.
Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 298, ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 412.
317 Id. ¶ 419.
318 Id.
319 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment,
2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 79 (Feb. 14, 2002) (Higgins, J., Koojimans, J. & Buergenthal, J.).
Similarly, “[i]t is unwise to stick stubbornly to either normative regime in the face
of facts that point to a more nuanced approach.” Watkin, supra note 285, at 199.
“[T]he enticing prospect of averting conflict of norms, by enabling the harmonization of rules rather than the application of one norm to the exclusion of another.” McLachlan, supra note 307, at 286. Of course, the ICJ had once held, in
the context of the application of Article 6 of the ICCPR in armed conflict, that
“what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by
the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.” Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8). It has clearly
moved beyond that view more recently, stating “[a]s regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three
possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others
may be matters of both these branches of international law.” Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9). At the very least, Lubell correctly notes
increasing acceptance that “human rights law is not entirely displaced” even if
IHL is the lex specialis relating to armed conflict. Lubell, supra note 304, at
737–38.
315
316
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This approach to harmonization has some resonance with
Dworkin’s concept of law as integrity, given Dworkin’s instruction to treat individual parts of the law as “part of a coherent
theory”320 and to interpret the law on the assumption “that the
law is structured by a coherent set of principles”321 in order “to
make the law coherent as a whole, so far as” possible.322 Harmonization of legal regimes seeks the same goal as Dworkin’s “law
as integrity” thesis—the application of “a single, coherent set of
principles”;323 for the same reason, “integrity demands that [legal] standards be seen as coherent, as the State speaking with a
single voice.”324 Of course, harmonization is much easier to describe in the abstract than to apply in practice; as Dworkin acknowledges, it may not always be possible to achieve in reality.325
The endeavour, however, is necessary if the coherent application of international law to armed conflict in outer space is to be
achieved.
Important attempts to harmonize competing international legal regimes have been made by the ECtHR in two contexts.326
First, it has considered the relationship between the ECHR and
the law of sovereign immunity. In Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,
Fogarty v. United Kingdom, and McElhinney v. Ireland, the court
stated in each case that “[t]he [ECHR], including Article 6, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. The [ECtHR] . . . must also take
the relevant rules of international law into account. . . . The
[ECHR] should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony
320 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 245 (1986) (“Law as integrity . . . requires
a judge to test his interpretation of any part of the great network of political
structures and decisions of his community by asking whether it could form part
of a coherent theory justifying the network as a whole.”).
321 Id. at 243.
Law as integrity asks judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that
the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice
and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each
person’s situation is fair and just according to the same standards.
Id.
322 Id. at 251. In other words, Dworkin’s “law as integrity” thesis aims “to produce a grand interpretation of the law of a legal system that embodies a coherent
conception of justice, fairness, and procedural due process.” Barbara Baum
Levenbook, The Sustained Dworkin, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1108, 1121 (1986).
323 DWORKIN, supra note 320, at 166.
324 Id. at 218.
325 Id. at 245.
326 For a general discussion of the ECtHR’s attempts to harmonize see
Tzevelekos, supra note 307, at 645–60.
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with other rules of international law of which it forms part.”327
Accordingly, the ECtHR held that “measures . . . which reflect
generally recognised rules of public international law on State
immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction” in breach of Article 6 of the ECHR.328
Second, the ECtHR has addressed the relationship between
the ECHR and the UN Charter obligation to carry out decisions
of the Security Council.329 As the court explained in Nada v.
Switzerland, “diverging commitments must . . . be harmonised as
far as possible.”330 The ECtHR was more expansive in Al-Dulimi
v. Switzerland, explaining that:
Where a number of apparently contradictory instruments are simultaneously applicable . . . endeavour to construe them in such
a way as to coordinate their effects and avoid any opposition between them. Two diverging commitments must therefore be
harmonised as far as possible so that they produce effects that are
fully in accordance with existing law.331

The ECtHR attempted this harmonization in Al-Dulimi by (1)
first looking to identify a shared purpose in the competing regimes;332 (2) then interpreting the relevant provisions “in a
spirit of systemic harmonisation”333 to avoid conflict where possible by focusing on attaining shared purpose where it can be
found; and (3) finally, seeking “to strike a fair balance”334 between the objectives underlying inconsistent norms.335
Accordingly, in order to determine how IHL, IHRL, and ISL
will apply to targeting, it is necessary to commence by identifying themes shared by the three bodies of law. Arguably, the most
appropriate shared theme is the concept of fundamental stan327 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, ¶ 55; Fogarty v.
United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, ¶ 35; McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, ¶ 36.
328 Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56; Fogarty, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 36;
McElhinney, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 37.
329 U.N. Charter art. 25; see, e.g., Stubbs, supra note 307, at 67–68.
330 Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, ¶ 170.
331 Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, App. No. 5809/08, ¶ 138 (June 21, 2016), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-164515 [perma.cc/U9EB-ZV3F].
332 Id. ¶¶ 139–40.
333 Id. ¶ 140.
334 Id. ¶ 146.
335 An alternative description is an interpretive process that “takes particular
account of the interplay between the objects and purposes of the normative paradigms relative to the prevailing facts to which both apply.” POUW, supra note 282,
at 348.
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dards of humanity.336 ISL plainly promotes peaceful exploration
of outer space for the benefit of all humanity,337 and IHL and
IHRL “share as a basis a fundamental concern for humanity,”338
evident in IHL’s balancing of its two foundational principles of
military necessity and humanity,339 and in IHRL’s foundational
aim of protecting human life and dignity.340 Accordingly, in situations of armed conflict in outer space, provisions of IHRL or
ISL that promote fundamental standards of humanity should be
interpreted in such a way as to influence the humanitarian features of IHL.341 The next Part will explore how the approach of
harmonization could be applied to the law regulating targeting
in outer space.
VI.

CO-APPLICATION OF REGIMES: HARMONIZATION
AND LEX SPECIALIS

The previous Part established that the interpretative tool of lex
specialis and the process of harmonization can be used to resolve
instances of normative conflict.342 This Part discusses compara336 For an overview of the concept of the fundamental standards of humanity,
see Marco Odello, Fundamental Standards of Humanity: A Common Language of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 15, at 15–56. This is not to suggest that humanity is the only
important consideration in any of these regimes, but that it is a shared consideration relevant to all of them.
337 E.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1 (“The exploration and use of
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out
for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”).
For further discussion, see Freeland & Jakhu, The Intersection between Space Law and
International Human Rights Law, supra note 14, at 225.
338 RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 5
(2002); see generally JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR
VICTIMS (1975); Dale Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict–The Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2001).
339 See DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 13.
340 See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Some Reflections on the Principle of
Humanity in Its Wide Dimension, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW 188, 188–89 (Robert Kolb & Gloria Gaggioli eds., 2013).
341 Stephens, supra note 9, at 96.
342 Of course, there will be some instances of irreconcilable conflict. See, e.g.,
Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human
Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 95, 108–13 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011). As Milanovic explains,
these can occur because “states, like people, are perfectly capable of assuming
contradictory commitments.” Id. at 115.
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ble norms in IHL, IHRL, and ISL (as identified in Parts II, III
and IV respectively) and determines how IHRL and ISL norms
can influence the interpretation and application of IHL in pursuit of the promotion of humanitarianism. It should be
remembered that the core of what IHL provides is not likely to
change in this process—as the ICJ stressed in Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, IHL “applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the
present and those of the future.”343 However, IHRL and ISL
norms may influence IHL norms “from the background,” supplementing or complementing the interpretation and application of IHL.344 After all, as the ICJ has repeatedly emphasized
with respect to the relationship between IHL and IHRL, it is
necessary “to take into consideration both these branches of international law,”345 and “both branches of international law . . .
would have to be taken into consideration” in determining the
law applicable in an armed conflict.346
343 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 86 (July 8).
344 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 298, ¶ 19; Quénivet, supra note 15, at 9–10.
Stated in other words, it may be “necessary to look to human rights norms to not
merely inform interpretation of law of armed conflict, but to add proverbial flesh
to the bones of the law of armed conflict regulatory framework.” Corn, supra note
285, at 62.
345 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9).
346 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19). A significant body of scholarship now addresses the interaction of IHL and IHRL in the terrestrial domain.
See generally Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari, Targeting and Detention in Non-International
Armed Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence, 91
INT’L L. STUD. 60 (2015); Daniel Bethlehem, The Relationship Between International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 180 (2013); BOOTHBY, supra note 101, at
317–90; Corn, supra note 285; Robert Cryer, The Interplay of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law: The Approach of the ICTY, 14 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 511 (2010);
Alon Margalit, Recent Trends in the Application of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law: Are States Losing Patience?, 7 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 156 (2016);
David Luban, Human Rights Thinking and the Laws of War, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (Jens Ohlin ed., 2016); Lubell,
supra note 304; Sarah McCosker, The ‘Interoperability’ of International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law: Evaluating the Legal Tools Available to Negotiate their
Relationship, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NEW AGE OF GLOBALISATION 145 (Andrew Byrnes, Mika Hayashi & Christopher Michaelsen eds., 2013); Milanovic,
supra note 342; Sassòli & Olson, supra note 285; Marco Sassòli, The Role of Human
Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra
note 342, at 34; Watkin, supra note 285.
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Accordingly, the first step will be to examine whether competing regimes can be harmonized to avoid normative conflict and
produce a coherent application of all applicable rules. It is only
if they cannot do so that the second step—reference to the lex
specialis maxim—will be needed in order to identify a regime
that will receive priority, but which may still be modified or supplemented by principles from the lex generalis. As Milanovic has
stated, “lex specialis would operate as a rule of norm conflict resolution, so that IHL would displace or qualify the conflicting rule
of IHRL to the extent strictly required to resolve the conflict.”347
This latter step accepts the reality that “there are limits to what
legitimate methods of interpretation can do to harmonize IHL
and IHRL,”348 but the primary question remains one of determining how far applicable regimes can be harmonized. This
Part pursues both those interpretive approaches. In doing so, it
is worthwhile to recall Milanovic’s statement regarding the relationship of IHL and IHRL: “[a] large part of human rights law
as interpreted in peacetime will have to be read down, to a
greater or lesser extent, in order to be effectively applied in wartime.”349 Similarly, the Oslo Manual concludes that “the principles and rules of [IHL] are the lex specialis during armed conflict
and prevail over the general law of Outer Space.”350 Accordingly, the inquiry which follows will at times conclude that the
content of a particular legal requirement is supplied entirely by
IHL as lex specialis. More often, however, there may be some
scope to incorporate normative elements from ISL and IHRL in
conjunction with IHL, achieving a harmonization of the principles from the three relevant normative regimes. This Part therefore identifies the value-add arising from co-application of the
regimes, by considering which principles may be picked up from
ISL and IHRL to supplement or complement IHL rules applicable to the targeting of a satellite in outer space.
A.

NECESSITY

Under IHL, there is a presumption that lethal force may be
used against military objectives.351 In essence, lethal force may
347 Marko Milanovic, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship
between Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 346, at 106.
348 Milanovic, supra note 342, at 97.
349 Id. at 106.
350 DINSTEIN & DAHL, supra note 116, at 5.
351 See Quénivet, supra note 15, at 341.
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necessarily be used at any time to pursue a military advantage.352
Conversely, IHRL only permits the use of lethal force as a last
resort in circumstances of absolute necessity in order to pursue
specified legitimate aims.353 Thus, the two regimes appear to be
fundamentally inconsistent on this point. IHRL is therefore unable to be meaningfully applied in any way that is complementary
to the relevant IHL, and harmonization of the regimes will not
be possible. IHL will therefore remain lex specialis regarding necessity, with pursuit of a military advantage remaining key.354
Accordingly, a satellite will be a targetable military objective in
IHL if it makes an effective contribution to military action
through its nature, location, purpose, or use and if its destruction offers a definite military advantage.355 At this point in the
analysis, neither ISL nor IHRL has been capable of affecting the
IHL rules that would regulate the necessity of targeting a
satellite.
B.

PROPORTIONALITY

The principle of proportionality in IHL mandates that an attack must not cause excessive incidental damage to civilians or
civilian objects, as measured against the anticipated concrete
and direct overall military advantage.356 Belligerents must identify collateral damage that is reasonably foreseeable.357 Thus,
IHL contemplates the consequences of an attack in light of the
foreseeability of certain outcomes.358 Only collateral damage
that is either a direct consequence or a reasonably foreseeable
indirect consequence must be considered, rather than collateral
damage that is too speculative.359
In the space environment, attacks against dual-use space objects will likely result in collateral damage to civilians and civilian
objects on Earth.360 However, it will often prove difficult to determine the foreseeable collateral damage that will result from
See id.
ECHR, supra note 165, art. 2(2)(a)–(c).
354 A similar conclusion is reached by Milanovic, supra note 342, at 118–21.
355 See supra Sections II.A.1–2.
356 API, supra note 23, arts. 51(5), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).
357 See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶¶
190–91 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
358 See supra Section II.B.
359 Id.
360 See Stephens & Steer, supra note 2, at 95–96.
352
353
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the destruction of a dual-use satellite.361 The nature of space infrastructure means that collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects may be more indirect than is the case in some
traditional war paradigms. In part, this may call for the application of the principles of precautions and constant care, but
there may be useful perspectives on the proportionality rule that
can be gained from the other relevant legal regimes.
IHRL may be drawn upon to protect against indirect damage.
One possibility for how IHRL principles might inform the requirements of IHL in this context is by clarifying the extent to
which uncertainty of collateral damage affects the application of
the proportionality principle. The IHRL principle of proportionality requires that a State must have regard to “all the relevant circumstances” surrounding potential deprivation of life,
including the risk of collateral damage inherent in the situation,
and the degree of risk that use of force “might result in loss of
life.”362 Hence, it may be argued that, due to inherent difficulty
in determining likely collateral damage in advance of an attack
against a dual-use satellite, IHRL should be used to expand the
scope of foreseeability—taking into account indirect damage to
civilians and civilian objects and widening the protection afforded to them under IHL.
It is possible that in the context of weighing collateral damage
against anticipated military advantage when targeting a satellite
that has significant civilian uses, a harmonized approach to proportionality would require taking into consideration less direct
harm than traditional IHL would consider relevant.363
C.

PRECAUTIONS

AND

CONSTANT CARE

The principles of precautions and constant care in IHL require belligerents to take feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack and to spare civilians and civilian
objects unnecessary harm.364 Similarly, IHRL requires that all
precautions must be taken to avoid, as far as possible, any use of
361 Abdul R. Khan, Space Wars: Dual-Use Satellites, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
314, 321 (2017).
362 Stewart v. United Kingdom, App. No. 1044/82, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 453, ¶ 19
(1985) (emphasis added), aff’d, Wolfgram v. Federal Republic of Germany, App.
No. 11257/84, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548, 549 (1986).
363 See Michel Bourbonnière & Ricky J. Lee, Jus Ad Bellum & Jus In Bello
Considerations on the Targeting of Satellites: The Targeting of Post-Modern Military Space
Assets, in 44 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 167, 200–01 (2014).
364 API, supra note 23, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
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lethal force.365 Operations must be “planned and controlled by
the authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible,
recourse to lethal force.”366
IHRL, therefore, can reinforce the IHL requirements of precautions and constant care. While it may be relatively easy to
destroy a satellite—generating a decent military advantage—the
inherent civilian consequences of doing so mean that the IHL
principles of precautions in attack and constant care, supplemented by the IHRL principle of precautionary measures, require that other, less-civilian-harming means should be used if
they are available.
In this instance, the IHRL principle complements the IHL
principles. It can also add richness to the IHL principles by
identifying particular precautionary steps that might be required in accordance with the various assessments of risk required under IHRL. A harmonized approach would pick up on
specific requirements including sufficient planning and execution of an operation, incorporating assessments of perceived
threats and constraints, possible harm to civilians, and other
weapons or tactics at the State’s disposal.367 Thus, under an approach to precautions in attack and constant care, which harmonizes IHL and IHRL precautionary requirements, States may be
obligated to avoid kinetic attacks by first using other non-space
attacks, such as a terrestrial kinetic attack on command and control facilities. If non-space attacks will not result in a comparable
military advantage, incremental approaches to space attacks—
deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and, finally, destruction—should be used.368 In addition, for States to demonstrate
that they have identified and minimized risks to civilians and
civilian objects throughout the process, they must undertake sufficient planning in advance of an attack, as well as sufficient
monitoring of the conduct and results of an attack. The additional considerations imported by IHRL might require a more
nuanced and staged approach to space attacks than is necessary
under IHL alone.369
365 See, e.g., McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 194
(1995).
366 Id.
367 Isayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00, ¶ 175 (Feb. 24,
2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68379 [perma.cc/H86H-L4A4].
368 See supra Section II.C.2.
369 This might lead to asymmetrical obligations according to the technical capacity of States, a point that may arise under IHL in any event. See Michael N.
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INVESTIGATION

In the event that lives are lost, IHRL imposes a positive obligation on States to undertake an effective and independent investigation.370 Effective investigation should be “thorough, prompt,
and impartial”;371 the investigative authority should have all powers necessary to conduct the inquiry;372 authorities must act sua
sponte;373 and families of the deceased shall be informed of and
have access to the inquiry.374 The existence of an armed conflict
does not displace these obligations.375 Accordingly, as the
ECtHR held in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, when a death occurs
that is lawful under IHL, it is nonetheless necessary for an effective and independent investigation to be undertaken in accordance with the IHRL requirement.376 This requirement
supplements what is required by IHL alone377 and is a powerful
example of how the two regimes can apply in a manner that
harmonizes their provisions to achieve their shared humanitarian goal. Accordingly, when civilian deaths occur as a result of
the targeting of a satellite, an effective, official, ex post facto investigation will need to be held.
E.

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

Under IHL, States are obligated to protect the natural environment against “widespread, long-term and severe damage”
during armed conflict.378 Damage must be “exceptionally serious” before a breach of this requirement will occur.379 A similar
aim of environmental protection is reflected in ISL, which manSchmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 445, 460 (2005).
370 McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 161; Hum. Rts. Comm., Baboeram v.
Suriname, Commc’n No. 146/1983, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/24/D/146/1983
(Apr. 4, 1985); Hum. Rts. Comm., Rubio v. Colom., Commc’n No. 161/1983, ¶
10.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/31/D/161/1983 (Nov. 2, 1987).
371 Econ. & Soc. Council, Res. on Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
E/RES/1989/65 (May 24, 1989).
372 Id. ¶ 10.
373 Kelly v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30054/96, ¶¶ 94–98 (May 4, 2001),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59453 [perma.cc/A6JQ-XBPY].
374 Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 371, ¶ 16.
375 See Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, ¶ 126.
376 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶ 163.
377 See, e.g., POUW, supra note 282, at 334.
378 API, supra note 23, arts. 35(3), 55(1).
379 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, supra note 107, at 539.
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dates that States must pursue studies and exploration of outer
space so as to avoid its harmful contamination.380 Although the
Outer Space Treaty does not define “harmful contamination,” it
has been described as “the introduction of elements that make
outer space unfit for use or are likely to be injurious to users of
outer space,”381 including the creation of space debris.382 Moreover, international debris mitigation guidelines (although nonbinding) stipulate that intentional destruction of space objects
should be avoided where long-lived debris will be created.383
IHL therefore contemplates protection against “exceptionally
serious,” foreseeable, and indirect environmental damage of attacks. However, in the space environment, ISL expands this consideration, bringing a broader perspective on damage and
recognizing the unique environmental danger posed by the creation of debris in outer space. Outcomes such as the creation of
space debris have the potential to have long-lasting, hazardous
effects on the space environment.384 Hence, actors must think
more broadly about the long-term impacts of the destruction of
space objects and must consequently avoid kinetic attacks in
space where possible to do so. Actors must also take adequate
precautions against the environmental effects of any kinetic attacks that are conducted in space—such as destruction of a
space object while it is in a low orbit—allowing for subsequent
debris to be destroyed by re-entering Earth’s atmosphere relatively soon thereafter. These requirements of ISL complement
IHL’s prohibition of exceptionally serious environmental damage by introducing a requirement to avoid, where possible, a
wider range of environmental damage above a lower threshold
of harmful contamination arising from the creation of longlived debris. In this way, the shared aims of environmental protection are better achieved through supplementing the IHL prohibition of exceptionally serious environmental damage with
the ISL requirement of avoidance of harmful environmental
contamination.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, art. 9.
Mineiro, supra note 228, at 339.
382 Marchisio, supra note 229, at 177.
383 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 264, annex IV,
guideline 4; Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., supra note 265, ¶
5.2.3.
384 See generally Wright, supra note 92; Space Debris from Anti-Satellite Weapons,
supra note 219; see also Mountin, supra note 1, at 116.
380
381
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In the context of targeting a satellite, therefore, a harmonized
approach to environmental damage would require States: (1) to
avoid kinetic attacks if at all possible; and (2) to conduct any
interception that might be justifiable at the lowest possible orbit,
with a positional inclination that would increase the proportion
of debris that re-enters Earth’s atmosphere quickly, so as to
avoid harmful contamination of the outer space environment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Armed conflict in space is no longer the stuff of science fiction. The increasing militarization of outer space demands the
attention of scholars, scientists, and State officials. As space infrastructure becomes increasingly integrated in aspects of both
civilian life and military operations, adverse impacts of military
space operations on civilians are increasingly likely. Additionally, kinetic operations in outer space present a unique environmental threat to the outer space environment. Critically, there is
no single legal regime equipped to adequately respond to these
developments.
This Article has considered the application of overlapping
IHL, IHRL, and ISL norms relevant to the targeting of a satellite. While the justification for the application of IHL and ISL is
obvious, this Article has also explored the potential significance
of the evolving jurisprudence of IHRL that is also likely to be
relevant. The interpretative principles of lex specialis and harmonization have been recommended to resolve instances of normative conflict between these three regimes. This Article has
demonstrated a number of ways in which IHRL and ISL norms
could influence the interpretation and application of IHL in
outer space in pursuit of the objectives shared by all three regimes of humanity and environmental protection.
It is important to appreciate that IHL itself is capable of responding to the unique challenges of armed conflict in outer
space. The rules of proportionality, precautions, and constant
care militate against the potential effects of attacks on military
objectives by requiring that consideration be given to the impacts on civilians and civilian infrastructure. The result is that
IHL alone is likely to restrict kinetic attacks on satellites to only
those situations where alternative forms of attack—terrestrial kinetic attack on command and control facilities, soft-kill attack
against a satellite, and incremental use of deception, disruption,
denial, and degradation—cannot be successfully carried out,
and then only where the anticipated direct military advantage
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sufficiently outweighs the reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences for civilians.
However, this Article has also demonstrated that principles of
IHRL and ISL can complement and supplement IHL rules,
leading to greater protection of civilians on Earth, as well as
greater protection of the unique environment of outer space.
The risk assessments provided for in IHRL may complement
IHL’s existing requirements of precautions and constant care,
identifying more specific precautionary steps that should be
taken. Additionally, IHRL may be drawn upon to increase the
extent to which uncertainty of collateral damage is considered
under the proportionality principle in IHL. Further, ISL provisions on environmental protection may add a new and complementary protection to those in IHL, requiring avoidance of a
greater range of environmental harms. Finally, if lives are lost,
the investigation requirement of IHRL can supplement what is
required in IHL, adding an ex post facto process that must be
conducted. Of course, in some cases, harmonization will not be
possible, and IHL will remain lex specialis—as is the case with
necessity—where military advantage remains the touchstone
and where IHRL’s standard cannot be applied. Nonetheless,
there is clearly scope for the co-application of IHL, IHRL, and
ISL principles in a harmonized interpretation of the law regulating armed conflict in outer space in a manner that promotes the
regimes’ shared objectives of humanity and environmental
protection.
This Article contributes to an emerging body of scholarship
that seeks to reconcile existing legal norms applicable to armed
conflict in outer space.385 There is a pressing need for further
consideration of the legal issues arising from armed conflict in
outer space to identify similar instances of normative conflict
and explore how they might be resolved. Civilians and the environment should not bear the burden of unresolved normative
See, e.g., THE UNIV. OF ADELAIDE, THE WOOMERA MANUAL ON THE INTERNALAW OF MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS, https://law.adelaide.edu.au/
woomera/ [perma.cc/JM9J-Z4KE]; Matthew Stubbs & Dale Stephens, The
Woomera Manual: Clarifying the Law of Military Space Operations to Promote Sustainable
Uses of Outer Space, in PROJECT ASTERIA 2019: SPACE DEBRIS, SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND SPACE SUSTAINABILITY 99 (Michael Spencer ed., 2019), https://
airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Contemporary%20AirPower/
AP43-Project-Asteria-2019-Space-Debris-Space-Traffic-Management-and-SpaceSustainability.pdf [perma.cc/SEN3-NZKF]; Manual on International Law Applicable
to Military Uses of Outer Space Project (MILAMOS Project), MCGILL UNIV., https://
www.mcgill.ca/milamos [perma.cc/YU2B-GDZ6].
385
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conflict. Reconciliation of norms must be prioritized to ensure
that if, or when, these are no longer hypothetical situations, the
law is readily equipped to deal with them.
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INTRODUCTION

I

N JANUARY 2018, DURING A Spirit Airlines overnight flight,
a twenty-three-year-old victim awoke to a stranger “molest[ing] her with his hands.”1 At trial, she testified that she felt
frozen and petrified.2 The assailant was sentenced to nine years
in federal prison.3
Unfortunately, this is far from an isolated incident. For example, in May 2019, a Massachusetts man was indicted for sexual
assault after he allegedly molested a nineteen-year-old United
Airlines passenger.4 In November 2019, an American Airlines
flight bound for Salt Lake City, Utah had to be diverted to
1 Associated Press, Man in U.S. on Work Visa Gets 9 Years in Prison for Sex Assault
on Flight, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
man-u-s-work-visa-gets-9-years-prison-sex-n9478 [perma.cc/G3TH-JGQD].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 David Oliver, Passenger Indicted for Alleged Mid-Flight Sexual Assault of 19-YearOld Woman, USA TODAY (May 21, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
travel/flights/2019/05/21/united-airlines-passenger-alleges-sexual-assault/
3751023002/ [https://perma.cc/X64B-JWAL].
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Tulsa, Oklahoma for the arrest of an assailant after he allegedly
grabbed the crotch of a woman sitting next to him who was traveling with her daughter.5 Additionally, not all assailants are punished. Even more recently, a class action lawsuit was filed against
Frontier Airlines alleging the airline mishandled multiple cases
of in-flight sexual assault and that they lack proper reporting
procedures.6 All of these cases illustrate the increasingly important issue of sexual assault on airplanes and airlines’ responses
to these crimes.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), from
2014 to 2017, the number of reported in-flight sexual assault
cases went from thirty-eight to sixty-three.7 This number may
seem small, but numerous sexual assaults occurring on airplanes
go unreported each year.8 One in five flight attendants claims
they have experienced a report of passenger-on-passenger sexual assault.9 These same flight attendants report that law enforcement was notified or met the plane at the gate less than
half of the time.10 In some cases, law enforcement responds to
the assaults because airline crewmembers choose to report.11
Yet, company policy is currently the only guide for reporting on
airlines, which results in law enforcement not knowing about—
much less investigating—numerous other cases.12
Current aviation and criminal laws fail to address the problem
of sexual assault aboard aircraft. To better serve travelers, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the Transportation
and Security Administration (TSA) should create a uniform,
5 Mariel Padilla, Man Charged in Sexual Assault of Woman on a Flight, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/us/americanairlines-passenger-groping.html [https://perma.cc/24V4-5MF8].
6 Hally Freger, Class Action Lawsuit Claims Frontier Airlines Mishandled Cases of InFlight Sexual Assault, ABC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Busi
ness/class-action-lawsuit-claims-frontier-airlines-mishandled-cases/story?id=67787
731 [perma.cc/E8K6-9SDR].
7 Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/raising-awareness-about-sexual-assault-aboardaircraft-042618 [perma.cc/4WR5-CFVD].
8 See id.
9 #MeToo in the Air, ASS’N OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, https://www.
afacwa.org/metoo [perma.cc/96MN-ZT9V].
10 Id.
11 See id.
12 See Jamie Freed, In-Flight Sexual Assaults Often Unreported; Airlines Need to Step
Up, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-actor-assault-airlines-analysis/in-flight-sexual-assaults-often-unreported-airlines-need-tostep-up-idUSKBN1E80YN [perma.cc/9RYY-TW72].
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mandatory reporting requirement that requires commercial airline staff to disclose reported instances of in-flight sexual assault
to law enforcement. Part II of this Comment will discuss two
cases which brought airlines’ nonreporting to the media’s attention. Part III will address the current state of the relevant U.S.
aviation law; this includes the liability airlines currently face for
in-flight sexual assault, the government’s authority over crimes
aboard aircraft, and pending legislation. Part IV will address
shortcomings in pending legislation to show why more stringent
reporting laws are necessary. Part V will examine other reporting requirements and how their purposes and policies extend to
the airline industry. Part VI will address the benefits of a uniform, mandatory reporting requirement. Lastly, Part VII will
provide a conclusion by laying out steps Congress should take.
II.

RALLYING THE MEDIA

If a flight attendant or other airline crewmember is notified of
an in-flight sexual assault, there is no mandatory reporting requirement or other uniform procedure for handling such an
incident.13 Prior to this decade, the treatment and lack of reporting of in-flight sexual assaults was rarely discussed, but it has
garnered media attention in the past few years. This is partially
due to two highly publicized cases—both of which illustrate the
seriousness of nonreporting.14

13 See Andrew Appelbaum, Recent In-Flight Sexual Abuse Complaints to Feds Released by Airline Passenger Group . . . Nothing Done?, FLYERS RIGHTS (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://flyersrights.org/press-release/recent-in-flight-sexual-abuse-complaints-tofeds-released-by-airline-passenger-group/ [perma.cc/529A-68GD]; Shannon McMahon, What to Do if In-Flight Sexual Assault Happens to You, SMARTERTRAVEL (Mar.
19, 2018), https://www.smartertravel.com/flight-sexual-assault-what-to-do/
[perma.cc/BQT6-JD87]; see also Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, supra note 7 (noting “in most cases” law enforcement will be available to respond if the flight crew
is immediately notified and encouraging victims to reach out to the FBI
themselves).
14 The #MeToo movement has also influenced the attention devoted to inflight sexual assault as its massive impact continues to result in increased reporting of sexual crimes in all contexts. See, e.g., Frankie Wallace, How the #MeToo
Movement Has Affected the Airline Industry, AERONAUTICS AVIATION NEWS & MEDIA
(Aug. 5, 2019), https://aeronauticsonline.com/how-the-metoo-movement-has-affected-the-airline-industry/ [perma.cc/J385-Z6ZG]. The breadth of this movement and its influence on the airline industry, however, is outside the scope of
this Comment.
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DVALADZE V. DELTA AIR LINES, INC.

The first largely publicized case shows how nonreporting can
result in an assailant getting away. In 2018, Allison Dvaladze
sued Delta Air Lines, alleging she was assaulted by a stranger
mid-flight.15 Dvaladze stated that she told the crewmembers of
the incident immediately but received unsatisfactory responses.16 One flight attendant told Dvaladze to let it “roll off
her back” and that sexual assault occurs frequently on flights.17
Upon landing, crewmembers did not report the incident to law
enforcement, and the alleged assailant was never identified or
arrested.18 Since then, Dvaladze has frequently discussed her
case with the media.19 It was even brought to the FBI’s attention
and used in their campaign to raise awareness regarding the
dangers of in-flight sexual assault.20
B.

SARDINAS V. UNITED AIRLINES

Another largely discussed case, citing the Dvaladze incident in
its own complaint, shows how nonreporting hinders law enforcement investigations.21 A teenager flying unaccompanied on
United Airlines (United) woke up mid-flight to a stranger assaulting her.22 The victim caught a flight attendant’s attention
who proceeded to “chastise” the assailant, telling him his actions
15 Complaint for Damages at 3–4, Dvaladze v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 2:18-cv00297-RSL (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2019), ECF No. 1; see also Order of Dismissal,
Dvaladze, No. 2:18-cv-00297-RSL, ECF No. 22 (noting case was later dismissed pursuant to settlement).
16 Complaint for Damages at 4–5, Dvaladze, No. 2:18-cv-00297-RSL.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id. at 5; see also Avi Selk, She Says She Was Groped on a Delta Flight—Then Told to
Sit Down and ‘Let It Roll off Your Back’, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/02/28/she-says-she-wasgroped-on-a-delta-flight-then-told-to-sit-down-and-let-it-roll-off-your-back/
[https://perma.cc/MEW6-CSE3].
19 E.g., Mary Louise Kelly, 36,000 Feet in the Air, Flight Attendants and Passengers
Say ‘Me, Too’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/622361890 [https://perma.cc/K253-H3F8]; Matthew Halverson, The Unfriendly Skies: Why Sexual Assault Still Plagues Air Travel, CONDÉ NAST TRAVELER
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/the-unfriendly-skies-why-sexual-assault-still-plagues-air-travel [perma.cc/C5QZ-P9PA].
20 See Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, supra note 7.
21 Complaint at 3, Sardinas v. United Airlines, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA (Wash.
Super. Ct.-King Cnty. Feb. 22, 2019), ECF No. 1-1.
22 Id. at 4–5; see also Amy Clancy, Seattle Teen: United Airlines ‘Negligent’ for InFlight Sexual Assault, KIRO 7 (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.kiro7.com/news/local
/tonight-at-5-30-seattle-teen-united-airlines-negligent-for-in-flight-sexual-assault/
950947481/ [perma.cc/R7VF-6JS].
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were “not cool.”23 Yet, the assailant was allowed to walk off the
plane undeterred as United never notified law enforcement.24
Instead, the victim reported the assault to her mother who, in
turn, notified law enforcement.25 Luckily, unlike in Dvaladze, the
assailant was later identified, arrested, and convicted.26
Both of these instances illustrate that the lack of a mandatory
reporting requirement for in-flight sexual assault leads to adverse consequences. These cases, along with others, have garnered media attention and forced our legislative and executive
branches to examine the current state of the law regarding inflight assault.27
III.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A.

LIABILITY

FOR

AIRLINES

Prior to the late 1990s, sex on airplanes—consensual or otherwise—was rarely discussed.28 It is unknown if this is due to a lack
of reporting, a cover-up mentality, or it just did not occur. Nonetheless, in the past few decades courts have recognized a problem on both domestic and international flights and have come
up with avenues of liability to hold airlines accountable.29 The
remainder of this Part will discuss liability for both international
and domestic airlines.
1.

Liability for International Air Carriers

In the 2000 case Wallace v. Korean Air, the Second Circuit
found that an international air carrier could be liable for injuries arising from passenger-on-passenger sexual assault occurClancy, supra note 22.
Complaint at 5, Sardinas, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA; Clancy, supra note 22.
25 Complaint at 5–6, Sardinas, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA; Clancy, supra note 22.
26 See Complaint at 5–6, Sardinas, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA; Clancy, supra note 22.
27 See Rene Marsh & Juana Summers, Women Detail Sexual Assaults and Harassment on Commercial Flights, CNN (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/
12/27/politics/women-sexual-assaults-harassment-commercial-flights/index.
html [perma.cc/Q33G-7N68] (containing additional instances of victims complaining of airlines’ responses to in-flight sexual assaults).
28 See Asra Q. Nomani, A New Problem for the Airlines: Sexual Misconduct at 37,000
Feet, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 1998), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB897364901819356000 [https://perma.cc/H5FB-DQRQ].
29 Id.; see also Judith R. Karp, Mile High Assaults: Air Carrier Liability Under the
Warsaw Convention, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1551, 1553 (2001) (“[I]n 1997, one-third
of the reported cases of ‘unruly behavior’ among airplane passengers involved
sexual misconduct.”).
23
24
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ring mid-flight.30 Similarly, in Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., an
Illinois federal district court held that a victim could sue for injuries if the airline failed to act after a passenger-on-passenger
sexual assault on a transatlantic flight.31 In reaching this holding, the court found that the airline contributed to the attack by
continuing to serve the alleged assailant alcohol after receiving
complaints and refusing to intervene.32 Courts have subsequently held that liability extends to international air carriers
regardless of the victim’s gender.33 Likewise, airlines on domestic flights can be held liable for passenger-on-passenger sexual
assault.
2.

Liability for Airlines as Common Carriers

Liability for airlines on domestic flights originates primarily
from the classification of airlines as common carriers. U.S. law
has long recognized this categorization.34 Being a common carrier imposes a heightened duty of care for airlines on domestic
flights, which makes them liable for foreseeable criminal acts,
including sexual misconduct.35 The test for liability is “whether
such an incident was foreseeable under the circumstances of the
case or whether the air carrier owed a heightened duty to the
passenger due to a special relationship.”36 For example, in R.M.
v. American Airlines, Inc., a minor’s parents sued American Airlines after their daughter was sexually assaulted mid-flight.37 The
court held that airlines, as common carriers, are subject to a
heightened duty of care; however, this crime was not foreseeable
30 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Karp, supra
note 29, at 1561.
31 Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 97C0320, 1997 WL 767278, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 1, 1997); see also Jonathan E. DeMay, Marissa N. Lefland & Constantine J.
Petallides, In-Flight Sexual Misconduct: Congressional Action and Air Carrier Liability,
2019 ABA FORUM ON AIR & SPACE L. ANN. CONF., Sept. 12–13, 2019, at 1, 9–10.
32 Tsevas, 1997 WL 767278, at *10; see also DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 9–10.
33 E.g., Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000); Karp,
supra note 29, at 1563–64.
34 See 45 U.S.C. § 181; 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(25), (27); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. N.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 84 (1956); Paul T. David, Federal Regulation of
Airplane Common Carriers, 6 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 359, 360 (1930).
35 DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 13; see also R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F.
Supp. 3d 1203, 1213–14 (D. Or. 2018).
36 DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 13.
37 R.M., 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1205. Note that the assailant pleaded guilty to “Assault with Intent to Commit Sexual Contact of a Minor and Indecent Sexual Proposal to a Minor.” Id. at 1207.
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enough for the airline to be liable.38 The facts indicated that (1)
the defendant was not intoxicated; (2) the attack was noticed by
a flight attendant; (3) the passengers were separated; (4) law
enforcement was notified immediately; and (5) law enforcement
met the assailant upon landing.39
Conversely, in other cases, such as Thompson v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., courts have found some in-flight crimes foreseeable
enough to hold airlines responsible in their common carrier
role.40 In Thompson, the court denied the defendant airline’s
motion for summary judgment when it found the foreseeability
of an in-flight sexual assault was a question of fact.41 The plaintiff in Thompson alleged that her assailant was visibly intoxicated
prior to boarding and that the flight attendants continued to
serve him alcohol.42 She woke up mid-flight to the assailant
touching her groin.43 While a jury later ruled the plaintiff take
nothing, the court’s recognition that airlines can be liable for
their passenger’s actions on domestic flights is relevant and followed by most states.44
Despite continued recognition of airline liability for in-flight
sexual assault, little has been done to encourage specific protocols and reporting when an in-flight assault occurs. This is true
even though courts, federal legislators, and the media recognize
the problem of in-flight sexual assault.45 The executive and legislative branches did not begin widely discussing mandated reporting for airlines until 2018.46 One possible reason for this is
the prior lack of media attention on the subject. Another possiId. at 1215.
Id. at 1206–07.
40 Thompson v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., No. CV 09-4515 CAS (PLAx), 2010 WL
1151431, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2010).
41 Id.
42 Id. at *2.
43 Id.
44 See Judgment at 1, Thompson, 2010 WL 1151431 (No. CV09-4515 CAS
(PLAx)), ECF No. 154; DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 13.
45 See, e.g., R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1215 (D. Or. 2018)
(“undeniably a serious issue for airlines today”); Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (describing
proposed legislation to address sexual harassment in public transportation);
Karen Schwartz, Recent Incidents Put a New Focus on Sexual Assault on Airplanes, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/travel/recent-incidents-put-a-new-focus-on-sexual-assault-on-airplanes.html [perma.cc/G2ZYSMYV].
46 See H.R. 5139; FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254,
§ 339A, 132 Stat. 3186, 3282 (2018).
38
39
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ble explanation is that Congress does not want to meddle with
company policy. While the latter explanation promotes airlines
having free reign over their own business, it lacks merit considering the broad authority already bestowed on the federal government to regulate airlines.
B.

THE GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY

OVER

CRIMES

ON

AIRCRAFT

While airline jurisdictional questions are convoluted and generally outside the scope of this Comment, the U.S. government
possesses vast authority over airlines—particularly as it relates to
criminal offenses like sexual assault. This authority, stemming
from both the Constitution and federal statutes, is more than
enough to initiate a mandated reporting requirement. The remainder of this Part will discuss the U.S. government’s constitutional and statutory authority to regulate airlines.
1.

Constitutional Authority

First, the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause states that
Congress shall have the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states.”47 This power rapidly
expanded throughout the twentieth century and has been interpreted to mean that Congress may regulate (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce
or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities
which substantially affect interstate commerce.48 A commercial
plane arguably fits into all three of these categories.49 Therefore, “[i]n the context of aviation law, courts generally uphold
the federal government’s efforts to regulate even intrastate air
travel.”50
Additionally, under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, the
“laws of the United States” are the “supreme law of the land”
regardless of the “laws of any State to the contrary.”51 This
means any valid federal laws will take precedence over conflictU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
49 MICHAEL W. PEARSON & DANIEL S. RILEY, FOUNDATIONS OF AVIATION LAW 28
(2015).
50 Id.; see also United States v. Knowles, 197 F. Supp. 3d 143, 155–56 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (holding “Congress may regulate an instrumentality of both interstate and
foreign commerce—an airplane . . . pursuant to its commerce powers.”).
51 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
47
48
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ing state laws.52 States must adhere to these laws; they cannot
turn a blind eye to the federal government’s decisions—so long
as they are constitutional.53 Congress consequently has the constitutional authority to create a mandatory reporting requirement for commercial airlines under the Commerce Clause.
Under the Supremacy Clause, all airlines would have to adhere
to this requirement regardless of state laws.
2.

Statutory Authority

Under the Commerce Clause’s authority, the legislature has
already enacted numerous statutes regulating airlines and inflight crimes. Under 49 U.S.C. § 40103, the U.S. government has
“exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.”54 Under
49 U.S.C. § 46506, certain in-flight actions considered crimes in
the territorial United States are made criminal so long as they
are committed within the United States’ “special aircraft jurisdiction.”55 This statute includes sexual abuse offenses.56 Essentially, all U.S. aircraft or any aircraft in the United States is
within the special aircraft jurisdiction.57 In the case of in-flight
assaults, the FBI generally has investigative jurisdiction—so long
as they are actually reported.58
Congress does not possess exclusive interest in aviation laws
and regulations. Regarding commercial aviation, Congress has
delegated authority to two executive agencies. First, the FAA has
authority to regulate any U.S. civil aviation activities.59 Since its
52 Id.; see Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015)
(“[T]his [Supremacy] Clause creates a rule of decision: Courts ‘shall’ regard the
‘Constitution,’ and all laws ‘made in Pursuance thereof,’ as ‘the supreme Law of
the Land.’ They must not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws.”).
53 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958) (holding the Constitution is
the supreme law of the land, and state legislatures do not have the authority to
nullify Supreme Court or other federal court decisions).
54 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1).
55 Id. § 46506(1); see also 1412. Certain Crimes Aboard Aircraft in Flight—49 U.S.C.
46506, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1412-certain-crimes-aboard-aircraft-flight-49-usc-46506 [perma.cc/C55FZUBR].
56 49 U.S.C. § 46506; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2248; 1412. Certain Crimes Aboard Aircraft in Flight—49 U.S.C. 46506, supra note 55.
57 49 U.S.C. § 46501(2).
58 Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, supra note 7.
59 Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/safetyfirst/federal-aviation-administration [perma.cc/
TEX6-N86P]; see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 75 Stat.
737 (repealed and re-codified without substantive change at 49 U.S.C.
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creation in 1958, the FAA has grown tremendously and is now in
charge of providing the “safest, most efficient aerospace system
in the world.”60 Some of the FAA’s main tasks include developing programs to combat the environmental impact of airplanes;
regulating commercial space transportation as well as civil aviation; and setting safety standards for planes and crewmembers.61
On October 5, 2018, President Trump signed into law the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 (FAA Reauthorization Act), which
extended the FAA’s authority (and funding) until 2023.62
Second, TSA is another executive agency with authority relating to airline transportation. Created in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks,63 some of TSA’s main tasks include
organizing and implementing all security screenings for passengers at U.S. airports; liaising with law enforcement regarding
transportation security; and enforcing security-related regulations.64 TSA also controls the federal air marshals. The air marshals are “federal law enforcement officers deployed on
passenger flights worldwide to protect airline passengers and
crew against the risk of criminal and terrorist violence.”65
Though both agencies regulate aviation safety, the FAA’s mission indirectly helps keep passengers safe by creating safety standards, while TSA is directly responsible for passenger security in
all modes of transportation.66 Considering the authority granted
to each agency, either should have the power to create and implement a mandated reporting requirement for commercial airlines. While TSA seems the more logical choice due to its
connection to passenger security and its law enforcement powers, the FAA Reauthorization Act directed the Secretary of
Transportation to establish a task force addressing the issue of
§§ 40101–40105) (stating the FAA has authority over regulations and promotion
of civil aviation).
60 Safety: The Foundation of Everything We Do, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/about/safety_efficiency/ [perma.cc/7JNT-S9MM]; see 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(b)(1).
61 See Safety, The Foundation of Everything We Do, supra note 60; see 49 U.S.C.
§§ 40101–40130 (laying out the general policies and duties of the FAA).
62 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186
(2018).
63 See Mission, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission [perma.cc/TEX6-N86P]; see also 49 U.S.C. § 114(f).
64 49 U.S.C. § 114.
65 Federal Air Marshal Service and Law Enforcement, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.tsa.gov/about/jobs-at-tsa/federal-air-marshal-service-and-law-enforcement [perma.cc/U5EQ-JBJP]; 49 U.S.C. § 44917.
66 49 U.S.C. § 114(f); Mission, supra note 63.
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in-flight sexual misconduct.67 This task force, as well as the Stop
Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act (House
Bill 5139)—a bill recently passed by the House of Representatives—lay the groundwork for mandated reporting of in-flight
sexual assaults.68
C.

PENDING LEGISLATION

While Congress has said each airplane should have policies to
address in-flight sexual misconduct that include “facilitat[ing]
the reporting of sexual misconduct to appropriate law enforcement agencies,”69 there is no mandatory reporting requirement
even if an assault is reported to airline staff.70 The burden is
entirely on the airline itself to create and adhere to a reporting
policy.71 At most, a failure to report may be a factor when determining the airlines’ civil liability for the assault.72 The rest of
Section C will discuss pending legislation that could address the
issue of airline nonreporting including the FAA Reauthorization
Act and House Bill 5139.
1.

FAA Reauthorization Act

In 2018, Congress and President Trump addressed in-flight
sexual misconduct in the FAA Reauthorization Act,73 which directed the Secretary of Transportation to create the National InFlight Sexual Misconduct Task Force (Task Force).74 The Task
Force’s primary function is to review the current practices, protocols, and requirements of airlines when responding to alleged
sexual misconduct in-flight—this includes review of an airline’s
training, reporting, and data collection.75 The Task Force’s secondary function is to make recommendations based on their review of the airline’s protocols and firsthand accounts from
passengers who have experienced in-flight sexual misconduct.76
FAA Reauthorization Act § 339A.
See id. §§ 339A, 339B; Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation
Act, H.R. 5139, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
69 FAA Reauthorization Act § 338(1)(B).
70 See Appelbaum, supra note 13 (noting that there are no mandatory reporting requirements so airlines may report according to their own policies).
71 See FAA Reauthorization Act § 338(1).
72 See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Sardinas v. United Airlines, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA
(Wash. Super. Ct.-King Cnty. Jan. 17, 2019), E.C.F. No. 1-1.
73 FAA Reauthorization Act §§ 339A, 339B.
74 Id. § 339A(a).
75 Id. § 339A(a)(1).
76 Id. § 339A(a)(2).
67
68
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The Task Force’s purposes are six-fold. First, the Task Force
recommends ways to address sexual assault on planes; this could
include airline employee and contractor training.77 Second, the
Task Force suggests ways for passengers involved in an in-flight
sexual assault to report it.78 The Attorney General uses these recommendations to “establish a streamlined process” for “individuals involved in incidents of alleged sexual misconduct onboard
aircraft to report such allegations” in a way that protects their
privacy.79 Third, the Task Force suggests means of providing
data of in-flight sexual misconduct while protecting the victims’
privacy and preventing the public from identifying an individual
air carrier.80 Fourth, the Task Force is to “issue recommendations for flight attendants, pilots, and other appropriate airline
personnel on law enforcement notification in incidents of alleged sexual misconduct.”81 Fifth, the Task Force reviews and
uses firsthand accounts from passengers who have been assaulted in-flight, and, sixth, the Task Force does anything else it
deems necessary.82
The FAA Reauthorization Act requires that the Task Force
consist of representatives from (1) the Department of Transportation (DOT); (2) the Department of Justice; (3) national organizations that specialize in helping sexual assault victims; (4)
labor organizations that represent flight attendants and pilots;
(5) airports; (6) air carriers; (7) state and local law enforcement
agencies; and (8) other federal agencies and stakeholder organizations deemed necessary.83 These representatives ensure the interests of all groups or individuals affected by in-flight sexual
assault are represented. While the FAA Reauthorization Act is a
step in the right direction and has prompted discussion of inflight sexual assault, it leaves a lot to be desired regarding an
airline’s responsibility to report.
2.

House Bill 5139: Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in
Transportation Act

Representative Peter DeFazio recognized the legislative gap in
reporting requirements when he introduced House Bill 5139 to
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 339A(c)(1).
§ 339A(c)(2).
§ 339B(a).
§ 339A(c)(3).
§ 339A(c)(4).
§ 339A(c)(5)–(6).
§ 339A(b).
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the House of Representatives.84 The main purpose of House Bill
5139, which is still under review, is to “protect transportation
personnel and passengers from sexual assault and harassment.”85 To that end, it has an entire section devoted to the
sexual assault and harassment policies of foreign and domestic
air carriers.86 While House Bill 5139 is not yet as detailed as the
FAA Reauthorization Act, it better addresses airlines’ responsibility in preventing and reporting sexual assault.87 As it stands,
House Bill 5139 would require all commercial airlines to create
a formal in-flight sexual assault policy with five requirements.88
First, the policy must state that sexual assault or harassment is
always unacceptable.89 Second, the policy must include procedures to facilitate a victim’s reporting, including appropriate
public outreach activities and confidential ways to report.90
Third, the airlines must limit or prohibit future travel by an assailant.91 Fourth, the policy must mandate training for airline
personnel who may receive reports of in-flight assault and training to recognize and respond to potential human trafficking victims.92 Fifth, and most importantly, the policy would require
specific “procedures that personnel should follow upon the reporting of a transportation sexual assault or harassment incident, including actions to protect affected individuals from
continued sexual assault or harassment and to notify law enforcement when appropriate.”93
To make House Bill 5139 more palatable to air carriers, it also
states that compliance with these requirements would not definitively determine whether the airline fell below any requisite
standard of care.94 This essentially prevents noncompliance with
House Bill 5139 from becoming a per se determination of liabil84 Press Release, Rep. Peter DeFazio, Chair DeFazio Introduces Legislation to
Address Sexual Assault and Harassment in Passenger Transportation (Nov. 18,
2019), https://defazio.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/chair-defazio-introduces-legislation-to-address-sexual-assault-and [https://perma.cc/XVA3EB5B].
85 Id.
86 Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139,
116th Cong. pmbl., § 41727 (1st Sess. 2019).
87 See id.
88 Id.
89 Id. § 41727(b)(1).
90 Id. § 41727(b)(2).
91 Id. § 41727(b)(4).
92 Id. § 41727(b)(5).
93 Id. § 41727(b)(3) (emphasis added).
94 See id. § 41727(d).
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ity for the air carrier; however, this safeguard does not prevent a
court from reviewing noncompliance with the reporting requirement as a factor in deciding liability. Yet, as promising as
the FAA Reauthorization Act and House Bill 5139 are, there are
still issues to be addressed.
IV.

SHORTCOMINGS IN PENDING LEGISLATION
A.

THE FAA REAUTHORIZATION ACT

As the remainder of this Part will address, both the FAA
Reauthorization Act and House Bill 5139 fail to fully solve the
issue of nonreporting of in-flight sexual assaults. While the FAA
Reauthorization Act is a step in the right direction, it places the
burden of reporting on the victim, not the airline.95 In some
ways, it even places the protection of airlines over passenger
safety. For instance, the Task Force’s third purpose, encouraging data collection, is vital, as instances of in-flight sexual assault
are underreported.96 More accurate information could lead to
better prevention tactics. Yet, by failing to pair sexual assault
data with specific airlines, the public cannot consider safety as a
factor when choosing an airline. It appears this is an attempt to
protect air carriers from liability and economic loss, which may
not be considerate of the safety of future travelers.
The Task Force’s fourth purpose—to issue recommendations
for airline crewmembers on how to report to law enforcement—
is the most relevant to this Comment.97 While the FAA
Reauthorization Act is worded ambiguously, one can assume the
Task Force is meant to address reporting requirements for commercial airline crewmembers. Yet, there is no further mention
of requiring airlines to report. Instead, the FAA Reauthorization
Act focuses on ways the victim can report.98 The emphasis on
victim’s reporting is likely an effort to protect the privacy of victims and to allow them to control whether their assault is reported to law enforcement. While this is commendable, it shifts
the burden from airlines, imposing a duty on the traumatized
victim who generally lacks reporting capability at 35,000 feet.99 If
95 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 339B(a), 132 Stat.
3186 (2018).
96 Id. § 339A(c)(3).
97 Id. § 339A(c)(4).
98 See id. § 339B.
99 See Celine Hacobian, Here’s How High Planes Actually Fly, According to Experts,
TIME (June 27, 2018), https://time.com/5309905/how-high-do-planes-fly/
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the victim has already reported the incident to an airline
crewmember, the crewmember should have a duty as a common
carrier to notify law enforcement.
Further, by placing the reporting burden on the victim instead of the airline, the assailant is more likely to get away. Victims, compared to airline crewmembers, often lack the ability to
easily contact law enforcement until after they have landed.100
This time critically impacts law enforcement’s ability to respond
effectively.101 Cell phones remain largely prohibited and inaccessible to passengers in-flight.102 While some airlines sell inflight wireless internet,103 this is often unreliable. Further, while
a victim could potentially contact law enforcement using inflight wireless internet to send an email, it seems unlikely that
law enforcement will read the email and take action by the time
the plane lands. This impacts the victim’s ability to secure protection for themselves, hinders law enforcement’s arrest and investigation, and may endanger another victim.104 Ultimately, the
victim is often unable to seek redress or protection via law enforcement until after the plane has landed—potentially after be[perma.cc/ARA8-TAUP] (noting that planes generally fly at 31,000 to 38,000
feet).
100 See Fact Sheet – Portable Electronics on Airplanes, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June
21, 2013), https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=1477
4#:~:text=Since%201991%2C%20the%20FCC%20has,is%20taxiing%20to%20the
%20gate [https://perma.cc/9QFR-4ZWA] (noting banned cell phone use on airplanes and that even in newer model planes, when passengers might be allowed
to use their phones after the plane reaches 10,000 feet, cell phones lack the ability to transmit signals until landing); Portable Electronic Devices, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/ped/#:~:text=the
%20FAA%20is%20not%20considering,airborne%20calls%20using
%20cell%20phones [https://perma.cc/Z426-LLU3] (“The FAA is not considering the use of cell phones . . . during flight because Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) regulations currently prohibit any airborne calls using cell
phones.”).
101 WILLIAM SPELMAN & DALE K. BROWN, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., CALLING THE
POLICE: CITIZEN REPORTING OF SERIOUS CRIME, at xix, 61–80 (1984), https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/82276NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H2AWL5W] (finding time it takes to report crime affects possibility of on-scene
arrests).
102 See Fact Sheet – Portable Electronics on Airplanes, supra note 100; Portable Electronic Devices, supra note 100.
103 See, e.g., Wi-Fi and Connectivity, AM. AIRLINES, https://www.aa.com/i18n/
travel-info/experience/entertainment/wi-fi-and-connectivity.jsp?anchorLocation=directURL&title=wifi [perma.cc/CDH2-HBCM] (showing ability to
purchase wi-fi on domestic flights).
104 See, e.g., Complaint at 5–6, Sardinas v. United Airlines, 19-2-01663-9 SEA
(Wash. Sup. Ct.-King Cnty. Jan. 17, 2019).
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ing subjected to repeated assaults or attempted assaults.105 While
the Task Force is trying to create a streamlined reporting process for the victim of an in-flight assault,106 this seems to focus
on preventing liability for airlines instead of assisting victims and
punishing the offender.
Lastly, the FAA Reauthorization Act does not require TSA
representatives to be part of the Task Force.107 If a mandatory
reporting requirement is created—as this Comment suggests—
the Task Force should include TSA. TSA oversees passenger security and has more direct ties with law enforcement.108 It would
logically follow that TSA is included and has a say in how to
handle reporting and investigating in-flight sexual assaults. Additionally, TSA would likely be the agency responsible for ensuring the alleged assailant does not leave the airport prior to
being detained.
B.

HOUSE BILL 5139

House Bill 5139 is a great start to addressing the responsibility
airlines should have in responding to sexual assault. It supplements the FAA Reauthorization Act and recognizes that the airline, not just the victim, should report transportation assault and
harassment to law enforcement because they are in a better posi105 While it is possible for flight attendants to move victims to seats away from
their assailant, and thus limit their ability to be assaulted again, this is not always
the crewmembers’ response. See, e.g., Nora Caplan-Bricker, Flight Risk, SLATE
(Aug. 31, 2016, 5:58 AM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/08/flightrisk.html [https://perma.cc/VQM7-4A2E] (describing incident where female
passenger was verbally and physically harassed mid-flight and had to beg to move
to different seat); Melanie Cox, Flight and Fight, MARIE CLAIRE (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/a33252517/sexual-misconduct-on-airplanes/ [https://perma.cc/D66R-Z3F2] (discussing woman being groped on a
Frontier Airlines flight and being forced to return to her seat next to assailant
after reporting incident to flight crew). This is likely due to a lack of guidance or
training. See Nathan Wilson, WA Senator Makes New Push to Address Airline Sexual
Assaults, KIRO 7 (June 13, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/
first-on-kiro-7-wa-senator-makes-new-push-to-address-airline-sexual-assaults/
769083070/ [https://perma.cc/KHU2-XZBG] (reporting 91.5% of flight attendants, out of 2000, received no written guidance or training on how to handle
sexual assault from their airline).
106 FAA Reauthorization Act § 339A(c)(2).
107 See id. § 339A(b).
108 Bob Burns & Jennifer Lapidow, 10 Things You Might Not Know About TSA,
U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. BLOG (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/
10/13/10-things-you-might-not-know-about-tsa [https://perma.cc/F3GC-44T7].
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tion to do so.109 As House Bill 5139 stands, however, it allows
airlines flexibility to determine their own reporting policies.110
This needs to be amended to provide more specific direction.
One can expect significant pushback from commercial airlines
that may not want to spend the money it would take to implement a specific reporting policy. This is especially true if the
reporting requirements would mandate updating airplane technology.111 Nonetheless, while flexibility in company policy is
often beneficial from an economic standpoint, passenger safety
should be prioritized. More specific requirements would (1)
help ensure that an airline cannot find a loophole in the legislation; and (2) help courts uniformly assess airlines’ responses to
in-flight sexual assaults when determining liability. Further, specific reporting requirements would assist in ensuring that all inflight assaults reported to crewmembers are addressed and
investigated.
Overall, the FAA Reauthorization Act and House Bill 5139 are
conduits of conversation for the issue of in-flight sexual assault.
Yet, more responsibility should be placed on airlines to combat
steadily increasing crime through reporting requirements. By
examining the policies and purposes of other reporting requirements, one can see how the pending legislation on this issue
fails to capitalize on the benefits more stringent reporting requirements could incur.
V.

OTHER MANDATED REPORTERS

Requiring airlines to report in-flight assaults is consistent with
the policies and purposes of reporting requirements in other
crimes. Further, a uniform mandated reporting policy would
benefit victims and air carriers alike. The remainder of this
Comment will address these two propositions.

109 See Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139,
116th Cong. § 41727(b)(3) (1st Sess. 2019).
110 Id. (noting there is no specific method to determine when notifying law
enforcement is appropriate or how to do so).
111 For an example of technology that assists airlines in reporting, see Making
Respect Real: Continued Work to Prevent and Address Sexual Misconduct, ALASKA AIRLINES: BLOG (Nov. 9, 2018), https://blog.alaskaair.com/values/people/sexualharassment-prevention/ [perma.cc/7FCZ-N2D6]. This technology is discussed
further in Part VI, supra.
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“If you see something, say something.”112 This is the slogan
and title of the Department of Homeland Security’s campaign
encouraging ordinary, everyday citizens to report suspicious activity to their local law enforcement.113 While this sort of reporting is encouraged and arguably imposes a moral duty, there is
no universal law that requires citizens to report criminal activity.114 Title 18 of the U.S. Code seems to require the reporting of
felonies, but it generally only criminalizes concealment—not
nonreporting.115 Historically, only certain individuals in specific
circumstances have been forced (and not just encouraged) to
report.116
Lately, there has been a trend toward requiring more professionals and corporations to report criminal activity.117 Requiring
airlines to do the same in the case of sexual assault follows this
trend; however, creating a reporting requirement for in-flight
sexual assault raises the question of whether airlines should be
required to report other in-flight crimes. While reliable statistics
of in-flight crime are difficult to find, research indicates in-flight
theft has been going on for years.118 Similarly, there have been
numerous, highly publicized incidents of in-flight assault.119 If
Congress were to create a reporting requirement for in-flight
sexual assault, it would likely have the surplus benefit of the legislature considering mandated reporting for other in-flight
crimes. While these benefits are outside of the scope of this
Comment, it is useful to recognize the difficulties all in-flight
crime imposes on airlines, passengers, and the justice system as a
whole.
112 If You See Something, Say Something, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something [perma.cc/EZX6-7PJM].
113 Id.
114 See Candice Delmas, The Civic Duty to Report Crime and Corruption, 9 LES ATELIERS DE L’ÉTHIQUE 50, 55–56 (2014).
115 18 U.S.C. § 4; Sungyong Kang, In Defense of the “Duty to Report” Crimes, 86
UMKC L. REV. 361, 361 (2017).
116 See generally Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: “Duty to
Report” Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 5 (2002)
(detailing types of reporting requirements affecting different professionals).
117 See id.
118 Beth Williams, On-Board Theft: 10 Tips to Protect Valuables While You Snooze in
the Sky, CORP. TRAVEL SAFETY (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www.corporatetravelsafety.com/safety-tips/airline-on-board-theft/ [perma.cc/9UYH-XJUJ].
119 See, e.g., Madeleine Marr, ‘You’re Out of Control.’ Plane Passenger Hits Husband
with Laptop for Ogling Women, MIA. HERALD (July 24, 2019), miamiherald.com/
news/local/crime/article233056302.html.
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The remainder of this Part will examine three mandatory reporting requirements and their underlying policies. It will also
state how these policies could apply to an air carrier’s duty to
report in-flight assaults.
A.

CRUISE SHIP REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

First, the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA) requires the owner of a cruise ship to report a crime to the
FBI “as soon as possible after the occurrence on board the vessel
of an incident involving homicide, suspicious death, a missing
United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily
injury, [sexual crimes,] firing or tampering with the vessel, or
theft of money or property in excess of $10,000.”120 Prior to the
creation of this new reporting requirement, cruise ships did not
have to alert law enforcement of crimes occurring on the high
seas.121 The reporting of crimes on cruise ships before 2010 was
self-regulating, just as the airline industry is today.122 “Without a
legal duty, cruise companies ha[d] little incentive to voluntarily
report or investigate crimes on vessels for fear of victims establishing civil liability against the companies.”123 This lack of reporting—combined with the large amount of time that passes
before the FBI can access ships to investigate—posed a substantial problem for addressing onboard sexual assaults and often
left victims without justice or closure.124
When the CVSSA was introduced, Congress observed that sexual assaults were the primary crime occurring on cruise ships
and found issues with a lack of reporting to law enforcement
and the public.125 Congress further recognized the difficulties
facing the FBI for securing crime scenes and investigating witnesses such as competing jurisdictions, being on the high seas,
and the varying nationalities of the victims.126 Accordingly, the
CVSSA was immensely popular and passed with only four “no”
46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(A)(i).
Tiffany L. Peyroux, The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 Founders on
Its Maiden Voyage, 13 LOY. MAR. L.J. 74, 87 (2014).
122 See id. at 88.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 91–92.
125 Id. at 97–98; see also Jim Walker, Accurate Cruise Crime Statistics Finally Available, CRUISE L. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.cruiselawnews.com/2016/10/articles/crime/accurate-cruise-crime-statistics-finally-available/ [perma.cc/BKQ5TDFP] (noting “sexual assault on cruise ships occurs with a similar regularity as
you might find on land”).
126 Peyroux, supra note 121, at 98.
120
121
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votes.127 Part of the CVSSA’s mission was to bring to light crime
on cruise ships and prevent the industry from operating under
“a veil of secrecy.”128 For this reason, the CVSSA allows for civil
and criminal penalties for reporting requirement violations.129
The airline industry and the cruise ship industry should have
the same heightened reporting requirements as both industries
share the same concerns. First, airlines can be held liable for inflight sexual assaults just as cruise ships can be held liable for
onboard sexual assaults.130 Thus, there is motivation for airlines
to cover up in-flight crimes to avoid liability. Competition within
both industries provides incentives to avoid lawsuits and losing
money.
Further, just as “emergency 911” is nonexistent on some
cruise ships,131 passengers are usually incapable of reporting
their assault to law enforcement mid-flight.132 Difficulty in contacting law enforcement and receiving an immediate investigation beg for a mandatory reporting requirement to ensure that
crewmembers who can easily contact law enforcement do so.
Law enforcement can then give advice on how to preserve the
scene, assist the victim, or deal with the assailant. This is true
even if law enforcement cannot investigate until the plane has
landed or the ship has docked.
The airline industry is self-regulating, just as the cruise ship
industry used to be.133 By passing the CVSSA, Congress intimated that self-regulation alone was unsatisfactory for the cruise
line industry.134 The similarities of the industries suggest Congress could find the commercial aviation industry likewise
should not be self-regulating. Both industries carry over 25 million passengers a year with 25.8 million global cruise passengers
Id. at 101.
See id.
129 See 46 U.S.C. § 3507(h)(1).
130 See Leticia M. Diaz, Barry H. Dubner & Nicole McKee, Crimes and Medical
Care on Board Cruise Ships: Do the Statistics Fit the Crimes?, 27 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
40, 74 (2014); DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 6–20 (discussing liability for sexual
assault aboard airplanes).
131 Diaz et al., supra note 130, at 63.
132 Note that the CVSSA does require that victims of sexual assault onboard
cruise ships be given means to contact law enforcement; however, the investigation may still be postponed until the ship is docked. See 46 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(5).
133 See Appelbaum, supra note 13; McMahon, supra note 13 (noting that since
there are no mandatory reporting requirements, different airlines are allowed to
regulate and report in different ways).
134 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-207, § 2, 124
Stat. 2243, 2243–44.
127
128
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in 2017135 and 1 billion scheduled airline passengers in 2018.136
Both industries transport travelers in an isolated manner where
they lack the ability to easily contact the outside world if passengers could even determine who to contact. Both industries take
passengers under similar care and control while traveling. It follows that the policies requiring reporting on cruise ships apply
equally to the airline industry. This is particularly true considering how many more people travel on airplanes annually than on
cruise ships.137 More passengers, statistically speaking, means
more opportunities for assault and likely more assailants.138 Although passengers remain on cruise ships for longer than they
are on airplanes, many in-flight sexual assaults occur while passengers are sleeping in their seats.139 On cruise ships, passengers
may sleep in bunk rooms with lockable doors. In some cases,
lockable doors provide assailants an opportunity to shield themselves and their crime from onlookers;140 in other cases, lockable doors (especially those with peepholes) should provide
some security against assault that is not similarly available to passengers sleeping on airplanes.141 Accordingly, passengers could
be similarly vulnerable on airlines and cruise ships.
135 2018 Cruise Industry Overview, FLA.-CARIBBEAN CRUISE ASS’N, https://www.fcca.com/downloads/2018-Cruise-Industry-Overview-and-Statistics.pdf [perma.
cc/SQA3-Z4NR].
136 2018 Traffic Data for U.S. Airlines and Foreign Airlines U.S. Flights, BUREAU
TRANSP. STATS. (Oct. 2019), https://www.bts.dot.gov/newsroom/2018-trafficdata-us-airlines-and-foreign-airlines-us-flights [perma.cc/NU4Q-VCWR].
137 See 2018 Cruise Industry Overview, supra note 135; 2018 Traffic Data for U.S.
Airlines and Foreign Airlines U.S. Flights, supra note 136.
138 See Press Release, House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, Chair
DeFazio’s Bill to Curb Sexual Assault and Harrassment in Passenger Transp.
Clears Full House (Oct. 1, 2020), https://transportation.house.gov/news/pressreleases/chair-defazios-bill-to-curb-sexual-assault-and-harassment-in-passengertransportation-clears-full-house [https://perma.cc/N2CU-4SKA] (noting 119 reports of in-flight sexual assaults in 2019 alone compared to 260 reported sexual
assaults aboard cruise ships since 2016).
139 E.g., David Williams & Carma Hassan, Man Gets 9 Years for Sexually Assaulting
an Airline Passenger While She Slept, CNN (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/12/14/us/airplane-sexual-assault-sentence-trnd/index.html [perma.cc/
B3RT-MQE7].
140 E.g., Cruise Ship Security Practices and Procedure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Com., Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of Evelyn Fortier, Vice
President, Policy, Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network (RAINN)) (describing crewmember raping passenger in her cabin room).
141 Emanuella Grinberg, Cruise Ship Security Bill Clears Congress, CNN (July 11,
2010), https://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/07/01/cruise.ship.bill/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3H5X-QZE6].
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Lastly, critics of mandatory reporting requirements often say
that requiring a report to law enforcement takes away an individual’s autonomy and self-determination—it takes away the victim’s decision of whether to report for one’s self.142 This
argument fails in the airline and cruise ship context. First, if a
victim reports the incident to crewmembers, whether on a plane
or a cruise, he or she is already reporting the incident to what is
essentially the highest authority available.143 In such isolated circumstances, the crewmembers are often the only authority
figures readily available to take action against an assailant.144
Second, if a victim is reporting to a crewmember that he or she
has been sexually assaulted, the cruise ship or airline is put on
notice and has an obligation to act to protect other passengers.145 Their liability for negligence may be enhanced if they do
not tell law enforcement of the incident, particularly if the assailant continues traveling and assaulting others.146 It is true that
the victim may only report the incident to crewmembers so they
may switch seats or cabins to avoid their assailant, without intending to report law enforcement. Yet, in passing the CVSSA,
Congress indicated that the danger of allowing the assailant to
go unreprimanded is too great, regardless of a passenger’s motivation for reporting.147 There is no reason this logic should not
extend to the airline industry. The assailant may hurt other passengers in the future, and the airline should not open itself up
to that sort of liability.
B.

CHILD ABUSE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Similarly, the policies underlying child abuse reporting requirements apply to the airline industry. All states require at
least some professional actors to report suspected child abuse to
See Joseph W. Barber, The Kids Aren’t All Right: The Failure of Child Abuse
Statutes as a Model for Elder Abuse Statutes, 16 ELDER L.J. 107, 122–23 (2008).
143 Cruise Industry Oversight: Incidents Show Need for Stronger Focus on Consumer
Protection: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 2
(2013) [hereinafter Cruise Industry Oversight Senate Hearing] (opening statement
by Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV) (describing responsibility cruise ship’s
crewmembers have toward protecting passengers from crime while on board).
144 Id.
145 See K.T. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 931 F.3d 1041, 1044 (11th Cir.
2019) (overturning a dismissal of a negligence claim against a cruise line when
the crewmembers allegedly knew about sexual crimes against cruise ship
passengers).
146 See id.
147 46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3).
142
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law enforcement.148 This was federally mandated in 1974 when
Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA).149 CAPTA threatened to withhold federal grants
to states if they did not have mandatory reporting requirements.150 Since all states had already passed some form of reporting law by 1967, CAPTA was essentially a reinforcement
tactic.151 Who is required to report varies by state, but even a
state with the least comprehensive reporting laws still requires
“medical and mental health professionals, school officials, law
enforcement officers,” and those in a “safety-sensitive position”
to report suspected abuse.152 Many of these requirements occurred because the media called for it: “[P]ress and broadcasters created an impetus for child abuse reporting laws.”153
Regardless of how they came about or the specific requirements of each state, these reporting requirements all share a
common purpose. The duty to report child abuse is designed to
protect vulnerable children and catch wrongdoers.154 Reporting
notifies law enforcement of an incident and triggers an investigation in hopes of getting the child the help he or she needs, as
well as punishing the wrongdoer and preventing future harm.155
What differentiates child abuse from other crimes, and justifies
its mandated reporting, is the vulnerability of the child. “If an
adult is assaulted, he or she is more likely to be capable of reporting the incident to the authorities. Society’s view of children, however, is that a child may be too young to protect
himself or too frightened to report the abuse to the appropriate
authorities.”156 The individuals generally required to report—
such as medical professionals or teachers—are in a position to
148 Leonard G. Brown, III & Kevin Gallagher, Mandatory Reporting of Abuse: A
Historical Perspective on the Evolution of States’ Current Mandatory Reporting Laws With
a Review of the Laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE
LEGE 37, 37 (2013).
149 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5119.
150 Brown & Gallagher, supra note 148, at 38.
151 Id. at 37. CAPTA also created a mandatory reporting requirement for certain people who suspected child abuse on federal property. Id. at 46.
152 Id. at 61 (describing the South Dakota mandatory reporting requirement).
153 Id. at 40.
154 Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion., 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 727–28
(1987).
155 See id. at 728.
156 Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (1998).
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care for the child with access to special knowledge about the
child’s physical or mental well-being.
The purposes underlying reporting requirements of suspected child abuse—protecting the vulnerable and initiating
criminal investigations—support issuing a reporting requirement for in-flight sexual assault.157 While the Author does not
intend to trivialize the horrors of child abuse or neglect,158 being an airline passenger makes one vulnerable. If one is assaulted in-flight, they will largely rely on the flight crew for
protection and real-time reporting to law enforcement.159 In
some cases, due to a flight crew’s poor response, victims have
been forced to remain seated next to their assailant.160
Further, crewmembers, like medical professionals and other
mandatory child abuse reporters, are at least knowledgeable
about crimes on airplanes, and they could receive additional
training to respond to these types of situations.161 Moreover,
child abuse is a covert crime—even with mandatory reporting.162 Similarly, the isolated nature of an airplane means inflight sexual assault is covert.163 Mandatory reporting in that moment will ensure law enforcement is notified quickly to improve
See Mitchell, supra note 154, at 727–28.
Marrus, supra note 156, at 514.
159 See Experts Explain Why Sexual Assaults Occur On Airplanes & What Airlines Can
Do to Stop It, ASS’N OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, https://www.afacwa.org/experts_explain_why_sexual_assaults_occur_on_airplanes_what_airlines_can_do_
to_stop_it [https://perma.cc/BLY3-R75W] (“The particular environment of
planes can also make the experience of surviving sexual assault even more difficult. . . . [W]hen a victim is violated in a confined space, it can be even more
distressing and exacerbate the feeling of helplessness, vulnerability, and
powerlessness.”) (internal quotations omitted); see Karen Schwartz, How to Protect
Yourself From Sexual Assault on a Plane, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/10/21/travel/how-to-protect-yourself-from-sexual-assault-ona-plane.html [https://perma.cc/XUD2-EJCK] (stating one of the primary ways to
protect against in-flight sexual assault is to report suspicious activity and any harassment to the flight crew and ensure they notify the pilot).
160 See Elisha Fieldstadt, Women Claim They Were Sexually Assaulted on Frontier
Flights and Airline Did Nothing, NBC NEWS (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.
nbcnews.com/news/us-news/women-claim-they-were-sexually-assaulted-frontierflights-airline-did-n1107231 [perma.cc/Z3PU-LGKT].
161 Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to Report Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R.4TH 782,
§ 2(b) (1989) (discussing how training impacts duty to report); 49 U.S.C. § 44918
(discussing some training made available to airline crewmembers).
162 Marrus, supra note 156, at 514.
163 See Experts Explain Why Sexual Assaults Occur On Airplanes & What Airlines Can
Do to Stop It, supra note 159 (noting in-flight sexual assault “is a crime that is not
obvious” and conditions on planes make it more likely to occur).
157
158
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the chances of preserving evidence and responding to the
crimes effectively.164
C.

HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Reporting requirements in environmental law present other
parallels to the commercial airline context outside of demonstrating a passenger’s vulnerability. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA),165 which was later reinforced by the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA),166 requires that if hazardous waste is released without permission in
certain circumstances, it must be immediately reported to the
U.S. government, state, local, or tribal officials.167 One reason
this requirement was created is so that the government could
appropriately respond to the situation by investigating, organizing a cleanup, and evacuating citizens.168 Another reason was to
record inactive hazardous waste sites.169 Essentially, this means
that the reporting requirement “also contains record keeping
requirements that enable the government to track potential
threats to the environment.”170
Under CERCLA and EPCRA, the one required to report the
impermissible release of hazardous waste is the “person in
charge” of the vessel or facility from which the waste was released.171 In other words, the one responsible for reporting is
the one entrusted with the care of the facility or vessel.172 The
purpose of environmental reporting requirements supports the
idea that the general public needs protection from dangerous
events beyond their control.173
164 See Scott McFarlane, Surge in Sexual Assaults on Airplanes, NBC (June 12,
2015), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/surge-in-sexual-assaults-onairplanes/1982641/ [https://perma.cc/WFJ7-4PGS] (“Investigations [of in-flight
sexual assault], though still possible, become more complicated after attackers
and witnesses have left the scene.”).
165 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
166 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001–11050.
167 See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a); Thompson, supra note 116, at 31–32.
168 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 34.
169 Id. at 33.
170 Id.
171 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(a), 11004(a).
172 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 33.
173 See id. at 34.
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Just as reporting hazardous waste is necessary for the government to appropriately respond to the situation,174 airline members need to report the instances of in-flight sexual assault so
that law enforcement may properly respond to the situation.175
If the commercial airline does not report the incident to law
enforcement when they are notified, the perpetrator may get
away.176 The fact that passengers come from around the world
may further complicate this.177 If assailants are not stopped as
soon as the plane lands, they may retreat to a location outside
the reach of U.S. law enforcement or far enough away that law
enforcement lacks the resources to pursue an effective investigation.178 Further, if airline crewmembers do not report the incident to law enforcement immediately, important details that
were known at the time of the attack may be forgotten or witnesses to the incident may be unavailable.179 The assailant may
even be allowed to fly on the same airline again.180 All of this
See id.
See supra Parts II, IV.
176 E.g., Complaint for Damages at 5, Dvaladze v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No.
2:18-cv-00297-RSL (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2019), ECF No. 1; see also Stephen Stock,
Mark Villarreal & Kevin Nious, Chaos on Commercial Flights: Unruly Airline Passengers Rarely Face Criminal Charges, NBC (Dec. 16, 2015, 2:04 PM), https://www.
nbcbayarea.com/news/local/unruly-passengers-escape-prosecution/143956/
[https://perma.cc/RXA9-QMHS] (noting that, similar to the lack of reporting
requirements for in-flight sexual assault, airlines are not required to report unruly passengers—even if they must be detained mid-flight—and these passengers
are often allowed to go free without facing any repercussions).
177 Air Passenger Travel Arrivals in the United States from Selected Foreign Countries,
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS., https://www.bts.gov/content/air-passenger-travel-arrivals-united-states-selected-foreign-countries-thousands-passenger [https://
perma.cc/SV5G-CF7D].
178 Brad Heath, The Ones That Get Away, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2014), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/11/fugitives-next-door/
6262719/ [https://perma.cc/VFU6-HEHS] (describing legal difficulties associated with securing justice once fugitives cross state lines); William Magnuson, The
Domestic Politics of International Extradition, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 839, 897 (2012)
(describing uncertainty regarding what counts as compliance with international
extradition treaties).
179 See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note 164 (describing incident where passenger
notified law enforcement of an in-flight assault after landing, but charges could
not be brought because “other passengers and potential witnesses had already
dispersed”).
180 See Rheana Murray, The Consequences of Being an Unruly Plane Passenger, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014, 1:28 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/consequences-unruly-plane-passenger/story?id=25246721 [https://perma.cc/G6R8-HHXY] (reporting on American Airlines spokesperson Josh Freed’s statement that while
denying a passenger future travel aboard an airline is possible, it “rarely
happens”).
174
175

696

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

suggests that the airline should be required to report as soon as
practicably possible. Just as a hazardous waste facility failing to
report an incident may subject others to harm such as pollution
or sickness, an airline failing to report sexual assault could create future victims.181 While this sort of crime does not affect the
general public in the same way hazardous waste might,182 the
benefit of requiring reporting—potentially protecting others
from being victimized—arguably outweighs the cost of intruding on airline company policy with mandating reporting
requirements.
Further, while a commercial airline would not necessarily be
responsible for the in-flight assault in the way the one in charge
of the vessel or facility leaking hazardous waste might,183 they
are still entrusted with the care of their passengers. Courts have
demonstrated this by repeatedly stating that airlines can be held
liable for passenger-on-passenger assault.184 Requiring airline
crewmembers to report in-flight crime makes sense, as they have
more control over the vessel than their passengers and a responsibility to care for those onboard.185 Lastly, as the FBI has stated,
data on sexual assault aboard planes is likely incorrect.186 Just as
the CERCLA reporting requirement also functions to aid the
development of a central database containing violations,187 requiring airline crewmembers to report in-flight sexual assault
could aid law enforcement agencies in collecting and maintaining more accurate data. In the age of technology, data is being
used around the world to predict where crime is most likely to
See Thompson, supra note 116, at 34.
E.g., Isabelle Chapman, A Landfill in Their Backyard, CNN (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/09/us/september-11-cancer-rates-freshkills/ [https://perma.cc/5K88-WF9L] (describing liability to third parties for impacts of hazardous waste).
183 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 33 (discussing how those required to report hazardous waste releases are the ones responsible for it because they oversee
the facility or vessel).
184 See DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 6–20.
185 See Louis Cheslaw, What Happens When a Law is Broken on a Plane, CONDÉ
NAST TRAVELER (July 8, 2019), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/what-happenswhen-a-law-is-broken-on-a-plane [https://perma.cc/W5QL-QXEH]. When situations occur within the cabin, the flight crew is the group that responds. Id. Pilots,
who respond to reports from other crewmembers onboard, “are also the ones in
charge of reporting any incidents to air traffic control below”—it is this report
that leads “to a police presence at the gate once the plane lands.” Id.
186 See Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, supra note 7 (mentioning how in-flight sexual assault is underreported).
187 Thompson, supra note 116, at 33.
181
182
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occur.188 Law enforcement uses this information and deploys additional resources to deter crime where the patterns indicate it
is likely to return.189 If accurate data were collected regarding inflight sexual assault, police could potentially review this information and deduce which flights are most likely to have attacks,
which airlines need to increase safety procedures, and if other
circumstances increase risk for an airline or passenger.190
Child abuse and environmental violations are very different
types of crimes. Crimes on cruise ships can take a variety of
forms. Child abuse generally affects one person and a broad
range of individuals may be required to report it.191 Environmental violations may affect a larger portion of the public and
require only a few specified individuals to report them.192
Crimes on cruise ships generally affect one individual at a time
and restrict who is required to report.193 Yet, the purposes and
policies behind all of these varied, large-scale reporting requirements extend to the mandated reporting of in-flight sexual assault. Congress should instill a reporting requirement to better
protect and respond to victims, prevent future attacks, decrease
incentives for airlines to cover up crimes, assist law enforcement,
and collect accurate data. Still, the best solution is not to allow
an airline to report however they choose. Instead, a uniform reporting requirement should be enacted, as it is the most beneficial for the victims, the judicial system, and the airlines.

188 Andrej Kovacevic, Police are Using Big Data to Predict Future Crime Rates, SMART
DATA COLLECTIVE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.smartdatacollective.com/policeare-using-big-data-to-predict-future-crime-rates/ [perma.cc/6AAS-8X98].
189 JENNIFER BACHNER, PREDICTIVE POLICING: PREVENTING CRIME WITH DATA AND
ANALYTICS 8–9 (2013), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files
/Predictive%20Policing.pdf [https://perma.cc/68UQ-F46K].
190 For more information on data-driven policing and how law enforcement
uses the data it receives, see id.; WALTER L. PERRY, BRIAN MCINNIS, CARTER C.
PRICE, SUSAN C. SMITH & JOHN S. HOLLYWOOD, PREDICTIVE POLICING (2013),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/243830.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9CE7-4AT6]; Lawrence W. Sherman, Wolfson Prof. of Criminology and Dir. of
Police Exec. Programme, Cambridge Univ., Knowledge-Based Policing: India and the
Global Revolution in Crime Prevention (Apr. 8, 2010), in JINDAL GLOB. L. REV. 1,
Sept. 2010, at *1.
191 See supra Section V.B.
192 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 33–34; see also supra Section V.C.
193 See supra Section V.A.
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THE BENEFITS OF A UNIFORM REPORTING
REQUIREMENT

While the above Parts of this Comment have addressed some
of the general benefits of a reporting requirement, the remainder of this Part will discuss the benefits of a uniform reporting
requirement specifically. Unlike child abuse reporting requirements where each state has their own procedures and rules,194
the federal government could enact a reporting requirement for
in-flight sexual assault that would extend to all domestic commercial airlines regardless of jurisdiction.195 As the federal government likely has the authority to enact such a requirement, it
should do so, particularly in light of the benefits that come with
a uniform reporting requirement.196
Air carriers can be liable for sexual assaults that occur in-flight
even if it is a passenger-on-passenger assault.197 As a common
carrier’s liability often turns on whether the incident was foreseeable or whether the vessel had a heightened duty of care,
airlines are likely to decrease their chances of liability by adhering to a uniform reporting requirement that has been put in
place.198 For example, if a victim reports an in-flight assault, the
crime is not reported, and the assailant escapes, the airline
could be considered negligent in their treatment of the victim if
the court finds they owe the victim a duty of care.199 This is a
likely result under common carrier doctrine.
On the other hand, if the federal government enacts a uniform reporting requirement with specific measures to be taken
and procedures to be followed, airlines will have clearer guidelines as to how they should respond. With clarity in guidance,
airlines will better understand what they should do, which in
turn helps them understand their risks for liability. This clarity
would also increase judicial efficiency, as there would be less
case-by-case analysis (at least insofar as whether the airline
See Brown & Gallagher, supra note 148, at 37–38.
See Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 59; Mission, supra note 63.
196 Supra Section III.B.
197 See, e.g., Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 2000); Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 2000); Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., No. 97C0320, 1997 WL 767278, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1997).
198 See DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 13 (discussing common carrier liability).
199 Cf. R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1206–07 (D. Or. 2018)
(finding airline not liable when (1) the defendant was not intoxicated; (2) the
attack was noticed by a flight attendant; (3) the passengers were separated; (4)
law enforcement was notified immediately; and (5) law enforcement met the assailant upon landing).
194
195
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should have reported), and the court may instead look to see
whether they adhered to the uniform requirement. Yet, as
House Bill 5139 suggests, adherence or failure to abide by a reporting requirement should not be dispositive in a court proceeding; it should be looked at as a factor to determine the
airline’s liability.200 The court should still account for possible
extenuating circumstances.
Additionally, as it currently stands, reporting requirements
are dictated by the airlines themselves. While some companies,
such as Alaska Airlines, have been praised for their recently enacted policies,201 others have yet to respond to the increase in
mid-air assaults.202 If a mandatory, uniform reporting requirement was enacted, the airlines who have yet to respond to the
increasing issue of in-flight sexual assault would be pushed to
action. This could help keep passengers safer, shield airlines
from liability, and encourage the airlines to enact other policies
relating to in-flight sexual assaults. These policies could include
additional training for the flight crew, guidance on how to treat
a victim of an alleged assault, and regulations concerning when
a passenger should be removed or forbidden from future flights
with the airline.203 By making the reporting requirement uniform, airlines will no longer dictate when to report. Uncertainty
will be eliminated, and airlines do not have to hope their company reporting policies are sufficient to protect themselves from
liability. It will also be more difficult for airlines to find loopholes in the hopes of shielding themselves from legal responsibility. Further, crewmembers will have to be trained on in-flight
sexual assault—at least to the extent that they will have to be
coached on when to report. A uniform reporting requirement
ensures passengers can choose any airline and not have to worry
200 Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139,
116th Cong. § 41727(d) (1st Sess. 2019).
201 Allison Dvaladze, Airline Industry Treats Sexual Assaults in the Skies Like an
Inconvenience, Not a Crime, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2019), https://usatoday.com/
story/opinion/voices/2019/04/01/sexual-assault-airline-flight-elaine-chaotrump-boeing-column/3312204002/ [perma.cc/8F5F-Z26R] (applauding Alaska
Airlines for their policies regarding in-flight assault).
202 Kirk Johnson, 2 Airline Sexual Assault Cases Draw Charges and a Call for Help,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/airplaneassault-seattle.html [perma.cc/9733-TRE7] (“[M]any other airlines have been
silent.”).
203 See Making Respect Real: Continued Work to Prevent and Address Sexual Misconduct, supra note 111 (discussing Alaska Airlines’ new reporting and training
policies).
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about an incident of in-flight sexual assault going unreported
when it occurs.204
A uniform reporting requirement does take away some of the
airlines’ autonomy and may require a price increase to instill the
reporting procedures. For example, Alaska Airlines, currently at
the forefront of airlines advocating for increased safety for passengers, has created a “24/7 hotline” and reporting tool.205 This
tool, called Report It!, is a safety app “installed on every company-issued mobile device” which allows crewmembers “to instantly report any allegation of harassment or assault, and flag it
for investigation.”206 Despite the likely cost associated with building a new application,207 Alaska Airlines found that it was a
worthwhile price to pay to ensure passenger safety, assist in law
enforcement investigations, and shield themselves from liability.208 Further, existing FAA regulations could be said to impede
airline autonomy and cost airlines a substantial amount of
money.209 As these regulations were passed, and many of them
relate to passenger safety, it follows that airlines and Congress
should be open to a mandated reporting requirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
“For the women, men and children sexually assaulted while
flying who have demanded action, as well as those who suffer in
silence, the DOT must do more. . . . Sexual assault can no
longer be treated as an inconvenience, it is a crime and must be
treated as such.”210 As in-flight sexual assault victim Allison
Dvaladze stated, the aviation industry can and needs to do more.
The current lack of a reporting requirement for in-flight sexual
assault prevents effective investigations by law enforcement and
204 Admittedly, this is something the normal passenger is unlikely to think
about when choosing an airline; however, it could play a bigger role in the future
as in-flight sexual assaults become more publicized. See supra Part II.
205 Making Respect Real: Continued Work to Prevent and Address Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 111.
206 Id.
207 While specific numbers for the cost to Alaska Airlines are unavailable, the
cost of developing applications, such as the one Alaska Airlines employs, can
range from $40,000 (simple apps) to $100,000 (complex apps). Kim Smith, How
Much Does It Cost to Create an App?, GOODFIRMS, https://www.goodfirms.co/resources/mobile-app-development-cost [https://perma.cc/T6C6-ZDVU].
208 See Making Respect Real: Continued Work to Prevent and Address Sexual Misconduct, supra note 111.
209 See Aeronautics and Space, 14 C.F.R. §§ 1–1399 (2019) (consisting of all
current FAA regulations).
210 Dvaladze, supra note 201.
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impedes justice for victims while allowing airlines to conceal
crimes and escape liability.
The airline industry should follow the lead of the cruise ship
industry and impose a uniform, mandatory reporting requirement such as the CVSSA.211 While the CVSSA is not perfect and
a similar reporting requirement alone will not be a solution to
the issue of in-flight assault, the first step in finding solutions is
knowing there is a problem.212 A uniform, mandatory reporting
law would inform the public and the airlines that Congress takes
the safety of its traveling citizens seriously. It alerts airlines to the
fact that they will be held accountable for the care of their passengers, promoting safety and better responses to sexual assault.
House Bill 5139 is a necessary first step to establishing
mandatory reporting for airlines. House Bill 5139 should, and
likely will, be passed into law,213 but its vague wording and the
discretion it leaves to the airline industry poses a potential for
airlines to continue to avoid responsibility.214 Congress should
revise House Bill 5139 to make it specific and uniform. Further,
Congress should continue to support the Task Force, so that the
trend of recognizing and preventing sexual assault in all scenarios can be maintained.215
See 46 U.S.C. § 3507.
For more information on the CVSSA and some of its initial shortcomings,
see Peyroux, supra note 121, at 103–17.
213 See Brown & Gallagher, supra note 148, at 39–40 (noting how media attention was part of the basis for enacting CAPTA). If the trend of media attention on
abuse continues, House Bill 5139 likely will be passed. See supra Part II.
214 See Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139,
116th Cong. § 41727(b)(3) (1st Sess. 2019); see also Peyroux, supra note 121, at
117 (discussing vagueness as one shortcoming of the CVSSA).
215 DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 3–5 (describing composition and purpose of
the Task Force); see also Section III.C.1.
211
212

GROUNDED: HOW THE 737 MAX CRASHES HIGHLIGHT
ISSUES WITH FAA DELEGATION AND A POTENTIAL
REMEDY IN THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
DREW H. NUNN*

ABSTRACT
The over-delegation by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) of new aircraft design certification authority to the very
companies seeking such certification has led to a stunning lack
of oversight and bending to private economic interests. Congressional action must be taken to ensure that aircraft certification authority, if delegated to private entities, is not delegated to
any entities with ties to the companies seeking certification, and
FAA oversight must be tightened.
This Comment analyzes whether the Federal Tort Claims Act
could provide a potential avenue for plaintiffs to challenge the
FAA as it relates to its oversight and delegation to The Boeing
Company (Boeing). In the face of inaction from the FAA, Boeing, and Congress, the judiciary provides the best hope for holding the FAA accountable when it delegates authority to private
industry leaders like Boeing. It is likely well within the FAA’s
discretion to determine that the engineers at Boeing to whom
Boeing would assign to this task are qualified in their engineering capabilities. However, if the FAA knew that economic pressures and factors outside of plane safety were guiding Boeing
executives’ directions to its inspecting engineers, it may have
delegated its certification authority to unqualified individuals,
which it cannot do.

* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2021; B.S. Biochemistry,
Texas A&M University. I would like to thank my parents for their encouragement
and my wife, Miranda, for her constant love and support. Also, a special thanks to
my first-year legal writing professor, Heather Stobaugh, for teaching me how to
be a competent writer.

703

704

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. THE 737 MAX AND COMPETITION WITH AIRBUS .
B. THE LION AIR AND ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES
CRASHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. FALLOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. THE ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION AUTHORITY:
DELEGATION OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY TO
PRIVATE ENTITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. THE FTCA AND THE FAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. THE FTCA AS AN AVENUE TO FAA
ACCOUNTABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Delegation of the Certification Process to
Boeing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Improper FAA Oversight and Issuing the
Certificate—A Dead End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Is the Federal Tort Claims Act the Right Tool? .
B. AGENCY CAPTURE AND THE FAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.

T

704
705
705
707
708
709
709
711
714
716
717
718
722
726
727
730

INTRODUCTION

HE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S over-delegation of new aircraft
design certification authority to the very companies seeking
such certification has led to a stunning lack of oversight and
bending to private economic interests. Congressional action
must be taken to ensure that aircraft certification authority, if
delegated to private entities, is not delegated to any entities with
ties to the companies seeking certification, and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) oversight must be tightened.
This Comment begins by describing the background of the
Boeing 737 (737) aircraft and the recent 737 MAX accidents.
The serious consequences of those crashes are explored, and
the scope of the problem is put into perspective. The Comment
then explains the relevant historical background of the FAA and
the designation program, establishes the framework within
which recent issues faced by The Boeing Company (Boeing) reside, and discusses how the delegation program came to be and
how the FAA designates private parties as Organization Designa-
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tion Authority (ODA) holders (ODA Holders). Next, it analyzes
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and how the Supreme
Court has interpreted the discretionary function exception to
the FTCA.
This Comment then assesses whether the FTCA could provide
a potential avenue for plaintiffs to challenge the FAA’s over-delegation of certification authority to Boeing. While this route was
not historically open to plaintiffs, by delegating certain aspects
of the safety inspection process to Boeing and failing to maintain oversight, the FAA’s actions have moved outside the protection of the discretionary function exception, allowing suits
against the FAA by injured plaintiffs. This Comment concludes
by discussing why litigation is the best way to spur meaningful
reform.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE 737 MAX

AND

COMPETITION

WITH

AIRBUS

The Boeing 737 is one of the most widely recognizable passenger aircraft in the world. Since its first flight in 1967, the 737 has
undergone a series of enhancements, culminating most recently
with the 737 Next Generation (737NG) and the 737 MAX.1
These upgrades were designed to provide more fuel-efficient engines, updated avionics and cabins, and lower operating costs,
all while having enough in common with previous models that
pilots could easily switch back and forth between them.2 In
2006, Boeing began discussions to significantly upgrade or replace the 737NG with a new, more fuel efficient model.3 By
2010, Boeing still had not made a decision when one of its chief
rivals in the industry, Airbus SE (Airbus), announced the
A320neo, “a re-engined, more efficient version of its A320, the
main competitor to the 737.”4 These two industry titans have
been in competition for almost half a century, and many have
wondered whether the tradeoffs being made in the interest of
1 David Slotnick, The First Boeing 737 Max Crash was 2 Years Ago Today. Here’s the
Complete History of the Plane That’s Been Grounded Since 2 Crashes Killed 346 People 5
Months Apart, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://businessinsider.
com/boeing-737-max-timeline-history-full-details-2019-9 [perma.cc/9N6W8PKU].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. Neo stands for new engine option.
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competition were dangerous.5 In 2011, Boeing’s then-CEO
feared that American Airlines, one of Boeing’s exclusive customers, would switch to Airbus unless Boeing could convince them
otherwise.6 Boeing decided to upgrade the engines on the 737
and build a new plane, launching Boeing’s effort to circumvent
important regulatory hurdles.7 American Airlines wound up
purchasing from Airbus, but also ordered 100 next generation
737s from Boeing, and “[j]ust one month later, Boeing announced the 737 MAX family,” the newest iteration of the 737.8
A key selling point of the 737 MAX was its purported similarity
with older models, which would make it easier for pilots and
staff to adjust to without much additional training.9 Significantly, and likely most important to Boeing executives, this provided a faster route to certification than what would be
necessary for a brand new type of aircraft.10 One of the key differences in the new plane was that the engines were larger, further forward, and higher up than the previous version.11 This
upgrade could cause the nose of the plane to pitch slightly upward in some situations, leading engineers to implement automated software called Maneuvering Control Augmentation
System (MCAS), which would automatically push the nose down
so that the plane stays level.12 Though theoretically the pilots
could fly both the old and new planes, “Boeing did not include
training on MCAS in the pilots’ manual, reasoning that the
software would work in the background.”13 “MCAS was designed
to take effect when a single sensor showed that the ‘angle-of attack’ was high,” meaning the system would still respond if one of
the two sensors broke.14 Issues surrounding this system would
5 Peter Cohan, Did Airbus Rivalry Drive Dangerous Tradeoffs for Boeing’s 737
MAX?, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2019, 9:14 AM), https://forbes.com/sites/petercohan/
2019/03/28/did-airbus-rivalry-drive-dangerous-tradeoffs-for-boeings-737-max/
[perma.cc/BU8H-9JSV].
6 Slotnick, supra note 1.
7 Cohan, supra note 5; David Gelles, Natalie Kitroeff, Jack Nicas & Rebecca R.
Ruiz, Boeing Was ‘Go, Go, Go’ to Beat Airbus With The 737 Max, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2019), https://nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html
[perma.cc/N25Z-EHAJ].
8 Slotnick, supra note 1.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Cohan, supra note 5; Slotnick, supra note 1.
13 Slotnick, supra note 1.
14 Id.
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later prove catastrophic.15 In 2015, the first 737 MAX was released, with its first test flight in 2016.16 It gained certification
from the FAA in 2017.17 “By May 2018 . . . more than 130 [737
MAX] planes were in service with 28 different airlines around
the world.”18
B.

THE LION AIR

AND

ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES CRASHES

On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 took off from
Jakarta, Indonesia in the early hours of the morning.19 The
plane had given incorrect speed and altitude readings during a
previous flight but was kept in service.20 Immediately after takeoff, the pilots received stall warnings; their instruments were not
giving readings on key data, and it seemed the plane was automatically being forced into a downward pitch.21 Twelve minutes
later, the plane crashed into the sea, killing all 189 on board.22
Shortly after the investigation began, MCAS and the pilots’ response became a focus, and the FAA and Boeing said they
planned to issue an Airworthiness Directive on issues related to
the system.23
Less than five months later, a disturbingly similar scene
played out in Ethiopia, when an Ethiopian Airlines flight
crashed, killing everyone on board.24 Once again, pilots of a 737
MAX were unable to control the pitch of the aircraft, and MCAS
forced the nose down and crashed the plane.25 Shortly after the
crash, although it was clear MCAS played a role, investigators
were unsure how much fault lay with the pilots.26 However, a
year later, investigators determined that MCAS was entirely at
See infra Section II.B.
Slotnick, supra note 1.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Tucker Reals, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Crash; Preliminary Report Says Pilots
Followed Boeing’s Guidance, CBS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019, 12:53 PM), https://cbsnews.com/live-news/ethiopian-airlines-flight-302-crash-preliminary-report-todaylive-updates-04-04-2019/ [perma.cc/E7WY-KD7P].
25 Id.
26 Id.
15
16
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fault, shining an even more negative light on the aircraft itself
and on Boeing.27
Ethiopian Airlines grounded the rest of its 737 MAX fleet the
day of the crash.28 The rest of the world followed suit, and soon
the highly publicized global grounding of the plane was in full
force.29 However, the FAA was the last to do so.30 Boeing initially
thought it could get the software issue fixed and the planes back
up and running by the end of March 2019.31 But due to delays
with the software updates, the FAA only cleared the 737 MAX
aircraft to fly again in late 2020.32
C.

FALLOUT

The fallout from the crashes continues to grow, touching all
aspects of government (particularly the FAA), the airline industry, and Boeing. The FAA continued to scrutinize the plane following delays in a potential fix, which led to the entire
certification process coming under scrutiny.33 Boeing has had to
cut production of the 737 MAX, suffering significant losses.34
“[It] is in talks with banks to secure a loan of $10 billion or more
. . . as the company faces rising costs stemming from two fatal
crashes of its 737 MAX planes.”35 Recently, Boeing announced
that further delays are expected after the recent disclosure of a
software issue.36 These delays will continue to drive up costs as
customers seek compensation for undelivered planes.37 Airbus
has now surpassed Boeing as the world’s largest aircraft manu27 Simon Marks & Abdi Latif Dahir, Ethiopian Report on 737 Max Crash Blames
Boeing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://nytimes.com/2020/03/09/world/africa/ethiopia-crash-boeing.html [perma.cc/Z4GM-PSUR].
28 Slotnick, supra note 1.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Slotnick, supra note 1; American Airlines Plans to Return Boeing 737 Max to
Service at Year-End, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2020), https://reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max-american-airline/american-air-to-run-boeing-737-max-at-year-endbloomberg-news-idUSKBN27305O [perma.cc/A2KT-BLYR].
32 Niraj Chokshi, Boeing 737 Max Is Cleared by F.A.A. to Fly Again, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/business/boeing-737max-faa.html [perma.cc/WZR5-KJSC].
33 Slotnick, supra note 1.
34 Leslie Josephs, Boeing Is in Talks to Borrow $10 Billion or More as 737 Max Crisis
Wears On, CNBC (Jan. 20, 2020, 11:47 PM), https://cnbc.com/2020/01/20/737max-crisis-boeing-seeks-to-borrow-10-billion-or-more.html [perma.cc/99TUZWPN].
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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facturer, and Boeing’s credit rating has been placed under
review.38
Congress has gotten involved and launched investigations
into Boeing, the FAA, and the relationship between the two.
Dennis Muilenburg, former Boeing CEO, testified before Congress in October 2019 and was subject to intense questioning.39
In December 2019, Boeing fired Muilenburg for his handling of
the 737 MAX crises.40 During the congressional investigation,
FAA administrator Steve Dickson gave a shocking piece of testimony: “After the first crash, an internal FAA analysis showed a
high likelihood of future crashes, as many as 15 over the 30–40
year life of the jet. However, the FAA let the plane keep
flying.”41
The FAA commissioned the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), consisting of technical experts from the FAA, National Aeronautics & Space Administration, European Union
Aviation Safety Agency, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.42 The
review documented observations, findings, and a series of recommendations for actions that could be taken to help prevent
similar tragedies from occurring.43
III.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A.

BRIEF HISTORY

OF THE

FAA

In 1926, at the urging of aviation industry leaders, and in an
effort to help air travel reach its full commercial potential, the
Air Commerce Act was passed.44 Under this initial version of
what would later become the Federal Aviation Act, the Secretary
of Commerce was charged with “fostering air commerce, issuing
and enforcing air traffic rules, licensing pilots, certifying aircraft, establishing airways, and operating and maintaining aids
Id.
Slotnick, supra note 1.
40 Josephs, supra note 34.
41 Slotnick, supra note 1.
42 The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) – Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control
System, FLIGHT SAFETY FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://skybrary.aero/index.php/
The_Joint_Authorities_Technical_Review_(JATR)_-_Boeing_737_MAX_Flight_
Control_System [perma.cc/U3YF-9JCB].
43 Id.
44 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017, 4:42 PM),
https://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ [perma.cc/ZN5M-N7BR]; Air
Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
38
39
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to air navigation.”45 One of the first tasks of the new Bureau of
Air Commerce centered on air traffic control.46 But by the early
1930s, the Department of Commerce’s oversight responsibilities
were already being called into question following crashes that
killed a prominent football coach and a U.S. Senator.47 To ensure a focus on safety, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the
Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, establishing the Civil Aeronautics
Authority (CAA) to conduct investigations into aviation accidents and provide recommendations to prevent future accidents.48 Just before the United States’ entry into World War II,
the CAA took full control over air traffic control towers, making
air traffic control a permanent federal responsibility.49 However,
in 1956, a midair collision killed 128 people and highlighted the
need for even greater oversight and safety control of national
airspace.50
In 1958, the Federal Aviation Act was passed, transferring the
CAA function to the new independent Federal Aviation
Agency.51 Feeling a need for a coordinated transportation system among all modes of transportation, Congress authorized
the creation of the Department of Transportation in 1966 and
1967.52 The Federal Aviation Agency became known as the FAA,
and oversight of the FAA soon transitioned to the Department
of Transportation.53 However, the new agency was not just
tasked with safety, but also with fostering air commerce.54 As one
commenter has noted, “This additional imperative has had a
profound impact on the development of the FAA and its administrative functions over the past four decades.”55 Thus, from the
beginning, the FAA has had to balance airline safety against
commercial success in the airline industry—two positions that
will inevitably conflict from time to time.56 Concerns over this
A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 1131.
49 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
50 Id.
51 Id.; Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
52 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
53 Id.
54 Federal Aviation Act, pmbl.
55 Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (And Airplanes): The Federal Aviation
Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 381, 407 (2002).
56 Id.
45
46
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“dual mandate” led to statutory amendments removing the “promoting” language and focusing more on safety.57 Nonetheless,
“[o]ne salient apparent consequence of the FAA’s dual mandate
has been its extensive reliance on the private entities it
regulates.”58
B.

THE ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION AUTHORITY: DELEGATION
OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY TO PRIVATE ENTITIES

Part of the legislation directing the Secretary of Transportation to promote safety in the airline industry granted the Secretary the discretion to “prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations” governing aircraft inspection, including how the inspections would be accomplished.59 Congress, however, emphasized that air carriers themselves “retained certain
responsibilities to promote the public interest in air safety.”60
Congress established a certification process to monitor and control how the airline industry complied with the regulations.61 At
each step in this process, FAA employees inspect materials submitted by aircraft manufacturers for compliance, then issue the
appropriate certificate to allow the manufacturers to produce
and market their products.62
Step one in this process is known as type certification.63 This
involves obtaining FAA approval of the plane’s basic design.64
“By regulation, the FAA has made the applicant itself responsible for conducting all inspections and tests necessary to determine that the aircraft comports with FAA airworthiness
requirements.”65 During this process, a prototype of the new
Id. at 408.
Id. at 413.
59 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 804 (1984).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 805.
63 Id.; 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11–.55 (2020).
64 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805.
65 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.33, 21.35).
Each applicant must make all inspections and tests necessary to
determine
(1) Compliance with the applicable airworthiness, aircraft noise,
fuel venting, and exhaust emission requirements;
(2) That materials and products conform to the specifications in
the type design;
(3) That parts of the products conform to the drawings in the
type design; and
57
58
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plane is developed, and ground and flight tests are conducted.66
The FAA then reviews all the submitted data and, if it finds the
proposed design meets the minimum safety standards, it approves the design and issues a type certificate.67 However, production still cannot begin.68 Before production, a company must
obtain a production certificate allowing it to produce copies of
the prototype for commercial use.69 “To obtain a production
certificate, the manufacturer must prove to the FAA that it has
established and can maintain a quality control system to assure
that each aircraft will meet the design provision of the type certificate.”70 While this certificate allows the manufacturer to mass
produce the new aircraft, it still cannot be put into service.71
First, the FAA must grant an airworthiness certificate, essentially
assuring the particular plane is safe for flying.72
When an aircraft manufacturer like Boeing wants to upgrade
its planes and introduce a major change in its design, yet another certificate is required: a supplemental type certificate.73
If a person holds the [type certificate] for a product and alters
that product by introducing a major change in type design that
does not require an application for a new [type certificate] under
§ 21.19, that person must apply to the FAA either for an STC, or
to amend the original type certificate under subpart D of this
part.74

To obtain this supplemental type certificate, the altered aircraft
must meet its airworthiness requirements.75 Similar to the prior
steps, the applicant must conduct the required inspections and
tests to ensure its product complies with regulations.76 However,
this is no small task. The FAA has a limited number of engineers
(4) That the manufacturing processes, construction and assembly conform to those specified in the type design.
14 C.F.R. § 21.33(b).
66 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805–06.
67 Id. at 806.
68 Id.
69 Id.; 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.131–.150.
70 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 806.
71 Id.
72 Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 21.183.
73 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 806 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.113).
74 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.113).
75 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.115(a)).
76 Id.
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and employees.77 “[R]oughly 700 individuals are responsible for
ALL design approvals, production & continued airworthiness of
everything that flies and of that, maybe 400 are engineers.”78 In
contrast, private companies like Boeing employ thousands of
employees. “According to the Boeing website, it has over 45,000
engineers spread throughout the entire company. [With s]uch a
deep roster of talent, [Boeing] has incredibly deep and specific
expertise for new designs and to manage the safety and airworthiness of the nearly 14,000 Boeing airplanes flying today.”79
In response to the FAA’s limited resources, Congress has authorized the FAA to delegate some of its testing authority.80 The
FAA “may delegate to a qualified private person, or to an employee under the supervision of that person, a matter related to
(A) the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a
certificate under this chapter; and (B) issuing the certificate.”81
Based on this provision, the FAA created the ODA program to
delegate to private organizations its authority to inspect aircraft
designs and issue certificates.82 “An FAA Designation ‘allows an
organization to perform specified functions on behalf of the Administrator related to engineering, manufacturing, operations,
airworthiness, or maintenance.’ ”83 This ODA system is designed
to be a system of direct oversight.
Generally, to be considered as an ODA, an applicant must:
(1) Have sufficient facilities, resources, and personnel, to perform the functions for which authorization is requested;
(2) Have sufficient experience with FAA requirements,
processes, and procedures to perform the functions for
which authorization is requested; and
(3) Have sufficient, relevant experience to perform the functions for which authorization is requested.84

According to federal regulations:
The ODA Holder must—
77 Mike Borfitz, What FAA Delegation Does—How and Why?, AVIATION TECH.
SOLS.: BLOG (Jan. 2, 2020), https://jdasolutions.aero/blog/what-faa-delegationdoes-how-and-why/ [perma.cc/3QVB-QUGS].
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d)(1).
82 Riggs v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 939 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2019).
83 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 183.41(a) (2020)).
84 14 C.F.R. § 183.47.
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(a) Comply with the procedures contained in its approved
procedures manual;
(b) Give ODA Unit members sufficient authority to perform
the authorized functions;
(c) Ensure that no conflicting non-ODA Unit duties or other
interreference affects the performance of authorized functions by ODA Unit members;
(d) Cooperate with the [FAA] Administrator in his performance of oversight of the ODA Holder and the ODA Unit;
(e) Notify the [FAA] Administrator of any change that could
affect the ODA Holder’s ability to continue to meet the
requirements of this part within 48 hours of the change
occurring.85

Though its origins date back to the 1950s, the ODA program
itself began in 2005 and was not fully implemented until 2009.86
This system relies heavily on the integrity and transparency of
the ODA holder and strict, careful oversight by the FAA.
C.

THE FTCA

AND THE

FAA

In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act.87 The
FTCA authorizes suits against the United States for damages:
[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.88

However, there are exceptions; the FTCA does not waive federal
sovereign immunity in all respects.89 In particular, under the discretionary function exemption,90 the FTCA does not apply to
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such state or regulation be valid, or
Id. § 183.57.
Roncevert Ganan Almond, After the Max: Rebuilding U.S. Aviation Leadership,
60 VA. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 14 (2019).
87 David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291, 293
(1989).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
89 Fishback & Killefer, supra note 87, at 293.
90 Id. at 294.
85
86
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based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.91

The scope of the discretionary function exemption has been an
area of dispute since the passage of the FTCA.92 “On the one
hand, some saw the exception as standing for the simple proposition that the FTCA could not be used to review high-level
policy decisions. On the other hand, some saw the exception as
severely limiting what otherwise would have been a very broad
waiver of sovereign immunity.”93
The seminal case regarding interpretation of the exception
and the scope of the waiver is Dalehite v. United States.94 In that
negligence case, explosions destroyed much of Texas City,
Texas and killed hundreds of people.95 The cause of the explosions was fertilizer the government made and shipped to Europe
as post-war aid.96 The easily-ignitable fertilizer was packaged in
flammable paper containers with no hazard warning, leading to
large explosions during loading onto ships.97 The plaintiffs alleged negligence by the large body of officials and employees
involved in the program.98 Though the Supreme Court did not
determine where the line for discretion ends, it held that the
actions of the federal government—the decision to start the program and the actions taken in aid of the program—were not
actionable as they involved some measure of discretion.99 The
Court noted that “[w]here there is room for policy judgment
and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of
subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in
accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.”100
Critics of the decision noted its language was incredibly broad
and could potentially encompass almost everything “except the
most routine postal truck injury-type cases.”101
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).
Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 294–95.
98 Id. at 295.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35–36 (1953)).
101 Id. at 296.
91
92
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In United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), a 1984 case addressing FAA delegation, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its position and understanding
of the discretionary function exemption.102 The Varig Court
held that the discretionary function exemption barred the plaintiff’s FTCA suit challenging the FAA’s decision to delegate responsibility for compliance with FAA safety regulations to the
aircraft manufacturer and its means of monitoring compliance.103 “The Varig Court explained that Congress included the
discretionary function exception ‘to prevent judicial secondguessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
social, economic, and political policy through the medium of a
tort suit.’ ”104 The Court stressed that the exception not only protects discretionary acts of the government in its conduct regulating role but also protects its policy judgments.105 Later Supreme
Court decisions defined the outer limits of the discretionary
function exemption,106 stating that the exemption effectively
does not apply when a statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for a government employee to follow.107 It is within this legal framework that this Comment considers the FTCA as a potential remedy for plaintiffs wronged by
negligent government acts related to the Boeing 737 MAX
crashes.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The legal issues facing Boeing and the FAA are extensive and
are not fully explored in this Comment.108 These include lawsuits against Boeing by the families of the victims, claims for
compensation from airlines that have unfulfilled orders for the
737 MAX, and lawsuits by Boeing shareholders alleging fiduciary breaches.109 While these suits address ancillary problems,
102 Id. (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984)).
103 Id. at 298.
104 Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813–14).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 301.
107 Id. at 302 (citing Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
108 See Arthur I. Willner, Raymond L. Mariani & Emily K. Doty, Recent Developments in Aviation Law – 2019, 85 J. AIR L. & COM. 221, 250–58 (2020).
109 Sinéad Baker, Here Are All the Investigations and Lawsuits that Boeing and the
FAA are Facing After the 737 Max Crashes Killed Almost 350 People, BUS. INSIDER (June
24, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-crisis-list-lawsuits-investigations-faces-faa-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/KM4E-VS7E]; Tom Hals & Tracy
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they do not get to the heart of the issue—there are serious flaws
in the aircraft certification process that allowed the 737 MAX to
fly. These structural failures fall into a few specific categories,
each of which can be addressed through legislation or through
FTCA claims against the FAA. The JATR report took issue with
the FAA’s failures to: (1) designate flight-path-altering changes
as “significant” changes, which would have subjected the certification to stricter standards;110 (2) conduct whole aircraft inspection, determining how MCAS would interplay with other
systems;111 (3) delegate inspection duty to individuals or entities
with MCAS expertise;112 (4) immediately ground the 737
MAX;113 and (5) take steps to ensure the impartiality of delegated safety inspectors with compromising ties to Boeing.114 Two
primary issues include: (1) the meaning of “qualified private”
individuals under the statute authorizing the FAA to delegate its
safety inspection authority; and (2) whether the director of the
FAA has full discretion to determine who constitutes a qualified
private individual.
A.

THE FTCA

AS AN

AVENUE

TO

FAA ACCOUNTABILITY

Federal agencies such as the FAA are largely shielded from
lawsuits for negligence and other claims under the discretionary
function exemption of the FTCA.115 Under the exemption,
claims cannot be brought against government employees who,
while executing a duty prescribed by statute or regulation, perform a “discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or any employee of the government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.”116 Since Congress did not define
a “discretionary function,” the scope of this exemption has
Rucinski, Lawsuit Against Boeing Seeks to Hold Board Liable for 737 MAX Problems,
REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://reuters.com/article/us-boeing737max-lawsuit-board/lawsuit-against-boeing-seeks-to-hold-board-liable-for-737max-problems-idUSKBN1XS2I3 [perma.cc/M9T3-QB2Q]; Boeing Settles First Lawsuit With 737 Max Crash Families, DW (Sept. 25, 2019), https://dw.com/en/boeing-settles-first-lawsuit-with-737-max-crash-families/a-50587098 [perma.cc/5P4QYZNJ].
110 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., BOEING 737 MAX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM OBSERVATIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at I (2019).
111 Id. at 6.
112 Id. at 26.
113 Id. at 49.
114 Id. at 30.
115 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
116 Id.
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largely been borne out by judicial decisions. Courts use a generalized two-part test to determine if the exemption applies.117
First, the Court determines whether the action is discretionary,
involving “an element of judgment or choice” in the absence of
a law or policy that prescribes a course of action.”118 Second, if
the conduct is discretionary, the judgment must be “the kind
that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield”—those actions based on policy analysis.119
In the case of the 737 MAX certification process, there are
three areas where fault may be found and where the discretionary function exemption may apply: (1) the FAA’s delegation of
portions of the certification process to Boeing via the FAA’s
ODA program;120 (2) FAA oversight of the process by the FAA’s
Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO);121 and (3)
the issuance of the amended type certificate for the 737 MAX
with MCAS installed.122
1.

Delegation of the Certification Process to Boeing

While it is undisputed that the FAA is allowed to delegate certification authority to private parties and that the ODA program
as a whole is a discretionary function,123 it is worth questioning
whether delegating the MCAS certification process falls under
the FTCA exemption. In 1984, the Supreme Court faced a similar situation in the Varig Airlines case. Following an accident that
killed 124 people involving a Boeing 707 aircraft, plaintiffs tried
to file suit against the FAA alleging negligence in “failing to inspect certain elements of aircraft design” before issuing certification. Plaintiffs took specific issue with the “spot-check” FAA
review method and the application of that method to the aircraft involved in the case.124
The Supreme Court held the discretionary function exemption shielded the FAA because its decisions about how to conduct its compliance review are discretionary actions “of the most
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988).
Id.
119 Id.
120 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 26.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 9.
123 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 807 (1984).
124 Id. at 819.
117
118
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basic kind.”125 The FAA was within its statutory rights to consider
the resources it has available, decide how to delegate its certification authority, and determine how it would oversee the designee’s inspection process.126 The statute authorizes the FAA to
delegate to a qualified private person a matter related to issuing
certificates or examination and testing necessary to issue a certificate.127 Because the statute does not describe a specific course
of action to be taken by the FAA or designee in the certification
process, the Court ruled that such a decision was within the discretion of the FAA and the designee.128 While the Court was
correct that the statute’s language is broad and general, Congress set forth a qualification which constrains the delegation:
the designee must be a qualified private individual.129 It is not
within the discretion of the FAA to designate an unqualified individual to conduct inspections or certify the aircraft. Here,
there are serious concerns about the qualifications of those persons inspecting and certifying MCAS.130
Among other concerns, FAA engineers and Boeing employees
raised red flags about the lack of qualified engineers available to
review changes to the aircraft, including MCAS.131 In 2005, Congress (in response to industry lobbying efforts) allowed Boeing
to choose the engineers who would assist with the FAA’s review
and certification process.132 Some FAA engineers have commented that, over time, this change has led to an inability to
monitor what was happening at Boeing.133 During the 737
MAX’s development, two of the BASOO’s most prominent and
experienced engineers—who were responsible for flight control
systems including MCAS—resigned and were replaced by an engineer with “little experience in flight controls” and a new hire
fresh out of school.134 “People who worked with the two [new]
engineers said they seemed ill-equipped to identify any
Id. at 819–20.
Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
127 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 807; 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
128 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805.
129 See supra Section III.B.
130 Natalie Kitroeff, David Gelles & Jack Nicas, The Roots of Boeing’s 737 Max
Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes Its Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2019), https://nytimes.com/2019/07/27/business/boeing-737-max-faa.html [perma.cc/NF9HRD3F].
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
125
126
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problems in a complex system like MCAS.”135 Furthermore,
while the FAA originally retained certification authority over
MCAS’s addition, it later delegated that authority to Boeing.136
With so much authority being delegated to Boeing, it is important to determine whether those involved in the Boeing
ODA are qualified private people within the meaning of the statute. Federal regulations outlining the qualifications and duties
of ODAs are a good starting point to examine who counts as a
qualified private individual.137 To qualify, an applicant must
generally have sufficient facilities, resources, and experience to
conduct the duties that have been delegated to them—in this
case, certifying the changes made to the aircraft, including
MCAS.138 It is likely well within the FAA’s discretion to determine if the engineers that Boeing would assign to this task are
qualified in their engineering capabilities. However, it is the responsibility of the ODA Holder (Boeing) to “[e]nsure that no
conflicting non-ODA duties or other interference affects the
performance of authorized functions by ODA Unit members.”139 Accordingly, Boeing has a duty to ensure no undue
pressure or influence, such as a race to produce a plane before a
competitor, affects the diligence of engineers tasked with certifying the safety of the new systems. It stands to reason that Boeing’s inability to ensure it meets this responsibility could render
it unqualified to hold an ODA designation. Therefore, if the
FAA knew economic pressures and factors other than plane
safety guided Boeing’s directions to its inspecting engineers,
then the FAA delegated its certification authority to an unqualified individual, which it cannot do.140
There is evidence that, throughout the 737 MAX certification
process, Boeing placed profit-motivated pressures on its employees and the FAA. According to the JATR’s findings, “signs were
reported of undue pressures on Boeing ODA engineering unit
members . . . performing certification activities on the B737
MAX program, which further erodes the level of assurance in
this system of delegation.”141 According to a former Boeing engineer, the company “puts its 737 MAX engineers under immense
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id.
JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 26.
See 14 C.F.R. §§ 183.47, 183.57 (2020).
Id. § 183.47(a).
Id. § 183.57(c).
See 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
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pressure to lower production costs and to downplay new features to avoid scrutiny” by the FAA.142 The engineer said he saw
“a lack of sufficient resources to do the job in its entirety.”143
Given how intertwined Boeing’s officials are with the FAA, it is
possible that the FAA was at least aware of the possibility of undue pressure or influence being asserted on the engineers responsible for the certification.144 Given the evidence of undue
pressure and influence, the perceived inability of the Boeing engineers’ ability to complete their safety certification directives,
and the qualification requirements of ODA Holders, there is a
colorable argument that the FAA’s designation to Boeing of certification authority over MCAS was to an unqualified private individual, which is forbidden by the statute.145 This could
potentially bar the application of the discretionary function exemption and allow families of those killed in the crashes to
bring FTCA suits against the FAA.
If the first prong of the Berkovitz test is not met because authority was delegated to private individuals who were not qualified, there is no need to move on to the second prong—the
discretionary function exemption does not apply. However,
even if the second prong does not need to be satisfied, analysis
can still demonstrate the principle that courts strive not to second guess agency policy decisions.146 A growing body of evidence suggests the delegation in this case was not made on
policy grounds, but was instead intended to tilt the scales in Boeing’s race against Airbus.147 Permitted policy considerations arguably do not include the economic interests of a single
airplane manufacturer.

142 Alexandra Ma, A Former Boeing 737 Max Engineer Said He Was ‘Incredibly Pressurized’ to Keep Costs Down and Downplay New Features to Avoid FAA Scrutiny, BUS.
INSIDER (July 29, 2019, 5:24 AM), https://businessinsider.com/boeing-737-maxformer-engineer-pressure-costs-avoid-faa-scrutiny-2019-7 [perma.cc/8JLN-HF5A].
143 Id.
144 See Kitroeff et al., supra note 130.
145 See supra Section III.B.
146 Fishback & Killefer, supra note 87, at 302 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
147 Thomas Kaplan, After Boeing Crashes, Sharp Questions About Industry Regulating Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019). https://nytimes.com/2019/03/26/us/politics/boeing-faa.html [perma.cc/YM2X-7W89].
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Improper FAA Oversight and Issuing the Certificate—A Dead
End

The most glaring and well-publicized criticism of the 737
MAX crisis is that there is a significant lack of meaningful FAA
oversight over the Boeing ODA program and the 737 MAX certification process.148 Throughout the 737 MAX certification process, the FAA continually delegated more of its oversight
responsibility to Boeing.149 Members of the BASOO program in
charge of oversight complained they were underqualified and
unable to understand the significance of MCAS.150 “For example, during an initial project review, an FAA engineer failed to
detect that a manufacturer’s certification plan did not demonstrate compliance with specific aviation regulations governing
design and construction of aircraft flight controls.”151 However,
the FAA’s ODA oversight duties are even more generalized and
vague, requiring little more than merely overseeing the ODA in
unspecified terms.152 The FAA engineers had no explicit duty to
review MCAS themselves.153 It is likely within the discretionary
function exemption for the FAA to determine what oversight is
appropriate and who to place on any oversight committee regarding a specific certification, as the Varig Airlines case states.154
Beyond the Varig decision, other circuit courts have reinforced the point that oversight-based allegations of negligence
on the part of the FAA are barred by the discretionary function
exemption.155 In Alinsky v. United States, victims of an aircraft collision tried to sue the FAA under the FTCA, alleging, among
other things, that the agency was negligent in contracting out
and overseeing the training and appointing of aircraft controllers.156 Explaining that the discretionary function exemption
shielded the FAA, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Here, Congress authorized the FAA to enter into contracts, as
necessary, to carry out the functions of the FAA, and thus the
See, e.g., Almond, supra note 86, at 15.
Id.
150 Id. at 16.
151 Id. at 15.
152 See 49 U.S.C. § 44736(a)(1).
153 Id.
154 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 819–20 (1984).
155 Alinsky v. United States, 415 F.3d 639, 648 (7th Cir. 2005); Riggs v. Airbus
Helicopters, Inc., 939 F.3d 981, 992 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019).
156 Alinsky, 415 F.3d at 647.
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government did not violate a specific mandatory statute, regulation or policy in hiring Midwest to provide training and oversight
at Meigs. The plaintiffs also fail to identify any mandatory statute
or regulation dictating how the FAA must oversee private contractors or assure the contractor complies with federal regulations and the contract provisions. Where the plaintiffs’ claim is
premised on negligent oversight, such a showing is imperative.157

Since the FAA made the discretionary decision to contract out
the selection, training, and oversight of air traffic controllers in
the case, the FAA was not open to attack for oversight failures.158
The Alinksy decision is distinguishable from the case of the
737 MAX and may provide a means of attacking the FAA for its
failed oversight. Alinksy focused on the FAA’s decision to delegate to a third party authority to select and train air traffic controllers.159 But here, the FAA retained certain oversight
authority, which it vested in the BASOO.160
According to the JATR report, “[t]he BASOO is required to
perform a certification function, including making findings of
compliance of retained (non-delegated) requirements, while
also performing the oversight function of the Boeing ODA. The
BASOO must have the resources to carry out these two primary
functions without compromise.”161 Therefore, the FAA may not
have provided enough adequate, qualified individuals to administer its retained oversight over the 737 MAX certification. Some
of the engineers involved in the small oversight team were recent graduates and people unfamiliar with MCAS.162
The JATR report found that there were twenty-four engineers
on the BASOO team, and that the allocated staffing levels may
not have been sufficient to “carry out the work associated with
retained items and with the conduct of oversight duties.”163 This
critical understaffing could have played a part in some key oversights, including the failure to list the appropriate MCAS correction. Initially, Boeing determined and submitted to the FAA that
MCAS limited automated corrections in the airplane’s flight up
to 0.6 degrees.164 However, the final system design was submitId.
Id. at 648.
159 Id.
160 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at VII.
161 Id.
162 See Kitroeff et al., supra note 130.
163 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at VII.
164 Dominic Gates, Flawed Analysis, Failed Oversight: How Boeing, FAA Certified the
Suspect 737 MAX Flight Control System, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019), https://
157
158
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ted and reviewed with a 2.5-degree limitation instead of 0.6.165
Boeing decided such a change was insignificant, and so it was
never reviewed by FAA oversight engineers, who were unaware
of the change until after the crashes.166 Among other factors,
this was one of the key causes of the system failure.
Even if Boeing had disclosed this change to the FAA, it is unlikely the change would have been noticed or further examined
due to inadequate staffing at the FAA.167 Moreover, while the
FAA has discretion to decide how to conduct oversight over its
retained functions, that discretion is still bound by statutory limits.168 Thus, if the FAA had a legal duty to provide adequate and
qualified supervision of certain aspects of the certification, and
the team dedicated to doing so did not have the staff to accomplish it, it could be argued the FAA acted outside of its discretion in allocating its employees. At the same time, however, the
FAA’s decisions of how to allocate limited resources are exactly
the sort of circumstance that typically invites judicial
deference.169
Other circuit court decisions relating to the policy prong of
the FTCA’s discretionary function exemption indicate that, absent clear, specific statutory mandates, the FAA is likely within its
rights to consider a wide variety of policy decisions.170 For example, the Second Circuit has held that the government’s use of a
chemical agent was discretionary, as were its contracting decisions in performing field tests with that agent.171 Similarly, the
First and Ninth Circuits have held that, once a private contractor is delegated authority to perform some function, the government is not liable for the contractor’s failure to protect its
employees from dangers typically within the government’s purview.172 But that discretion is not without limits. A footnote in
the Berkovitz decision suggests a limitation to the exemption’s
seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missedsafety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ [perma.cc/
4LE2-GNMX].
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See Alinsky v. United States, 415 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2005).
169 See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 820 (1984).
170 Fishback & Killefer, supra note 87, at 298.
171 Id. at 308 (citing In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d
210, 215 (2d Cir. 1987)).
172 Id.
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scope.173 The Court noted that: “While the initial decision to
undertake and maintain lighthouse service was a discretionary
judgment . . . failure to maintain the lighthouse in good condition subjected the Government to suit under the FTCA [because] the latter course of conduct did not involve any
permissible exercise of policy judgment.”174
Here, it was within the FAA’s discretion to delegate some certification responsibility to Boeing and to retain some for itself.175
But once it has decided to retain certain oversight duties, it can
only exercise policy judgments that are permissible.176 Economic
considerations, FAA resources, and public safety are all valid,
permissible policy considerations that should not be subject to
judicial scrutiny.177 However, it is questionable whether the
FAA’s consideration of Boeing’s desire to meet deadlines and
compete with Airbus is a permissible consideration, and there is
evidence that those interests were considered when the FAA was
deciding who would conduct the oversight.178 “A former FAA
safety engineer who was directly involved in certifying the MAX
[8] said that halfway through the certification process, ‘we were
asked by management to re-evaluate what would be delegated.
Management thought we had retained too much at the
FAA.’ ”179 In a troubling episode, a senior Boeing engineer,
whose job was to act on behalf of the FAA in issuing certifications, pushed back against Boeing management’s demands for
less stringent testing of a feature by the new engineers.180 After
initially rejecting the engineer’s call for stricter safety testing so
that he could comply with FAA regulations, Boeing management eventually caved to his requests.181 But “[l]ess than a
month after his peers had backed him, Boeing abruptly removed him from the program even before conducting the testing he’d advocated.”182 This incident highlights a consistent
Id. at 303.
Id. (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538 n.3 (1988)).
175 Borfitz, supra note 77.
176 See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538 n.3.
177 See Fishback & Killefer, supra note 87, at 297.
178 Gates, supra note 164.
179 Id.
180 Dominic Gates & Mike Baker, Boeing Pressured FAA-Authorized Engineers on
Safety Issues, HERALDNET (May 6, 2019), https://heraldnet.com/nation-world/
boeing-pressured-faa-authorized-engineers-on-safety-testing/ [perma.cc/ET9PPRFQ].
181 Id.
182 Id.
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problem with the Boeing ODA program: “Many engineers, employed by Boeing while officially designated to be the FAA’s eyes
and ears, faced heavy pressure from Boeing managers to limit
safety analysis and testing so the company could meet its schedule and keep down costs.”183 Boeing’s costs and schedules are
not likely the type of policy considerations envisioned by the
Berkovitz Court.184 However, in the absence of strict, expressly
delineated statutory processes that the FAA is bound to follow in
designating oversight authority, this mode of attack is probably
weaker than one based on the qualified private person
grounds.185
3.

Is the Federal Tort Claims Act the Right Tool?

Even if it is possible to sue the FAA under the FTCA, a question remains regarding the likelihood that private FTCA suits
against the FAA would be effective in ensuring the FAA is not
beholden to private companies, like Boeing, and that the FAA
performs its duty of ensuring the safety of aircraft without undue private influence.186 It has been noted that the FTCA makes
it hard to sue the FAA for negligence and that it would be more
prudent to sue Boeing directly.187 As one aviation lawyer remarked, “At the start, middle and end, regardless of the role the
FAA played, Boeing, Boeing, and Boeing is responsible for the
safety of the airplane.”188 Some feel that the role of investigating
the nature of the relationship between the FAA and Boeing is a
task better left to the legislature.189 After all, victims who want to
be made whole can always sue Boeing, which has agreed to settlements of over $1 million for some crash victims.190 However,
if the FAA is susceptible to “capture,” or is already captured, lawsuits against one of the biggest companies in the industry may
help, but would not address the root of the problem. Thus, two
Id.
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538 n.3 (1988).
185 See id. at 547.
186 See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 804 (1984) (“In the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1), Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to promote the safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce.”) (emphasis added).
187 Christine Negroni, Why It’s Unlikely the FAA Will Be Sued for the 737 MAX,
POINTS GUY (Apr. 1, 2019), https://thepointsguy.com/news/why-its-unlikely-thefaa-will-be-sued-for-the-737-max/ [perma.cc/NU4S-9MXR].
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 See Boeing Settles First Lawsuit With 737 Max Crash Families, supra note 109.
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questions must be addressed; is the FAA “captured”, and if it is,
could lawsuits pursuant to the FTCA help?
B.

AGENCY CAPTURE

AND THE

FAA

Regulatory agencies, such as the FAA, face the Herculean task
of overseeing a technological domain that seems to constantly
increase in complexity. With limited resources and personnel,
agency cooperation with industry leaders, who often have vastly
superior resources and technical expertise, is an inescapable reality.191 But occasionally, the interests of the private parties subject to regulation become so intertwined with the agency that
they lead to undue control and domination of the agency’s regulatory authority. This phenomenon is referred to as agency
“capture” and has “been all but universally seen as a negative
consequence.”192 Agency capture occurs when a private company, through lobbying or otherwise, usurps the agency’s public
policy considerations in favor of the private company’s own selfish interests.193 “It has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges,
and even by some agency members, that the cooperative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of
agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor if these
interests.”194
The FAA is an agency that is widely considered “captured” by
the airline industry.195 This conclusion is supported by findings
of various investigations into the 737 MAX certification program. A New York Times report found that many top agency officials “shuffle[ ] between the government and the industry.”196
Boeing was treated more as a client than as a private party regulated by the FAA.197 Managers within the FAA’s oversight program over the Boeing ODA were reportedly pressured to make
sure Boeing met deadlines to deliver the 737 MAX to its customers.198 Problems encountered by Boeing engineers tasked with
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
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certification were not reported to disinterested FAA officials, but
to Boeing executives.199
Concerns about the impartiality of the FAA and fears of its
capture by the industry are not new or unique to the aviation
industry. The rise of the administrative state has naturally led to
an increased number of agencies, and thus increased concern
over agency capture.200 For the FAA in particular, a primary
source of concern stems from what has been referred to as the
FAA’s dual mandate—beyond just regulating airline safety, the
FAA is also tasked with fostering air commerce.201 “[Thus f]rom
its inception, the FAA was given the difficult task of balancing
two interests which might be frequently, if not inherently, in
conflict: the protection of airline safety on one hand, and the
‘fostering’ of successful air commerce, and consequently, the
promotion of airline profitability, on the other.”202
While that language was removed in subsequent amendments
to the statute, the influence of the dual mandate remains.203
While other industries do rely on “audited self-regulation” by
private companies, the FAA is particularly susceptible to “hyperinfluence” by regulated parties since it “relies almost exclusively
on self-regulation.”204 Given that concerns about the influence
of the aviation industry on the FAA stretch back over forty years
and that the prevalence of companies like Boeing in the FAA
certification process has only increased in that time,205 it seems
that the legislature and the agency itself may not be capable of
crafting solutions to the problem. A critical examination of
some of the proposed changes and findings by the JATR reveals
why FTCA suits are a necessary aspect of FAA reform.
In its report on the FAA’s delegation of certification authority
to Boeing, the JATR panel concluded that “in the [737] MAX
program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of MCAS function
which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in the inability of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the adequacy of the Boeing proposed certification activities associated
with MCAS.”206 This statement alone is rather shocking. The fact
199
200
201
202
203
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205
206
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that the FAA was willing to certify the 737 MAX even though it
could not determine the adequacy of Boeing’s certification activites indicates a disturbing level of incompetence or industry
influence—or both—within the FAA. To remedy this, the panel
issued Recommendation R5, “that the FAA conduct a workforce
review of the BASOO engineer staffing level to ensure there is a
sufficient number of experienced specialists to adequately perform certification and oversight duties, commensurate with the
extent of work being performed by Boeing.”207 However, given
the Court’s broad understanding of the discretionary function
exemption, the FAA could likely meet this duty by simply stating
that current staffing levels are adequate—it would be acting
within its discretion in making that determination. Even if the
statue were amended to require “adequate” staffing, it would
still be up to the FAA (and by extension, Boeing) to determine
what that means.
The JATR also recommended that “[t]he FAA should review
the Boeing ODA work environment and ODA manual to ensure
the Boeing ODA engineering unit members are working without any undue pressure when they are making decisions on behalf of the FAA.”208 This would amount to having FAA officials
connected with Boeing determine whether Boeing is exerting
undue pressure on the engineers, and given the broad scope of
the discretionary function exemption, Boeing officials delegated
authority would have the discretion to conclude the engineers
operate free of undue pressure. Other JATR recommendations
involve requiring “holistic, integrated aircraft-level approach[es]” to certification209—that ODA engineers consider
how adding critical technological systems like MCAS might effect other processes of the aircraft.210 These recommendations
seem so obvious that it is hard to believe they have not been
considered by the FAA, fortifying contentions that the agency is
subject to industry control, which will only be loosened by bringing FTCA claims against it.
For a captured agency like the FAA, there is very little standing in the way of allowing the industry to apply undue pressure
absent judicial intervention. The lobbying groups behind the
airline industry are considered some of the most powerful and
207
208
209
210
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effective in the United States. The FAA is largely run by people
with significant connections to the major airlines, and who seem
to side increasingly with the industry on issues.211 Unfortunately,
the only catalyst for any semblance of change in the FAA tends
to be the public outcry following devastating accidents that cost
hundreds of lives.212 But these incidents are few and far between
and changes are typically not implemented once the outrage
subsides. For example, in response to a catastrophic crash of an
airplane off the coast of Long Island in the late 1990s, the “FAA
implemented several heightened safety measures and organized
a White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.”213
This commission, among other things, proposed thirty-one recommendations for tightening airport security, especially in the
face of terrorism.214 But those procedures were not seriously implemented by the FAA until after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack.215 Most observers agreed that “had those
recommendations been implemented within the spirit and intent of the commission, the plans to attack on September 11
might have been detected well before they occurred.”216 Allowing FTCA suits to proceed against the FAA for acts outside
the scope of the discretionary function exemption would place
the FAA on notice that it should conduct its duties in accordance with one of its primary purposes—to promote safety.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of congressional action amending legislation
to implement oversight requirements and limits on delegation,
the FAA might not curb its own excesses. A slew of small, but
specific amendments could go some way to creating meaningful
change.
First, the statute should require that an impartial FAA engineer have a non-delegable duty to conduct a cursory examination of a proposed change and make the initial determination
of whether it is considered significant or minor. In the case of
the 737 MAX, the JATR concluded that it was Boeing engineers,
likely under pressure from Boeing management, who made the
determination that a change in MCAS that increased the ability
211
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of the system to change the pitch of the aircraft was not significant and did not need further FAA review.217 Had the FAA oversight engineers seen the change, they could have caught the
mistakes that caused the accidents.218
Along those lines, the statute should mandate that any automated system that can alter the flight path of an aircraft without
input from the pilot is, by definition, a significant change that
needs to be reviewed independently by FAA engineers. Given
the stakes involved, it makes no sense that a change which can
alter the flight of the aircraft without input could be seen as
anything other than significant. Finally, amending the statute to
require the FAA to retain authority to appoint specific Boeing
engineers who will participate in the ODA program, rather than
delegating that duty to Boeing, is another solution to part of the
problem.
But in the face of Congress’ inaction, the judicial system provides hope of holding the FAA accountable when delegating authority to private industry leaders like Boeing.
217
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